Study examines religiosity, religious guilt, shame, and wellbeing among Arab adults

A study of 215 Libyan adults has found that religious guilt may be more tightly connected to psychological distress than religious shame, challenging the assumption that all forms of religious self-conscious emotion affect mental health in the same way. The research, published in Pastoral Psychology, examined how intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity relate to guilt, shame, resilience, depression, anxiety and stress among Arab Muslim adults. Its central finding was striking: although both guilt and shame were associated with intrinsic religiosity, guilt occupied a more influential position in the psychological network connecting religious experience with distress. The result does not suggest that religiosity is inherently harmful. Instead, it indicates that the emotional meaning people attach to religious expectations may determine whether faith is experienced as a source of comfort, pressure or both.

Religiosity is not a single psychological trait. The study distinguished between intrinsic religiosity, in which religious beliefs and practices are experienced as personally meaningful and central to life, and extrinsic religiosity, in which religion may be connected more strongly to social belonging, identity or practical benefits. This distinction has been used for decades in the psychology of religion, but its relationship with guilt and shame remains culturally complex. Guilt typically focuses on a perceived wrong action—“I did something bad”—while shame can involve a more global judgment of the self—“I am a bad person.” In religious settings, these emotions may arise after failing to meet obligations, violating personal standards or believing that one has fallen short of divine expectations. The researchers sought to determine whether these emotions formed separate psychological patterns in a Libyan sample and how they related to well-being.

Participants were 215 Libyan adults between 18 and 54 years old, recruited through social media. Women represented 72.1 percent of the sample, and the researchers collected responses using several established psychological instruments. Religious orientation was assessed with the Muslim Religiosity Scale, resilience with the Brief Resilience Scale, and symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress with the eight-item Depression Anxiety Stress Scale. Participants also answered items designed to measure religious guilt and religious shame. The use of an online sample allowed the researchers to reach adults across a geographically dispersed population, but it also means the findings may not represent all Libyan adults. People without reliable internet access, those less comfortable discussing religion online or those experiencing severe distress may be underrepresented.

Before examining relationships between the variables, the researchers used confirmatory factor analysis to test whether guilt and shame behaved as distinguishable constructs. This statistical method evaluates whether observed responses fit a proposed underlying structure. In this case, the analysis supported a two-factor model: guilt and shame were related but empirically separable. The model showed comparatively strong fit, with a comparative fit index of .95, a root mean square error of approximation of .06 and a standardized root mean square residual of .04. In practical terms, the results indicate that participants did not simply respond to all negative religious emotions as one undifferentiated experience. That distinction matters because interventions aimed at reducing distress may need to address action-focused guilt differently from identity-focused shame.

Both religious guilt and religious shame were positively associated with intrinsic religiosity. The correlation between intrinsic religiosity and guilt was .31, while the correlation with shame was .34. These are moderate associations, not evidence that religious commitment causes either emotion. A correlation measures how variables move together; it cannot determine which factor comes first or whether a third factor influences both. People with deeply internalized religious commitments may monitor their behavior more closely and therefore report stronger guilt or shame when they believe they have failed. Conversely, individuals already experiencing distress may turn more intensely toward religious concerns, increasing their sensitivity to perceived shortcomings. The study’s findings are therefore best understood as evidence of an interconnected relationship rather than a one-way effect of faith on mental health.

Network analysis offered a different way to examine those relationships. Rather than treating guilt, shame, religiosity, resilience and distress as isolated variables, the researchers represented individual symptoms or experiences as nodes connected by statistical relationships. In such a network, centrality describes how strongly or extensively a node is connected to others. Religious guilt emerged as more central than religious shame, and the statement “I feel guilty if I miss prayers” was identified as a particularly important node. This does not mean that missing prayers causes depression or that the statement is universally harmful. It suggests that, within this sample, prayer-related guilt was closely positioned within the broader web of religious emotion and psychological distress. Highly connected experiences may be useful targets for future research because changes in them could potentially coincide with changes elsewhere in the network, although network centrality alone does not prove causal influence.

The findings for extrinsic religiosity differed from those for intrinsic religiosity. Extrinsic religiosity showed a small positive correlation with total resilience, at .16, and negative correlations with depression, at −.25, and stress, at −.13. These associations were modest, particularly for stress, but they point to the possibility that socially embedded religious participation may provide access to support, structure or community resources. The researchers also found that intrinsic religiosity was higher among male participants, reflected by a correlation of .19. Because the study was cross-sectional and relied on self-report, it cannot establish why these differences appeared. Gender roles, social expectations, religious education, patterns of community participation or differences in how participants interpret survey questions could all contribute.

The mediation analysis added another layer to the picture. The researchers examined whether depression statistically explained the relationship between resilience and the two religiosity dimensions. Depression mediated those associations, while the direct effects of resilience on religiosity were not significant. In other words, the statistical model was more consistent with psychological distress shaping religious engagement than with resilience directly producing a stronger religious orientation. Resilience also played only a limited bridging role in the network linking religiosity with distress. This is an important caution against portraying resilience as a universal protective factor. The Brief Resilience Scale measures perceived ability to recover from stress, but a person’s capacity to rebound may not automatically alter religious guilt, shame or spiritual struggle. Different forms of resilience—social, spiritual, emotional or community-based—could show different patterns.

The authors argue that culturally sensitive mental-health interventions should take religious guilt seriously, particularly when it becomes persistent, inflexible or intertwined with depression and stress. The implication is not that religious practice should be discouraged, nor that guilt is always pathological. Guilt can sometimes motivate repair, reflection or behavior consistent with personal values. Problems may arise when a missed obligation becomes evidence of personal worthlessness, when fear overwhelms compassion or when religious concerns intensify existing depressive symptoms. Clinicians working with Arab Muslim clients may benefit from asking how patients interpret religious expectations and whether faith provides support, pressure or a shifting combination of both. Such conversations should respect religious belief while distinguishing spiritual guidance from debilitating self-condemnation.

The study also highlights how little is known about religious emotions in Arab and Muslim populations compared with Western samples. Its participants were Libyan adults, so the findings should not be generalized automatically to every Arab or Muslim community. The sample was relatively small, predominantly female and recruited online, and the one-time design prevents researchers from tracking whether guilt precedes distress or distress amplifies guilt. Future studies could use larger, more representative samples, longitudinal designs and interviews capable of capturing cultural and theological nuance. They could also test whether counseling, community support, self-forgiveness or compassionate religious interpretation weaken the connection between guilt and distress. For now, the research offers a sharper scientific picture of a sensitive question: religious commitment and psychological suffering do not exist at opposite ends of a simple scale. They can become connected through specific emotions, and in this Libyan sample, religious guilt appeared to be the most prominent link.