In an illuminating new study that bridges the fields of psychology, economics, and social behavior, researchers have uncovered pivotal insights into how those in positions of power respond to the threat of collective action. The findings, resulting from an innovative twist on a classic psychological experiment known as the Ultimatum Game, reveal that the willingness of the powerful to act fairly is not solely rooted in intrinsic values or moral compasses, but is heavily influenced by the ease with which those without power can coordinate and resist unfair treatment collectively.
Conducted collaboratively by Dr. David Gordon from the University of Staffordshire in the United Kingdom and Dr. Mikael Puurtinen at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland, the study leverages the Ultimatum Game—an extensively studied economic game that traditionally involves two players: a Proposer and a Responder. In this setup, the Proposer is allotted a sum of points, typically 100, which they can offer in any split to the Responder. Should the Responder accept the offer, both parties receive the proposed allocations; if rejected, neither player gains anything. This model has been lauded for its ability to replicate fundamental aspects of fairness and negotiation, reflecting real monetary payoffs to participants, thereby grounding the experiment in tangible incentives.
However, in a significant departure from tradition, the research team introduced a multiplayer dynamic, substituting the single Responder with a trio. This complex arrangement required all three responders to coordinate their efforts by pooling resources—points allocated to the potential rejection—to collectively reject an offer. The experiment was further nuanced by varying the difficulty of this collective action through three conditions: Easy, Medium, and Hard. In the ‘Easy’ condition, participants needed to invest only minimal points to reach the rejection threshold, while the ‘Hard’ condition demanded substantial pooled contributions, sometimes requiring all responders to commit fully for rejection to succeed.
The critical revelation from the experiment is that when collective power was easier to wield—that is, when rejection of unfair offers required low cooperative effort—those empowered as Proposers tended toward more egalitarian distributions. This suggests a behavioral shift motivated less by inherent fairness values and more by an acute awareness of the credible threat that collective opposition presents. Essentially, when faced with the tangible possibility that unfairness can be collectively challenged and penalized at low “cost” to the group, those in power adjusted their behavior responsively to maintain social equity.
Conversely, under conditions where the cost of collective action was prohibitive, Proposers exhibited less generosity, capitalizing on the decreased likelihood of coordinated resistance. This led to markedly larger disparities in earnings between the roles, vividly demonstrating how the perceived vulnerability of power-holders modulates fairness behaviors. Intriguingly, for responders, the ease or difficulty of pooling their points did not significantly alter their initial willingness to contribute toward rejection. Yet, over time, as the realization of the costs and success probabilities settled in, responders in harder conditions displayed increased acceptance of unequal offers, arguably a resignation or strategic adaptation to limited collective efficacy.
Delving deeper, post-experiment interviews and questionnaires unearthed fascinating psychological nuances. Proposers in the easier collective action scenario frequently justified their fairness as a moral duty, framing equitable offers as intrinsic obligations rather than strategic concessions. This cognitive dissonance underscores the complex interplay between genuine ethical beliefs and externally imposed constraints, hinting at a psychological rationalization process that masks strategic behavior under the guise of moral responsibility.
The implications of these findings ripple far beyond the laboratory. By simulating the “costs” associated with collective resistance—mirroring real-world expenditures such as time, resources, or risk involved in organizing protests, strikes, or voter mobilizations—the study offers a nuanced lens through which to interpret social dynamics of power, inequality, and justice. Dr. Gordon cautions that while the controlled environment of the experiment cannot fully capture the multifaceted complexity of societal power struggles, it provides a crucial foundation for understanding how the potential for collective action shapes the behaviors and decision-making of those wielding authority.
It is worth considering further dimensions that might influence these dynamics. For instance, would results differ if participants had earned their points through prior effort, thereby altering their sense of entitlement or loss aversion? Additionally, the formation of shared identities or common goals between Proposers and Responders might shift motivations from adversarial to cooperative, fundamentally transforming the equilibrium of fairness and resistance observed.
From a broader societal perspective, the research poignantly highlights the importance of safeguarding mechanisms that enable collective action. Legislative or systemic barriers that restrict protest, strike capabilities, or voter access risk entrenching inequality by disarming the collective checks on power that drive equitable behavior. This resonates with contemporary global concerns, where increasing disparities have been met with escalating efforts to limit dissent and civic engagement.
Published in the Social Psychological Bulletin, this study punctuates a timely message: fairness and equity in hierarchical systems may ultimately hinge more on external checks and balances than on the internal moral compass of individuals in power. As societies grapple with questions of justice, governance, and the distribution of resources, appreciating the psychological underpinnings of collective action as a lever for fairness offers fertile ground for policy and activism alike.
By blending rigorous experimental methodology with salient social questions, Gordon and Puurtinen’s research enriches our understanding of power relations and the psychological mechanisms underlying social justice. The multiplayer Ultimatum Game thus emerges not only as a novel experimental paradigm but as a mirror reflecting the real-world tension between authority and resistance, and the delicate calculus that defines fairness in human interactions.
Subject of Research: People
Article Title: Fairness is What You Can Get Away With: Proposer and Responder Behaviour in a Collective Action Ultimatum Game
News Publication Date: 31-Jul-2025
Web References: https://doi.org/10.32872/spb.11607
References:
Gordon, D., & Puurtinen, M. (2025). Fairness is What You Can Get Away With: Proposer and Responder Behaviour in a Collective Action Ultimatum Game. Social Psychological Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.32872/spb.11607
Keywords: Social psychology, Behavioral psychology
