Hyperpresidentialism: How American Power Is Concentrating in One Office

A sweeping new analysis of executive power argues that the United States has entered an era the author calls hyperpresidentialism, a condition in which the chief executive does not merely lead the political system but increasingly dominates it. Writing in the journal Global Public Policy and Governance, B. Guy Peters of the University of Pittsburgh traces how democratic systems, whether formally presidential or parliamentary, have become progressively presidentialized, with politics and governance alike orienting around a single dominant figure. The study contends that this tendency has intensified since political scientists Thomas Poguntke and Robert Webb first systematically identified presidentialization in 2005, and that in some systems it has now advanced so far that a new, stronger label is required. Peters uses the second Trump administration as a clear contemporary illustration of the phenomenon.

The analytical core of the paper rests on distinguishing ordinary presidential leadership from hyperpresidentialism. In conventional accounts of separation-of-powers government, the president shares authority with an independent legislature and judiciary, and the bureaucracy retains at least residual professional autonomy. Hyperpresidentialism, by contrast, describes a configuration in which those countervailing institutions are weakened, bypassed, or subordinated, leaving the executive as the effective center of political life. Peters draws explicitly on earlier comparative work, including scholarship by Rose-Ackerman and colleagues on Argentina and the Philippines, where separation of powers formally persists but checks and balances function weakly in practice. The American case, he suggests, has moved toward that pattern.

One technical pillar of the argument concerns the politicization of the administrative state. Peters documents how successive administrations have expanded mechanisms for installing political loyalists throughout the bureaucracy, a strategy with an intellectual lineage running from Richard Nathan’s early work on the administrative presidency through contemporary comparative research on politicization in ministerial bureaucracies. In the current American context, this has involved the rapid movement of personnel through the Executive Office of the President, which the paper notes houses a large and shifting staff whose precise numbers fluctuate with the fluidity of assigned tasks. The effect, Peters argues, is to convert career civil servants from sources of independent expertise into instruments of executive will, hollowing out the neutral competence that once buffered policy from personal power.

The article does not treat personnel control as politically neutral administration. It catalogs appointments in which, in the author’s judgment, loyalty outweighed relevant expertise, citing the Secretary of Education, a former professional wrestling executive, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services as the most prominent examples. The paper also recalls the cautionary precedent of Michael Brown, appointed to lead the Federal Emergency Management Agency despite a background promoting Arabian horses, whose agency failed spectacularly in responding to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Such cases, Peters argues, illustrate a structural hazard of hyperpresidentialism: when appointments become instruments of personal patronage, the technical capacity of government to manage complex crises degrades in measurable ways.

A second technical dimension involves the legislature. Peters analyzes how congressional control over public finance, long regarded as the cornerstone of legislative power, has eroded. He points to the fiftieth anniversary of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, the 1974 statute designed to restore congressional primacy over budgeting after presidential impoundments, and argues that the law’s machinery now faces what he describes as a mid-life crisis. Contemporary presidents, on this account, test the boundaries of impoundment authority and exploit procedural gridlock to shift fiscal initiative back to the White House. Combined with disciplined party pressure on legislators, exemplified by reporting on House Republicans’ eagerness to accommodate powerful figures in the administration’s orbit, Congress appears increasingly reactive rather than initiating.

The judiciary and the justice system form a third front. Peters notes reporting that an elite unit within the Department of Justice has experienced mass turnover even after the administration prevailed in Supreme Court litigation, suggesting that legal victory has not translated into institutional stability but rather into continued personnel churn and centralization of control. The doctrine of the unitary executive, which holds that all executive authority must be subject to presidential direction, receives extended comparative treatment, with scholarship situating the American version alongside global trends toward executive aggrandizement. Peters frames this doctrinal confidence as the legal architecture of hyperpresidentialism: each assertion of hierarchical control is defended as constitutional necessity, cumulatively converting a system of separated institutions into one of administrative command.

Communication strategy occupies a distinctive place in the analysis. The paper observes that President Trump created his own social media platform, Truth Social, explicitly to guarantee control of at least one direct channel to the public, a move Peters reads as emblematic of the hyperpresidential style. Earlier scholarship on authoritarian populism and the mass society, from Kornhauser onward, supplies theoretical context: personalized communication bypasses intermediating institutions such as parties and press, cultivating a direct affective bond between leader and mass audience. Peters links this to the broader personalization of politics documented across Anglo-American democracies, arguing that declining party membership and weakening institutional loyalty, trends visible since comparative party research in the early 2000s, create fertile ground for leaders who claim to embody the nation rather than represent a coalition.

Crucially, Peters insists that the United States is an intensified case of an international pattern rather than an isolated aberration. He surveys evidence of presidentialization in parliamentary democracies, where prime ministers have accumulated staff, media strategies, and personal mandates historically associated with presidents, citing new comparative work on the rising political craft of chiefs of staff in Westminster systems. The French Fifth Republic has even produced the label hyper-presidency in analyses of Nicolas Sarkozy’s activist style. Research on democratic backsliding and executive aggrandizement by scholars such as Bermeo and Laebens provides the conceptual vocabulary: hyperpresidentialism, in Peters’s framework, is the terminal stage of a continuum that begins with personalization and ends with the chief executive dominating political life even where formal democratic institutions survive.

The paper also situates the American trajectory in a longer historical arc. Peters traces precedents through the managerial and administrative presidencies of prior decades, the extraordinary assertions of executive authority under George W. Bush, and the systematic expansion of presidential power during the Cheney vice presidency, which recent reporting argues paved the way for the current administration to go further. International relations scholarship on neo-royalism connects the domestic consolidation of executive authority to an emerging global order in which personalist leadership is increasingly normalized. Against this backdrop, the second Trump administration appears not as a rupture with American tradition but as the culmination of cumulative institutional changes, with Project 2025 cited as a blueprint for reshaping the administrative apparatus along lines favorable to concentrated control.

The normative stakes are explicit. Peters argues that hyperpresidentialism threatens the epistemic and institutional foundations of democratic governance: politicized bureaucracies lose the capacity to speak truth to power, weakened legislatures cannot constrain fiscal or military action, and personalized communication dissolves the shared factual ground on which accountability depends. Recent scholarship on the guardian state, which asks how public services can be strengthened against backsliding, reflects growing concern among public administration researchers about these dynamics. Peters’s contribution is to name the endpoint clearly and to supply comparative evidence that it is reachable within an old constitutional democracy. Whether the United States remains an exceptional warning or becomes a template, the paper concludes, will depend on whether the countervailing institutions of the American system recover the capacity and will to check an executive that increasingly treats them as obstacles rather than partners.

Subject of Research: Hyperpresidentialism and the centralization of executive power in American government

Article Title: Increased centralization of power in American government: hyperpresidentialism

Article References: Peters, B. G. (2026). Increased centralization of power in American government: hyperpresidentialism. Global Public Policy and Governance. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-026-00144-0

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43508-026-00144-0

Keywords: hyperpresidentialism, executive power, American government, Trump administration, politicization, democratic backsliding, checks and balances, unitary executive, presidentialization, bureaucracy, Congress, personalization of politics