In recent years, the intersection of politics and environmental governance has become an increasingly critical area of study, particularly in rapidly developing nations such as China where urbanization and industrialization exert immense pressure on local ecosystems. Amid growing concerns over deteriorating air quality in prefectural-level cities, new research sheds light on how the dynamics within the local political system directly impact air pollution outcomes. By scrutinizing the roles played by governmental officials during periods of political turnover, this investigation reveals how the political machinery can both impede and potentially facilitate air quality improvements in often overlooked municipal jurisdictions.
Historically, the literature has acknowledged that political factors influence environmental policy efficacy, yet few studies have dissected the precise mechanisms linking political turnover with air quality fluctuations at the prefectural city level in China. This void is now addressed through a quasi-experimental framework that distinguishes between the government system—embodied by the mayor—and the Party system—represented by the Party secretary. Unlike the centralized focus on provincial or national governance, this granular examination provides a window into the micro-political processes shaping environmental governance amid leadership changes at the local scale.
The study’s most striking finding is that mayoral turnover correlates with a significant short-term spike in pollutant emissions. This counterintuitive outcome underscores how mayoral transitions introduce periods of administrative instability and policy uncertainty, disrupting the ongoing governance and regulatory enforcement essential for maintaining air quality standards. The research situates mayors as pivotal actors who drive local environmental management, responsible for orchestrating policy initiatives that can either sustain or squander gains in pollution reduction. When turnover occurs, the lack of continuity weakens regulatory oversight and diminishes the enforcement of environmental protections, thereby exacerbating pollutant discharge.
In stark contrast, the Party secretary turnover does not exhibit a statistically meaningful effect on air pollution levels in the immediate term. This observation challenges assumptions about the Party secretary’s influence, suggesting that their authority over environmental governance may be more indirect or symbolic, particularly in administrative domains where policy implementation requires decisive local executive action. Previous research paralleling these findings indicates that Party secretaries may lack strong incentives to prioritize environmental outcomes due to the ambiguous relationship between environmental performance and their political career advancement.
Critically, the adverse impacts of mayoral turnover are not homogeneous across all prefectural cities. Variability arises depending on factors such as geographic location, the origin of the incoming mayor, the tenure of preceding officials, and the presence of national environmental oversight mechanisms. Eastern Chinese cities, which generally face greater industrial activity and denser populations, experience more pronounced pollution increases during mayoral transitions. Similarly, cities appointing mayors from outside the jurisdiction are vulnerable to heightened disruption, as incoming leaders must navigate unfamiliar political terrain, compounding governance delays and inefficiencies.
Moreover, cities with long-serving prior mayors display intensified negative outcomes following turnover, indicating that entrenched local political networks or established environmental strategies are destabilized by sudden leadership changes. Newly appointed mayors who are younger also correlate with greater pollutant surges, potentially reflecting lower levels of administrative experience or weaker established authority. An additional layer of complexity emerges with the involvement of the Central Environmental Protection Inspection (CEPI); cities not subject to CEPI inspections suffer exacerbated pollution spikes during turnovers, highlighting the remedial role of vertical supervisory regimes in buffering local political turbulence.
These findings amplify the discourse on political accountability in environmental governance, emphasizing the mayor’s role as a linchpin in the local policy apparatus. While the Party system remains politically dominant in theory, the executive functions and day-to-day environmental decision-making vested in mayors determine whether air pollution is effectively managed or neglected. Consequently, empowering mayors with clear regulation authority, alongside rigorous performance monitoring, is paramount. This also implies institutional reforms that hold mayors individually accountable for environmental indicators, especially during transition phases prone to governance vacuums.
Ensuring policy continuity emerges as a central recommendation stemming from these insights. Mayoral turnover inherently breeds uncertainty that undermines sustained pollution control efforts, a phenomenon best mitigated through mechanisms that support leadership transitions without interrupting governance momentum. This involves establishing structured handover protocols, transitional support teams, and embedding environmental goals within long-term strategic plans transcending individual administrations. Such frameworks would enable newly installed mayors to maintain the trajectory of ongoing initiatives rather than default to disruption.
Beyond localized strategies, the study highlights the critical role of vertical oversight in safeguarding air quality improvements amidst political flux. The Central Environmental Protection Inspection’s function as an independent auditor and enforcer surfaces as a stabilizing force that constrains opportunistic backsliding on environmental commitments during volatile leadership periods. This vertical supervision creates external pressure on municipal officials to persist in upholding regulatory standards, effectively counterbalancing the transient weakening of environmental supervision caused by mayoral turnover.
Importantly, the research also cautions against the formation of an environmental-political business cycle wherein pollution levels oscillate in response to political transitions. Such cyclical environmental degradation underscores the fragility of governance mechanisms when they are overly dependent on individual leaders’ tenure. Long-term environmental sustainability thus necessitates institutionalizing robust laws and regulations that retain priority regardless of local political dynamics. Clear mandates, enforceable penalties, and transparent monitoring systems provide the scaffolding to insulate environmental governance from personal or partisan fluctuations.
The implications of these findings stretch beyond the Chinese context, offering lessons for other rapidly urbanizing and politically complex nations grappling with the balance between economic development and environmental stewardship. The evidence that administrative leadership continuity matters profoundly for environmental outcomes reinforces the need for governance reforms that prioritize not just the substance of policies but the stability of their implementation. Changes in political personnel are inevitable, yet their disruptive potential can be mitigated by well-designed transitional governance models and oversight systems.
Moreover, integrating environmental stewardship directly into the criteria for promotion and assessment of both mayors and Party secretaries represents a strategic lever for embedding long-term accountability. By aligning career incentives with environmental performance metrics, political leaders would gain tangible motivation to prioritize sustainable practices. This strategic recalibration would help break the current disconnect where political advancement and environmental protection appear insufficiently linked, enhancing the prospects of durable governance advances against air pollution.
As urbanization in China’s prefecture-level cities intensifies, the urgency of addressing air quality challenges cannot be overstated. This research elucidates that effective pollution control depends not only on technical solutions and regulatory frameworks but critically on the political actors who execute these policies on the ground. Mayors, as primary executors and local policymakers, command pivotal influence, and their turnover periods demand targeted management attention to avert lapses in environmental governance.
In conclusion, the nuanced relationship between political turnover and environmental quality in China’s prefectural cities reveals complex governance dynamics with significant policy implications. While mayoral changes pose immediate challenges by increasing pollution through policy discontinuity, Party secretary turnovers appear less impactful in the short run. Strengthening institutional continuity, enhancing vertical supervision, and embedding environmental outcomes into political incentives are critical pathways to achieving resilient environmental governance capable of withstanding political fluctuations. The findings call for a recalibration in how political leadership transitions are managed, underscoring that stable, accountable local governance is indispensable for sustainable air quality improvement.
Article References:
Yang, C., Zhang, J. & Li, R. Political official turnover and environmental governance: who is more influential on local air pollution in China. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 12, 745 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-05052-y
