How Iraqi Politicians’ Words Shifted From Authority to Myth Over Two Tumultuous Decades

When Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed in 2003, Iraq’s new political class faced a problem that was as much linguistic as it was institutional. How do you convince a fractured population that fragile, externally dependent state institutions deserve obedience, sacrifice and trust? A new study argues that the answer changed dramatically over the following eighteen years, and that the change can be measured, statistically, in the very words Iraq’s leaders chose.

The research, published in SN Social Sciences by Ayamn Abdoun Nazal of the University of Diyala, analyses a corpus of 847 texts produced between 2003 and 2021, spanning parliamentary debates, executive speeches, party communications and official state documents. Using corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis, the study tracks how Iraqi political actors deployed four recognised legitimation strategies: authorization, which appeals to authority and law; rationalization, which appeals to utility and purpose; moral evaluation, which appeals to shared values; and mythopoesis, which legitimates action through narrative, storytelling and shared social myths. The findings reveal a striking transformation in how power was justified in post-conflict Iraq.

Methodologically, the study is notable for treating language as something that can be quantified over time. Nazal divided the corpus into nineteen annual sub-corpora and calculated what the study terms legitimation density, a measure of how frequently legitimation strategies appear per unit of text. The corpus was then grouped into four historical phases mirroring Iraq’s political trajectory: the reconstruction period under the Coalition Provisional Authority and early transitional governments, the consolidation years, the crisis years dominated by the fight against the Islamic State, and the post-crisis period from 2018 to 2021 marked by protest movements and institutional exhaustion.

The headline result is a dramatic reversal in the dominant legitimation strategy. In the reconstruction period of 2003 to 2006, authorization-based legitimation dominated, registering 18.4 instances on the density measure, reflecting an era in which obedience was demanded primarily by appeal to occupation decrees, transitional law and the imprimatur of international authority. By the post-crisis period of 2018 to 2021, that figure had fallen to 9.1. Mythopoetic legitimation moved in precisely the opposite direction, rising from 3.3 to 14.7 across the same interval and overtaking all other strategies in the final phase. Statistical testing across the four phases returned log-likelihood ratio statistics, or G² values, of 2247.1 for authorization and 5241.0 for mythopoesis, each on three degrees of freedom and each with p less than 0.001. Effect sizes, measured with Cramér’s V, stood at 0.16 for authorization and 0.30 for mythopoesis, indicating an especially strong association between the crisis and post-crisis periods and narrative-based legitimation.

The interpretation offered is that as Iraq’s institutions matured nominally but remained fragile in practice, their leaders found appeals to formal authority progressively less persuasive. The occupation-era habit of legitimating decisions by citing legality and command gave way to storytelling: narratives of martyrdom, national sacrifice, resistance and historical destiny. This shift tracks Iraq’s political reality closely. In the years after 2003, institutions such as the constitutional drafting process and the electoral commissions derived whatever legitimacy they had from external sponsorship and legal procedure. After the rise of ISIS in 2014 and the mobilisation of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the most powerful justification available to political actors was the narrative of a nation defending itself, in which clerical calls to arms and the martyrdom of fighters supplied a moral story that no legal instrument could match.

The study also examines speech act distribution across institutional arenas, drawing on the speech act theory framework of Searle and Vanderveken. The quantitative picture is one of functional differentiation. Directive and commissive acts, the speech acts of command and promise, concentrated heavily in executive discourse, from prime ministerial addresses to ministerial statements. Parliamentary debate, by contrast, sustained a higher proportion of assertive acts, statements of fact and claim, throughout all four phases. This division of pragmatic labour persisted even as the content of discourse transformed, suggesting that the formal architecture of Iraq’s political institutions shaped how language functioned within them, even while the strategies of legitimation flowing through those institutions changed beneath.

Perhaps the most analytically rich finding emerges from co-occurrence analysis of key legitimation terms, using Mutual Information scores to identify words that cluster together more often than chance would predict. The analysis identifies a persistent semantic tension between the vocabulary of constitutional order and the vocabulary of religious duty. Terms associated with the constitution, elections and the state repeatedly co-occur with terms associated with faith, obligation and the sacred. Crucially, Nazal argues, this pairing does not resolve the central dilemma of Iraqi state-building, namely constructing a sovereign polity under conditions of dependency and fragility. Instead, it enacts that dilemma at the lexical level: every invocation of religious duty alongside constitutional language simultaneously strengthens and undermines the claim that the state’s authority rests on secular, procedural foundations. The tension is not a rhetorical accident but a structural feature of the discourse itself.

Framing analysis adds a temporal dimension to this picture. In non-crisis periods, sovereignty discourse was organised around frames of electoral mandate and economic development, presenting the state as the product of ballots and budgets. During crises, most notably the ISIS occupation of large swathes of territory, the framing reconfigured rapidly around external threat and martyrdom narratives. The study’s framing data thus show discourse responding elastically to security conditions, with the vocabulary of sovereignty bending toward survival narratives whenever the state’s territorial integrity was challenged, and snapping back toward developmental and procedural frames when relative calm returned. This oscillation, the study suggests, reflects a sovereignty discourse that never settled into a stable register during the entire 2003 to 2021 period.

For scholars of post-conflict state-building, the study’s contribution lies in connecting macro-political narratives to measurable linguistic behaviour. The literature on fragile states has long debated whether institutional weakness stems from design flaws, external intervention or local political settlements. Nazal’s findings imply that legitimation is itself a variable in that equation, one that can be tracked empirically. The decline of authorization and the rise of mythopoesis suggest that the social contract in Iraq was renegotiated not in constitutional texts but in stories, and that the state’s ability to command obedience by citing its own laws weakened even as its institutions multiplied. The study is careful to remain within its evidence, noting that no datasets were generated or analysed beyond the textual corpus, and its claims concern discourse rather than causal political outcomes.

The implications nonetheless extend well beyond Iraq. Post-conflict states from Afghanistan to South Sudan have experienced similar sequences: externally sponsored institutions, legitimacy problems, and the eventual ascendancy of narrative and identity-based justification over procedural authority. If legitimation density can be measured and tracked, it offers analysts a leading indicator of institutional health, detectable in political language before it manifests in constitutional crisis or street protest. The Iraqi case, as documented here, suggests that when a state stops being able to legitimate itself through law and starts needing myths to hold itself together, that shift is not rhetorical decoration. It is the political story of the state itself, written one speech, one debate and one communiqué at a time, and now, for the first time, counted.

Subject of Research: Legitimation strategies and institutional development in post-2003 Iraqi political discourse

Article Title: Legitimation and institutional development in Iraqi political discourse from 2003 to 2021

Article References: Nazal, A. A. (2026). Legitimation and institutional development in Iraqi political discourse from 2003 to 2021. SN Social Sciences, 6(10), Article 460. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-026-01751-8

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43545-026-01751-8

Keywords: Iraq, political discourse, legitimation strategies, Critical Discourse Analysis, state-building, fragile states, mythopoesis, speech acts, sovereignty, corpus linguistics, post-conflict, framing analysis