The conventional narrative in developmental psychology and moral philosophy suggests that as humans mature, their ‘moral circle’—the range of beings toward whom they feel moral concern and responsibility—inevitably expands. This process is often imagined as a gradual but steady widening: children start caring primarily for close family and friends, then branch out to neighbors, communities, and eventually strangers and even non-human animals. This expansion is frequently attributed to the growth of cognitive faculties such as reasoning, perspective-taking, and abstract ethical reflection. According to many scholars, these abilities help individuals to recognize that the suffering experienced by others, irrespective of proximity or social ties, is equally significant, thereby motivating more inclusive moral consideration.
However, recent groundbreaking research challenges this optimistic developmental story by revealing a more nuanced and counterintuitive dynamic: rather than a simple linear expansion, moral concern may, in some respects, narrow as children grow older. In fact, empirical studies demonstrate that younger children often exhibit a broader moral circle than adolescents or adults. This surprising evidence encourages a reevaluation of widely held assumptions about moral development and poses deep questions about the origins and evolution of moral cognition.
The study, led by Marshall, Wilks, Caviola, and colleagues and published in Nature Human Behaviour (2025), employed a series of carefully designed experiments to probe moral judgments across various relational, physical, and phylogenetic distances. The researchers assessed participants’ willingness to help or protect others who were socially distant—such as strangers or unfamiliar individuals—and even others belonging to different species or living in different parts of the world. Strikingly, younger children consistently displayed a greater readiness to extend moral concern across these dimensions, compared to older children and adults.
This counterintuitive developmental trajectory may seem to upend classical accounts of moral maturation, yet it aligns with emerging theoretical frameworks that emphasize the complexity and sometimes contradictory nature of moral cognition. One possible explanation is that early childhood is characterized by a more generalized and less discriminating form of empathy and care, a trait that becomes refined and, paradoxically, restricted as social experience and cognitive control mechanisms develop. Instead of pure expansion, childhood moral growth might involve a pruning process that shapes a more selective moral circle aligned with normative social values and pragmatic considerations.
Psychologists have long debated the extent to which moral reasoning is driven by automatic intuitions versus deliberate reflection. The findings by Marshall et al. contribute to this discourse by illustrating how early-emerging, perhaps more intuitive, prosocial tendencies may be broader but less differentiated. In contrast, the mature moral circle might reflect an outcome of cognitive processes that prioritize certain relationships and obligations, influenced by cultural learning and socialization. Thus, moral development is not simply an ascendancy toward universal concern but involves a complex recalibration that often trades breadth for depth and specificity.
Exploring the specific mechanisms that lead to this apparent constriction of moral concern during development reveals a host of cognitive and emotional factors. For example, increasing awareness of social categories, group boundaries, and reciprocal obligations may lead older children and adults to prioritize in-group members over distant others. Furthermore, the growing capacity for moral reasoning enables more nuanced judgments but also permits justification of partiality and exclusion. These cognitive abilities may inadvertently limit the application of moral concern to a narrower circle deemed relevant and worthy according to prevailing social norms.
From a phylogenetic perspective, the findings resonate with debates about the evolutionary foundations of morality. Human ancestors likely benefited from cooperative group living that emphasized care for close kin and fellow group members. Early developmental stages may echo these evolutionary predispositions by promoting a broadly inclusive but ultimately cautious approach to moral concern. As individuals mature, cultural practices and social expectations impose boundaries that reflect adaptive group dynamics, potentially narrowing the moral circle to manage social complexity and conflict.
This research invites a paradigm shift in how educators, policymakers, and ethicists approach the cultivation of moral values. Traditionally, efforts to widen the moral circle have targeted biases against caring for distant others, whether strangers, marginalized groups, or non-human animals. However, recognizing an early-emerging tendency toward broad moral concern may inspire interventions that preserve and reinvigorate this inclusive impulse throughout development, rather than merely correcting deficit or prejudice.
Moreover, understanding the interplay between early moral expansiveness and later constriction can illuminate persistent social challenges such as in-group favoritism, discrimination, and apathy toward distant suffering. By investigating when and why moral concern narrows, it becomes possible to develop strategies that sustain empathy and altruism beyond immediate social circles, potentially leveraging innate cognitive and emotional capacities evident in young children.
This study also poses provocative questions about the role of reason in moral flourishing. While rational deliberation is often hailed as the pinnacle of moral development, the evidence suggests that it may simultaneously bring constriction. The deliberate categorization and prioritization facilitated by reasoning might inadvertently limit moral concern, highlighting a tension between cognitive sophistication and moral inclusivity.
Future research could extend these findings by exploring cross-cultural variations in the development of moral circles, given that social norms and cultural narratives profoundly influence moral priorities. Additionally, longitudinal studies tracking individuals over time could clarify the trajectories and causal factors underpinning shifts in moral concern, providing vital insight into how moral cognition can be nurtured or undermined.
In sum, the work of Marshall and colleagues disrupts conventional wisdom by demonstrating that our moral circle does not merely expand as we age; in some respects, it may actually contract. This nuanced perspective enriches our understanding of human morality by emphasizing early-emerging inclusive tendencies and the complex ways in which cognitive and social factors reshape them throughout life. Recognizing this complexity is essential for fostering a more compassionate and just society, as it challenges us to honor and sustain the broad moral impulses evident in childhood.
The implications of these findings ripple across disciplines, from philosophy and psychology to education and public policy, provoking renewed reflection on what it means to be a moral being. They remind us that moral development is neither straightforward nor solely progressive but is a dynamic interplay of expansion and constriction, intuition and reason, inclusion and exclusion. Appreciating this tension may be the key to unlocking more effective approaches to cultivating empathy and equity in an increasingly interconnected world.
As the conversation around moral cognition evolves, the insights from this research underscore a critical truth: the early seeds of broad moral concern exist within us all, and understanding how developmental processes sometimes constrict these seeds offers both a challenge and an opportunity. In embracing the complexity of moral growth, we may discover innovative ways to nurture and sustain an expansive and enduring moral community that transcends generational and relational divides.
Subject of Research: Developmental changes in the breadth of moral concern and how moral circles expand or contract over childhood and adulthood.
Article Title: When development constricts our moral circle.
Article References:
Marshall, J., Wilks, M., Caviola, L. et al. When development constricts our moral circle. Nat Hum Behav (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-025-02212-7
Image Credits: AI Generated
