Oil Consumption Data Reveal the Global Energy Transition Is Working—Unevenly

Is the world’s much-debated energy transition actually bending the curve on oil consumption? A new analysis published in Frontiers in Sustainable Energy Policy offers one of the most systematic answers yet, and its conclusion is quietly striking: yes, the transition has had a measurable, positive effect on reducing global oil use—but the effects are deeply uneven, geographically shifting, and vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. The study, led by Yue Wang and colleagues at the Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences, tracks oil consumption across 78 major oil-consuming countries and regions from 2008 to 2023, combining spatial analysis with factor decomposition to reveal where oil demand is growing, where it is shrinking, and why.

The stakes of this question are enormous. Oil remains the second-largest source of carbon emissions from the energy sector, responsible for 11.3 gigatonnes of CO2 in 2023—roughly 30 percent of energy-related emissions, second only to coal. Reducing oil dependence is therefore central to any credible pathway toward the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals. Yet the transition itself is under strain: researchers have grown increasingly skeptical about the feasibility of limiting warming to 1.5°C, regional conflicts have disrupted global climate cooperation, and recent policy reversals—including the United Kingdom and European Union reconsidering their 2035 bans on new gasoline-powered cars, and the United States withdrawing from the Paris Agreement while prioritizing fossil fuel production—have created what the authors describe as a crisis of confidence in the entire transition project.

To cut through the noise, the research team deployed an integrated analytical framework combining three complementary methods. The center of gravity method traced the geographic midpoint of global oil consumption over time, revealing where demand is physically concentrating. Shapley decomposition, a technique borrowed from cooperative game theory, quantified each region’s marginal contribution to those spatial shifts. And Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) decomposition disentangled the four key drivers of oil consumption change: economic development, population growth, energy structure (the share of oil in primary energy), and energy intensity (energy used per unit of economic output). Together, these tools move the analysis from where oil demand is moving, to who is driving that movement, to what underlying forces are at work.

The spatial results tell a story of gradual but unmistakable rebalancing. Between 2008 and 2011, the global oil consumption gravity center shifted eastward from 18.44°E to 22.53°E, driven primarily by rapidly rising demand in developing Asian countries alongside declining consumption in parts of North America. From 2012 to 2015, the eastward drift slowed, with a notable inflection in 2014 followed by a directional reversal in 2015—likely triggered by the sharp collapse in international oil prices in the second half of 2014, which stimulated consumption and reshuffled regional demand patterns. Between 2016 and 2019, the center resumed its eastward march, pushed overwhelmingly by the Asia Pacific region and China in particular. Then, from 2020 to 2023, something unexpected happened: the gravity center moved westward for the first time in the study period, from 31.37°E to 30.64°E, with South America—Brazil in particular—playing the most significant driving role.

That westward shift in the most recent period is not merely a statistical curiosity. The authors interpret it as evidence that structural transformations in major economies—policies, technologies, and consumption patterns—are progressively weakening the traditional engines of oil demand. China, the United States, and Europe, which historically pulled the center of gravity eastward through their own demand growth, now exert limited influence on directional change. Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and post-pandemic recovery complicated the picture, temporarily boosting oil demand in the US and Europe. But the underlying signal is clear: the geography of oil consumption is being reconfigured, with demand shifting toward developing regions even as developed economies begin to structurally reduce their own use.

The decomposition analysis reveals which forces are winning and losing. Economic development remains the dominant driver of global oil consumption growth across all four periods, but its influence grew more slowly between 2016 and 2019 than in earlier years—suggesting a reduced dependence of economic growth on oil. Energy structure, meaning the share of oil in the primary energy mix, acted as a restraining factor in most periods, as renewables and natural gas expanded their share. Energy intensity improvements consistently suppressed oil demand, though their effectiveness weakened after 2016, particularly in the Asia Pacific. Population growth, meanwhile, contributed steadily to rising demand throughout, though its effect declined in the most recent period. The critical finding: the energy transition has promoted a relative decoupling of oil consumption from economic development and population growth, accelerated adjustments in the energy mix, and improved energy efficiency—though regional differences remain substantial.

Country-level analysis sharpens the picture further. Saudi Arabia, under its Vision 2030 initiative launched in 2016, diversified its economy away from oil, expanded natural gas production, and saw its non-oil GDP grow by 27.3 percent between 2016 and 2023, with oil’s share in primary energy falling from 66.85 percent to 62.48 percent by 2019. The US experienced a complex trajectory shaped by the shale revolution, the 2014 oil price collapse, the America First Energy Plan, and rising electric vehicle adoption—EV stock grew 55.15 percent between 2016 and 2019—though the Russia-Ukraine conflict later boosted US oil exports to Europe. The EU saw its EV stock surge 208.27 percent over the same period, yet the 2022 gas crisis pushed oil’s share in primary energy up to 36.58 percent by 2023. China, the world’s largest oil consumer, saw continued demand growth driven overwhelmingly by industrial expansion, though its 13th Five-Year Plan and rapid EV deployment slowed transport-sector oil consumption to near-flat levels between 2015 and 2022. India, meanwhile, sustained rising oil demand through manufacturing growth under the Make in India initiative and a surge in discounted Russian oil imports—up 714.84 percent in 2022 alone.

Perhaps the most nuanced contribution of the study is its treatment of oil substitution pathways. The authors emphasize that declining oil use does not automatically translate into proportional emissions reductions, because the climate benefit of replacing oil with electricity depends entirely on the carbon intensity of the power grid. Norway, with its overwhelmingly hydroelectric electricity supply, achieves strong emissions benefits from transport electrification. The US combines renewable growth with coal-to-gas switching. China’s EV boom is real but its power mix still includes substantial thermal generation, meaning the full climate dividend remains contingent on further grid decarbonization. India’s EV adoption remains limited by infrastructure gaps and weak policy support. Saudi Arabia’s oil reduction comes primarily from substituting liquid fuels with natural gas in power generation rather than end-use electrification. The lesson: oil substitution is real and accelerating, but its emissions potential has not yet been fully realized.

The study concludes with targeted policy recommendations organized by transition capacity. Oil-producing countries should accelerate the replacement of oil-fired power with natural gas in the short term while expanding renewables over the medium to long term, supported by clear renewable targets, fiscal incentives, and grid modernization. Countries with strong transition capacity—China, the US, and EU member states—should deepen electrification across transport, industry, and buildings while ensuring the electricity supply is increasingly low-carbon, and should also expand climate finance and technology transfer to developing economies. Countries with limited transition capacity, such as India, should prioritize removing structural barriers to clean energy adoption through infrastructure investment, institutional support, and international cooperation. The overarching message is one of cautious optimism: the energy transition is demonstrably working to reduce oil consumption in structural terms, but its momentum now depends on sustained political commitment, continued power-sector decarbonization, and a far more inclusive global effort that reaches the countries where oil demand is still growing fastest.

Subject of Research: Effectiveness of the global energy transition in reducing oil consumption

Article Title: Has the global energy transition been effective? Evidence from oil consumption

Article References: Wang, Y., Liu, G., Wei, J., Zhang, Y., Wang, G., & Zhang, H. (2026). Has the global energy transition been effective? Evidence from oil consumption. Frontiers in Sustainable Energy Policy, 5, Article 1818166. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsuep.2026.1818166

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/fsuep.2026.1818166

Keywords: energy transition, oil consumption, decarbonization, electric vehicles, LMDI decomposition, center of gravity method, Shapley decomposition, energy policy, Saudi Vision 2030, power sector, climate change, geopolitics