Why Public Trust in Science Is Falling in the Age of Information
Scientific progress has never moved faster. Genome editing is reshaping medical research, quantum computing is advancing the boundaries of information technology, and smartphones have placed extraordinary computing power in billions of hands. Yet the expansion of scientific knowledge has coincided with a deepening public distrust of scientists and scientific institutions. In his new book, Anti-Science: Shortcuts to a Big Idea, Professor Dariusz Jemielniak argues that this apparent contradiction cannot be explained simply by public ignorance or ineffective science communication. Instead, he describes a fundamental transformation in how societies decide what counts as knowledge, evidence and truth.
“We have entered a period in which the relationship between information and truth has become fundamentally contested,” says Jemielniak, a professor at Kozminski University. Digital technologies have made reliable information easier to access, but they have also made false claims easier to produce, distribute and amplify. The result is an environment in which accurate scientific findings compete for attention with conspiracy theories, manipulated data and emotionally powerful misinformation, often on platforms that reward engagement rather than accuracy.
During the mid-twentieth century, public confidence in scientists was closely linked to perceptions of progress and prosperity. Scientific institutions were associated with public health, technological innovation and solutions to social problems. That confidence has weakened as people have encountered corporate influence scandals, research fraud, high-profile retractions and an overwhelming volume of scientific information. These factors alone do not explain the collapse of trust, Jemielniak says, but they become more damaging when combined with a digital infrastructure designed to spread provocative content at high speed.
Social media recommendation systems typically measure success through clicks, comments, shares and viewing time. They do not necessarily distinguish between a carefully conducted study and a sensational claim. Content that generates anger, fear or surprise can therefore travel farther than cautious explanations of uncertainty. Online communities can also form around almost any belief, creating echo chambers in which users repeatedly encounter claims that confirm their existing views. “What is historically distinctive is the contemporary infrastructure that accelerates these cycles by rewarding outrage, simplifying complex disputes into identity signals, and turning epistemic conflict into content,” Jemielniak explains.
The problem is intensified by the specialisation of modern science. Research fields have become so technically complex that even trained scientists often depend on specialists outside their own disciplines. For the public, evaluating a claim may require knowledge of experimental design, statistical inference, measurement error, causal reasoning and the limits of available evidence. Most people cannot independently verify such claims, so they must rely on institutions and experts. This condition, known as epistemic dependence, is not irrational; it is an unavoidable feature of a society built on advanced knowledge. But it becomes fragile when institutions appear secretive, conflicted or inconsistent.
“When people cannot evaluate scientific claims for themselves, they must rely on trust,” Jemielniak says. If that trust is weakened by misconduct, contradictory expert statements or alienating technical language, alternative explanations can become more attractive. Such explanations often appear simpler and more personal, even when they lack empirical support. The appeal comes not necessarily from superior evidence, but from the sense that the explanation is understandable, emotionally satisfying and connected to everyday experience.
Human cognition also gives personal stories an advantage over statistical evidence. For most of human history, people exchanged knowledge through narratives shared within families and communities. A personal account of an illness improving after a treatment, or a child developing symptoms after vaccination, is concrete and emotionally vivid. By contrast, a peer-reviewed analysis may summarise thousands of cases using probability estimates, confidence intervals and discussions of methodological limitations. Statistics can provide stronger evidence, but stories are often easier to remember and more compelling to share. This cognitive preference can cause isolated experiences to outweigh large bodies of carefully collected data.
Scientific disputes become even more difficult to resolve when they are tied to political identity. Climate change, vaccine safety and evolution are no longer treated solely as empirical questions in many communities; they have become signals of group membership. Research discussed in Jemielniak’s book suggests that greater scientific literacy can sometimes intensify partisan divisions over climate change. When people use their knowledge to defend an existing political identity, additional information may strengthen motivated reasoning rather than encourage impartial evaluation. Changing one’s position can also carry social costs, including criticism, exclusion or estrangement from friends and relatives.
The consequences extend beyond individual beliefs. Research covering 158 countries between 2000 and 2019 found that social media can support democracy by enabling broader participation and exposure to diverse viewpoints, while disinformation is associated with democratic decline. In democratic systems, high levels of disinformation are linked to a greater likelihood of autocratisation. In authoritarian systems, misinformation can help rulers preserve the status quo. When citizens cannot agree on basic facts, expertise is dismissed as inherently biased and truth is reduced to personal opinion, democratic institutions lose the shared factual foundation required for collective decision-making.
Jemielniak rejects the idea that the answer is simply to provide more scientific information. Decades of research suggest that additional facts do not automatically change attitudes or behaviour, particularly when distrust is rooted in social experience, political identity or perceived institutional betrayal. Rebuilding confidence requires understanding where different groups draw the boundaries of trust, including legitimate concerns about pharmaceutical companies, government decisions and past failures within science. The response must also involve structural reforms: greater transparency, clearer communication of uncertainty, accountability for digital platforms, transparent political advertising and sustained support for high-quality journalism. Trust, Jemielniak argues, cannot be demanded as a consequence of expertise. It must be earned through openness, accountability and a visible commitment to the public interest.
Subject of Research: Public trust in science, anti-science sentiment, misinformation and the relationship between scientific expertise and democracy.
Article Title: Why Public Trust in Science Is Falling in the Age of Information
Web References: https://www.routledge.com/Anti-Science-Shortcuts-to-a-Big-Idea/Jemielniak/p/book/9781041212980; http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003726517
References: Jemielniak, Dariusz. Anti-Science: Shortcuts to a Big Idea. DOI: 10.4324/9781003726517
Keywords: Science communication, science journalism, science advocacy, scientific literacy, scientific community, education, society, sociology, communications, mass media, propaganda, public relations, social media, misinformation, human thought, scientific method, philosophy of science, sociolinguistics, democracy, public trust in science
