Regulatory shaming lists—commonly known as black, red, white, and green lists—have emerged as potent tools in modern governance, straddling the line between disclosure and public accountability. At first glance, these lists might simply appear as transparency measures designed to inform stakeholders like consumers or investors. Yet beneath this surface lies a far more complex interplay of regulatory objectives that challenge traditional notions of governmental disclosure and openness. While transparency and disclosure have long been cornerstones of democratic administration, the rise of shaming as a regulatory strategy complicates these paradigms by injecting reputational consequences directly into the calculus of compliance and corporate behavior.
The rationale for regulatory shaming lists is often couched within established frameworks of disclosure and transparency. For instance, governmental bodies publish these lists ostensibly to reduce information asymmetries between firms and the public, providing consumers with price guides or investors with environmental impact data. Regulatory transparency implies not merely openness but also public monitoring of regulatory processes, enhancing efficiency and curbing regulatory capture. The principles behind this notion—including publishing rules, internal policies, budgets, and adjudications—underscore the idea that “sunlight is the best disinfectant,” fostering accountability.
However, the once-clear distinction between transparency and shaming blurs when lists explicitly rank or single out non-compliant entities. Governments often present these publications as transparency-enhancing endeavors, sidestepping or minimizing the intrinsic shaming effects involved. For example, Israel’s Ministry of Environment issues a ‘Red List’ of top polluting companies, categorizing it principally as investor disclosure rather than recognizing its potential to generate public and reputational pressure. Such an approach neglects the broader universe of stakeholders—consumers, activists, and NGOs—who can mobilize social sanction outside formal regulatory actions.
The confusion surrounding the conceptual underpinnings of these information-sharing tools is widespread. Legislators, regulators, and even courts frequently frame policies instigating reputational harm as mere transparency measures. This conceptual vagueness can hinder regulatory effectiveness. When Israeli lawmakers debated publishing administrative fines for competition law violations, transparency was cited without recognizing the role of societal pressure and reputational risk in motivating compliance. Similarly, courts tend to focus on public access to information as an end rather than acknowledging the strategic use of reputational damage to deter misconduct.
These ambiguities reflect a missed opportunity to harness the full potential of regulatory shaming as a compliance-enhancing strategy. While transparency and disclosure laws are well-developed and grounded in democratic theory and jurisprudence, shaming lags behind with sparse statutory and case law frameworks. This deficiency retards its broader acceptance and incorporation into formal regulatory regimes, even though emerging scholarship recognizes the novel ways corporate reputation serves as a regulatory lever beyond formal sanctions.
Historically, transparency has played a vital role in democratic governance by promoting accountability, combating corruption, and bolstering public trust. The extensive legal traditions underpinning transparency rights reinforce these values. Regulatory disclosure extends this by empowering individuals to make autonomous, informed decisions through mandated information revelation by firms. This approach assumes a non-intrusive regulatory posture where the state does not prescribe behavior but enhances market functioning via information symmetry.
Yet disclosure and transparency are not without their critics. Scholars highlight that overwhelming individuals with information can be paternalistic, costly, and at times ineffective. Moreover, overreliance on transparency may mask inaction, creating an illusion of accountability while regulatory problems persist. Nonetheless, the normative appeal of these frameworks lends them legitimacy in the public eye and regulatory discourse alike—legitimacy that shaming, by contrast, has struggled to achieve due to its punitive and sometimes stigmatizing connotations.
Governments’ inclination to frame shaming lists as transparency or disclosure initiatives may stem from their established acceptance and perceived fairness. Transparency is often seen as evenly applied across firms, distributing reputational consequences proportionately. Shaming, however, selectively targets perceived wrongdoers, invoking moral judgments that can be construed as harsh or unfair. Consequently, positioning these lists within the transparency rhetoric eases regulatory communication while sidestepping the negative optics associated with shaming.
Global examples illustrate these dynamics. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s online blacklist of pharmaceutical companies accused of impeding generic competition was publicly promoted as a transparency measure. Yet the accompanying messaging inherently shamed companies by exposing alleged misconduct, deterring future violations through reputational risks rather than direct penalties. In the Netherlands, the publication of restaurants with poor hygiene ratings is justified by consumer choice considerations, but the implied moral censure functions as a powerful regulatory signal prompting behavioral changes.
The tension between regulatory objectives and the chosen conceptual frameworks also influences the stakeholders recognized in these policies. When information is framed exclusively as investor disclosure, as seen with Israel’s environmental ‘Red List,’ the potential for consumer activism and media scrutiny is downplayed. This narrow framing limits the reach and diversity of reputational sanctions that can compel corporate reform, weakening regulatory impact. A broader acknowledgment of multiple stakeholder roles could amplify the effectiveness of shaming lists as instruments of systemic change.
The conceptual confusion surrounding regulatory shaming also has practical consequences in policymaking. Mischaracterizing shaming initiatives as straightforward transparency efforts may blind policymakers to the nuances of behavior modification, omitting critical design elements such as timing, linguistic framing, and dissemination channels necessary for effective shaming. Moreover, the absence of explicit discussion on shaming’s mechanisms reduces opportunities to develop metrics for evaluating the success of such policies or to establish legal protections balancing reputational harms with fairness and due process.
Despite these challenges, the transformative potential of regulatory shaming warrants greater scholarly and institutional attention. Emerging research in law, public policy, and economics points to shaming as a non-coercive tool able to leverage social norms, reputational sensitivity, and stakeholder activism to complement traditional enforcement mechanisms. As digital technologies and social media amplify the visibility and speed of information dissemination, regulatory shaming becomes a more formidable means of influencing corporate behavior with fewer resource demands on regulatory agencies.
In conclusion, the evolving landscape of regulatory information sharing demands a clearer conceptual framework that distinguishes transparency, disclosure, and shaming while recognizing their interrelatedness. Clarifying these distinctions can improve regulatory design, facilitate informed legislative debate, and enhance judicial understanding. Most importantly, it can unlock the full potential of regulatory shaming lists as dynamic instruments wielding reputational power to promote compliance, societal welfare, and environmental stewardship. As governments navigate this complex terrain, embracing precise definitions and strategic communication will be essential to ensuring that such policies not only ‘get the price right’ but also foster genuine accountability beyond mere information provision.
Subject of Research: Regulatory shaming within governmental transparency and disclosure frameworks.
Article Title: Colouring outside the lines: a regulatory shaming framework for black, red, white, and green lists.
Article References:
Yadin, S. Colouring outside the lines: a regulatory shaming framework for black, red, white, and green lists. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 12, 1264 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-05586-1
Image Credits: AI Generated
