Remittance Dependence Linked to Support for Removing Term Limits

A new study published in Comparative Migration Studies examines the relationship between dependence on migrant remittances and public support for the abolition of presidential term limits in sub-Saharan Africa. The research, authored by Ana Isabel López García, utilizes survey data from the Afrobarometer to investigate how financial reliance on funds sent from abroad influences political attitudes regarding executive tenure. The central finding indicates that individuals who depend significantly on remittances are more likely to support the removal of constitutional limits on how long a president can serve compared to those with little or no such dependence.

The study focuses on a region where electoral turnovers are rare and incumbents frequently manipulate restrictions on the permitted length of stay in office to prolong their rule. Presidential term limits are formal rules designed to promote political alternation and forestall the concentration of power in the hands of the executive. The author theorizes that citizens who depend heavily on migrant remittances are more likely to support the removal of these limits not out of a normative commitment to authoritarianism, but driven by a desire to protect their assets amid actual or anticipated conflict and instability.

The analysis draws on data from Round 7 of the Afrobarometer survey, which covered 32 sub-Saharan African countries. The dependent variable, support for presidential term-limit removal, was measured using a survey item that offered two opposing statements: one asserting that the constitution should limit the president to two terms, and another stating there should be no constitutional limit. Respondents were asked to indicate which statement they agreed with more strongly. Support for the statement advocating no limits was coded as 1, while support for the two-term limit or neither statement was coded as 0.

Remittance dependence was measured based on respondents’ answers to a question regarding how much they depend on receiving remittances from relatives or friends living in other countries. Responses were coded into three categories: “not at all,” “a little,” and “somewhat” or “a lot.” The latter two categories were combined due to their small shares and because both indicate a meaningful level of remittance dependence. In the full sample, approximately 21.3% of respondents reported living in households with at least some degree of dependence on remittances, while 11.1% noted their level of dependence being “somewhat” or “a lot.”

To address the nonrandom selection into remittance dependence, the study employed entropy balancing, a nonparametric method that reweighs the data to achieve statistical balance between the treatment group and the control group on observable covariates. This approach retains the full sample, avoiding the loss of observations that can occur with other matching techniques. The covariates balanced included gender, age, education, urban or rural residence, employment status, access to electricity and water, and household wealth. The analysis used probit models with country fixed effects to control for time-invariant differences across countries.

The results confirm that individuals whose dependence on remittances is at the level of “somewhat” or “a lot” are significantly more likely to support presidential-term-limit removal than those living in low-dependence or nondependent households. The estimated difference is roughly 3.5 to 5 percentage points. Although this marginal effect is modest in absolute terms, it represents a 16 to 17 percent increase relative to the baseline support rate of roughly 21 percent. This association is stable across different model specifications and is larger in magnitude than other individual-level predictors, such as gender or urban residence.

The study also investigates the mechanism behind this association, proposing that the relationship is stronger among those who fear conflict or have prior experience with it. A fear of violence index was constructed based on questions about personal fear of violence at political rallies, public protests, or in the neighborhood. The analysis shows that differences in support for removing presidential term limits between the remittance-dependent and those less dependent become wider as fear of violence and instability intensifies. The second difference is approximately 3.6 percentage points when using a three-item fear index and 6.9 percentage points when using a four-item index, both statistically significant.

Falsification tests were conducted to corroborate the validity of the theorized asset-protection mechanism. The study examined whether remittance dependence was associated with views unrelated to incumbent continuity, such as support for restricting media freedom, monitoring private communications, or being effective but not held accountable. The results indicate that remittance dependence shows no significant association with these measures. This suggests that the main finding is not driven by a generalized support for strong government authority or a diffuse pro-authoritarian orientation among recipients, but is specific to the question of incumbent continuity.

Further analysis of related outcomes shows that remittance dependence is associated with support for one-man rule, one-party rule, military rule, and the selection of leaders through nonelectoral means. However, fear of violence moderates the relationship only for support for one-man rule, which implies indefinite tenure for the current leader. This pattern accords with the asset-protection story, where the threat to material security is perceived to be highest during political alternation. The study notes that remittance-dependent individuals do not display greater trust in the president, parliament, or courts, nor are they less concerned about corruption, indicating that their support for term-limit removal is driven by interest-based considerations rather than approval of the incumbent.

The findings highlight a nuanced relationship between remittances and compliance with democratic norms in origin countries. While remittances are frequently hailed as a force for democratization, this study finds they are associated with diminished prospects of political alternation and stronger risk-averse preferences against disruption of the status quo among those dependent on them. The author cautions that the results should be interpreted as conditional associations rather than causal effects, as the procedure does not address selection on unobservables. The study is limited to the sub-Saharan African context and uses cross-sectional survey data, meaning that endogeneity or reverse causation cannot be fully ruled out.

The research contributes to the literature by examining how the receipt of remittances relates to public support for a key safeguard of democracy. The dismantling of term limits is one of the clearest signs of democratic backsliding, and support for doing away with them represents a higher behavioral threshold than mere disengagement. The study suggests that a more nuanced understanding is needed of the relationship between remittance dependence and compliance with political contestation as a core democratic norm in developing countries. Future research could use longitudinal survey data or instrumental-variable approaches to further explore these dynamics.

The study underscores the complex political consequences of transnational financial flows. As sub-Saharan Africa continues to experience challenges to presidential term limits, understanding the factors that drive public support for such changes is crucial. The evidence presented here indicates that the protection of remittance-derived assets against the disruptions that political alternation can bring is a significant factor in shaping political attitudes. This insight adds a new dimension to the ongoing debate about the role of remittances in the political development of migrant-sending countries.

Subject of Research: The association between remittance dependence and public support for the abolition of presidential term limits in sub-Saharan Africa.

Article Title: Migrant remittances and the decline of presidential term limits in sub-Saharan Africa

Article References: López García, A. I. (2026). Migrant remittances and the decline of presidential term limits in sub-Saharan Africa. Comparative Migration Studies, 14(1), Article 52. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-026-00560-5

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1186/s40878-026-00560-5

Keywords: migrant remittances, presidential term limits, sub-Saharan Africa, political stability, Afrobarometer, democratic backsliding, asset protection, political attitudes, Migrant, remittances, decline, presidential