Successful deterrence often redirects rather than resolves interstate rivalry by altering the accessibility and relative costs of different strategic domains, according to an original research article published in Frontiers in Political Science. The theoretical study, authored by Ahmad Fares Albadareen at Abu Dhabi University, presents a bounded framework to analyze how strategic rivalries evolve in the aftermath of deterred actions.
Traditional scholarship on deterrence has conventionally evaluated operational success by whether an unwanted action was prevented. However, existing literature provides comparatively little explanation regarding how a strategic rivalry functions once an immediate action is successfully deterred, leaving a conceptual gap concerning post-deterrence rivalry trajectories.
To address this question, the paper introduces the theory of Recursive Strategic Transformation, or RST, which models persistent interstate conflict as an evolving series of structural transformations. Rather than concluding the rivalry, the deterrence of an action induces reciprocal adaptations between opposing states across conventional and nuclear-constrained strategic environments.
The RST theoretical framework is formally organized around four distinct constructs connected in a causal sequence. This structure generates five falsifiable propositions addressing the dynamics of strategic redirection, domain diversification, reciprocal co-adaptation between rivals, and subsequent configurational change across competitive arenas.
The scope of the theory is explicitly bounded to persistent interstate rivalries that possess access to more than one strategic domain. The research paper illustrates these nuclear-constrained and conventional-constrained pathways through two analytical demonstrations, including a stage-by-stage process trace of semiconductor competition between the United States and China.
The author concludes that assessments of deterrence effectiveness should account not only for the immediate prevention of an unwanted action, but also for how deterrence systematically reshapes the subsequent configuration and domains of strategic rivalry.
Published in the International Studies section of Frontiers in Political Science after being received on October 3, 2026, and accepted on November 2, 2026, the paper reframes deterrence assessment.
Subject of Research: Theoretical modeling of deterrence and recursive strategic transformation in interstate rivalries
Article Title: When deterrence redirects rather than resolves rivalry: a theory of recursive strategic transformation in conventional and nuclear competition
Article References: Albadareen, A. F. (2026). When deterrence redirects rather than resolves rivalry: a theory of recursive strategic transformation in conventional and nuclear competition. Frontiers in Political Science, 8, Article 2018201. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.2018201
Image Credits: AI Generated
DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2026.2018201
Keywords: deterrence theory, recursive strategic transformation, strategic rivalry, conventional competition, nuclear competition, escalation constraint, interstate rivalry, domain accessibility, strategic domain costs, reciprocal co-adaptation, configurational change, diversification, redirection, semiconductor competition, United States-China competition, international studies
Cite Scienmag News
Courtney Benton. (November 18, 2026). Successful Deterrence Redirects Rather Than Resolves Persistent Interstate Rivalries. Scienmag. https://scienmag.com/successful-deterrence-redirects-rather-than-resolves-persistent-interstate-rivalries/
Courtney Benton. "Successful Deterrence Redirects Rather Than Resolves Persistent Interstate Rivalries." Scienmag, 18 November 2026, https://scienmag.com/successful-deterrence-redirects-rather-than-resolves-persistent-interstate-rivalries/. Accessed 18 November 2026.
Courtney Benton. "Successful Deterrence Redirects Rather Than Resolves Persistent Interstate Rivalries." Scienmag. November 18, 2026. https://scienmag.com/successful-deterrence-redirects-rather-than-resolves-persistent-interstate-rivalries/








