A theoretical study published in the Asian Review of Political Economy demonstrates that the international transfer of collective skill formation systems cannot succeed through direct institutional borrowing or broad classifications of political economies alone. Investigating why national adaptations of the German Dual System produce widely divergent outcomes across the world, researchers Kenan Hai and Tianjiao He established that successful transplantation is neither automatic nor guaranteed simply because a host nation operates a coordinated market economy. Instead, systemic viability depends on a rigorous multi-stage convergence between two independent dimensions: the strategic alignment, capacity, and willingness of a domestic actor coalition, and the structural compatibility of the host country’s institutional environment and historical legacies. By disaggregating these dynamics through a deductive typological framework, the research reveals why institutional transfer frequently results in hybridization, severe operational friction, or total collapse when structural prerequisites and coalition politics are overlooked.
Governments worldwide face pressing structural demands to rapidly upgrade the competencies of their domestic labor forces to protect industrial productivity, foster manufacturing innovation, and maintain competitiveness in an increasingly intricate international marketplace. In this context, the German Dual System of vocational education and training has long served as a prominent international reference point for policymakers seeking human capital reform. The regime is fundamentally characterized by two core operational principles: the concurrent acquisition of theoretical knowledge in public vocational schools alongside applied practical training inside private commercial enterprises, supported by an integrated governance framework that systematically blends public regulatory mandates with private commercial incentives. Economically, this structure functions as an institutionalized risk-sharing contract between the state, private employers, and organized labor, wherein each party shares investments, mitigates poaching hazards, and reaps reciprocal returns from a highly qualified, stable, and adaptable workforce.
Despite its international prestige as a policy blueprint, cross-border transplantation of the German model has produced strikingly heterogeneous results across advanced and emerging economies. Rather than replicating the workplace-centric dual regime, nations such as Japan and Sweden developed alternative functional analogues that rely respectively on firm-led or school-led mechanisms, differing fundamentally from the German prototype in financing structures, stakeholder authority, and regulatory governance. Other nations, such as France, encountered persistent systemic contradictions within dual training initiatives, resulting in chronic deficits of employer engagement and qualification relevance. In emerging industrial economies like China, policy initiatives have successfully addressed short-term localized shortages of technical production skills in specific sectors, yet they continue to struggle with unresolved distributive tensions, failing to institutionalize the broad-based, high-standard occupational pathways envisioned by the original framework. Even within advanced liberal market economies such as the United Kingdom, repeated apprenticeship reforms grapple with high costs, uncertain perceived returns, and high worker turnover that systematically erode employer participation.
These widespread empirical disparities present a profound theoretical challenge to established comparative political economy, particularly the conventional Varieties of Capitalism framework articulated by Peter Hall and David Soskice. While the Varieties of Capitalism paradigm posits that collective, firm-embedded skill formation regimes are naturally complementary components of Coordinated Market Economies, this structural equilibrium perspective fails to explain why coordinated nations like Sweden explicitly rejected workplace-centric apprenticeship systems in favor of comprehensive school-based models. Furthermore, it cannot account for the chronic friction, partial hybridization, or total failure observed when collective training mechanisms are introduced into economies that share cooperative coordination features. Hai and He argue that this theoretical blind spot stems from relying on static institutional categories, which overlook the dynamic, highly contested political negotiations through which domestic coalitions contest, reshape, or reject imported institutional models across national boundaries.
To establish the causal mechanisms that govern institutional transplantation, the authors synthesized three distinct theoretical traditions into an integrated analytical framework: Actor-Network Theory, Institutional Complementarity Theory, and Historical Institutionalism. Actor-Network Theory approaches public and private entities not as monolithic, predetermined actors, but as relational actants whose identities, strategic interests, and authoritative power are continually assembled and renegotiated within socio-technical networks. From this perspective, state agencies, business enterprises, trade unions, and employer associations cooperate on skill development as a strategic response to perceived external pressures, including technological transformations and changing global market demands. Simultaneously, Institutional Complementarity Theory highlights how the stability of vocational arrangements depends upon functional alignment with adjacent political-economic pillars, specifically corporate finance structures, industrial relations, and welfare state institutions. Finally, Historical Institutionalism introduces the dimension of path dependence, demonstrating how established cognitive norms, legal architectures, and vested professional interests inherited from past institutional pathways actively shape and resist incoming structural reforms.
Within this synthesized model, the process of collective skill formation system transplantation is conceptualized as a sequential, phased progression rather than a sudden structural replacement. In the initial phase, the framework determines whether relevant domestic actors possess sufficient authoritative capacity and deliberate political willingness to initiate and sustain the institutional transfer. Only when these foundational agential prerequisites are satisfied does the process advance to the second stage, where analytical focus shifts to evaluating institutional compatibility, determining whether the incoming model aligns with adjacent domestic systems. If structural compatibility and mutual reinforcement exist, the reform enters the third stage of deep fusion, wherein the transferred system interacts with entrenched historical institutions. If the historical landscape cannot accommodate the incoming model or if agency is missing, the transplantation remains temporary, unstable, or entirely unrealized.
Operationalizing these insights, the study employs a typological methodology to classify transplantation outcomes into a two-by-two matrix defined by two generative variables: Actor Capacity and Willingness, and Institutional and Historical Compatibility. The agential variable assesses whether leading domestic stakeholders—most critically the central state, prominent commercial firms, and intermediary associations—possess the material, bureaucratic, and legislative resources, alongside sustained political commitment, to champion the reform. The structural variable assesses the presence of supporting institutional complementarities alongside the absence of deeply entrenched, competitive historical legacies that lock in alternative developmental trajectories. By dichotomizing both generative axes into Strong or High versus Weak or Low configurations, the authors delineate four distinct ideal types of institutional transplantation: Type I High-Success, Type II Actor-Constrained Low-Success, Type III Institution-Constrained Low-Success, and Type IV Theoretical Failure.
Type I scenarios represent the most favorable institutional configuration, occurring when an empowered, cohesive actor coalition operates within a structurally receptive and historically compatible domestic environment. In these settings, political leadership demonstrates sustained executive commitment to coordinated industrial policy, while a capable state bureaucracy possesses adequate fiscal capacity to fund public vocational schools and offer credible economic incentives to training firms. Large enterprises in technologically sophisticated sectors invest heavily in apprenticeships because they perceive competitive advantages in productivity and specialized innovation, while encompassing employer associations enforce industry-wide training standards to eliminate free-riding. Simultaneously, autonomous trade unions participate in tripartite governance, securing transferable occupational standards and equitable apprentice wages. Historical examples reflecting these elements include Germany’s post-war consolidation, early adoptions in Austria and Switzerland, and contemporary Swiss frameworks where enterprises, industry associations, and schools jointly oversee curricula, alongside complementary arrangements in Australia where public providers anchor training while private institutions collaborate with enterprises.
Conversely, Type II cases capture actor-constrained low-success outcomes, where the domestic institutional terrain possesses latent complementarities or moderate historical legacies, but the transplantation stalls because the necessary coalition of empowered actors fails to cohere. Governing political parties in this quadrant may adhere to market-oriented ideologies skeptical of state coordination, or depend on political constituencies indifferent to collective investments in intermediate labor skills. State administrative organs are often fragmented, underfunded, or prone to imposing top-down mandates rather than cultivating cooperative social partnerships. The broader commercial landscape is frequently dominated by resource-constrained small and medium-sized enterprises with short-term operational horizons, or large firms operating in sectors characterized by low skill specificity. Under these conditions, illustrated by recurring apprenticeship struggles in the United Kingdom, high initial training costs, limited perceived economic returns, and high labor mobility undermine employer willingness to invest, leaving the system functionally hollow.
Type III scenarios depict institution-constrained low-success trajectories, wherein a motivated, highly capable coalition of government officials, state agencies, and forward-looking business leaders is persistently thwarted by deeply rooted institutional mismatches and entrenched historical pathways. Even when political will is substantial and fiscal backing is secure, the incoming collective system encounters friction with adjacent structures, such as academically segregated schooling regimes, enterprise-level collective bargaining arrangements, or short-termist financial markets that penalize patient capital expenditure. Crucially, the host country often possesses an established, historically legitimized alternative pathway—such as a centralized, state-managed vocational school apparatus or an informal craft network—that commands strong societal loyalty from parents, students, and educators. This dynamic, historically documented during earlier institutional crises in Austria and observable in Denmark’s continuous structural negotiations between strong apprenticeship traditions and school-based programs, transforms foreign vocational imports into disruptive interventions that trigger path-dependent resistance.
At the theoretical extreme, Type IV represents absolute failure, occurring when an absent or disunited actor coalition converges with a profoundly incompatible or fragile institutional setting. The authors clarify that this quadrant functions primarily as a theoretical limit case rather than an empirical study of everyday policy transfer, highlighting the indispensable role of basic state capacity and governance infrastructure in economic development. Illustrative of this structural vacuum are post-colonial fragile states that experience persistent internal strife, fractured territorial control, and an absence of coherent social welfare, formal schooling, or stable corporate legal frameworks, such as observed in natural resource-reliant nations including Somalia, South Sudan, and Libya. Similarly, countries like Guinea-Bissau, which has experienced at least nine coups since gaining independence in 1974, suffer from repeated disruptions that systematically undermine the bureaucratic endurance required to construct and sustain even basic institutional mechanisms, rendering complex tripartite skill formation systems completely unviable.
By disaggregating the micro-politics of specific stakeholders, the researchers underscore that the state, commercial firms, employer organizations, and labor unions maintain distinct, often conflicting operational logics during policy transfer. Governing parties calculate reform agendas through ideological inclinations and electoral benefits, as demonstrated when Turkey’s Justice and Development Party strategically expanded vocational training during the 2000s to cater to small-business and lower-middle-class constituencies seeking upward mobility. Similarly, firm participation remains strictly voluntary and contingent on sectoral economic returns; export-oriented manufacturers competing on precision quality readily finance training infrastructure, whereas firms competing primarily on labor costs inevitably default to poaching. Employer associations consistently seek influence over skill definitions while attempting to shift financial burdens onto public budgets, and trade unions can only safeguard training quality and wage standards if sectoral bargaining structures grant them institutionalized veto and bargaining power rather than confining their influence to individual enterprises.
Ultimately, the study proves that institutional transplantation cannot be treated as an off-the-shelf engineering exercise in adopting foreign best practices, nor can success be predicted merely by whether a nation is classified as a coordinated or liberal market economy. The specific prerequisites of the German dual model—encompassing power-sharing across organized social partners, patient corporate capital, and sectoral wage setting—are not automatically inherent to all coordinated economies, as Sweden’s divergent institutional evolution confirms. Applying these theoretical findings to contemporary dilemmas, the authors note that the persistent institutional predicaments faced by countries like China in establishing a comprehensive dual apprenticeship framework cannot be resolved merely through central decrees, imported curriculum templates, or isolated non-state associations. Meaningful institutional evolution instead demands long-term political coalition building across diverse economic sectors, paired with pragmatic strategies of institutional conversion, layering, and compromise with enduring historical legacies.
While providing a rigorous conceptual framework for comparative analysis, the authors acknowledge important methodological limitations stemming from their deductive typological approach. By categorizing transplantation conditions based on existing theoretical literature, the deductive model may overlook unforeseen contextual variables that emerge during real-world policy execution, underscoring the urgent need for subsequent empirical validation. Furthermore, the operational boundaries between formal institutional transplantation, parallel endogenous development, and localized institutional establishment remain fluid in current scholarship. In addition, the authors note that Actor-Network Theory was not fully and naturally synthesized with institutional complementarity and historical institutionalism, as network approaches fundamentally prioritize granular empirical tracing. To address these theoretical gaps, future research will utilize focused comparative case studies, tracing China’s distinct state autonomy, gradualism, and selective institutional learning to observe how power struggles and coalition compromises unfold empirically across dynamic socio-technical networks over time.
Subject of Research: Transnational transplantation of collective skill formation systems
Article Title: Beyond institutional compatibility: a typological analysis of collective skill formation system transplantation
Article References: Hai, K., & He, T. (2026). Beyond institutional compatibility: a typological analysis of collective skill formation system transplantation. Asian Review of Political Economy, 5(1), Article 23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44216-026-00093-9
Image Credits: AI Generated
DOI: 10.1007/s44216-026-00093-9
Keywords: vocational education, skill formation, comparative political economy, institutional transplantation, dual study system, apprenticeship models, labor market policy, educational governance, Beyond, institutional, compatibility, typological
Cite Scienmag News
Courtney Benton. (November 6, 2026). Why Global Apprenticeship Models Often Falter Outside Their Native Soil. Scienmag. https://scienmag.com/why-global-apprenticeship-models-often-falter-outside-their-native-soil/
Courtney Benton. "Why Global Apprenticeship Models Often Falter Outside Their Native Soil." Scienmag, 6 November 2026, https://scienmag.com/why-global-apprenticeship-models-often-falter-outside-their-native-soil/. Accessed 22 November 2026.
Courtney Benton. "Why Global Apprenticeship Models Often Falter Outside Their Native Soil." Scienmag. November 6, 2026. https://scienmag.com/why-global-apprenticeship-models-often-falter-outside-their-native-soil/








