When U.S. allies enter war, Washington often finds that its influence is hardest to convert into timely political outcomes. Even with unmatched military and financial capacity, it can be slow to shape allies’ strategic direction—particularly once conflicts evolve beyond initial assumptions. A new Brookings Institution report argues that the U.S. should improve how it communicates its goals from the very beginning and should be more willing to pressure partners to adjust course when facts on the ground change.
The report’s author, Dafna Rand, a senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings and former senior State Department official, studies four recent allied wars: Ukraine and Russia, Israel and Hamas, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and Afghanistan and the Taliban. Rand draws on more than 30 in-depth interviews with senior U.S. and foreign officials. Her analysis emphasizes that the U.S. is only one actor among many, yet argues that clearer aims and better leverage can still reduce misalignment.
Rand highlights a recurring pattern: early in a conflict, both allies and even adversaries may be more receptive to external influence. But as wars continue, commitment hardens, negotiation space shrinks, and “mission creep” becomes institutional. In that sense, ending wars becomes not only politically harder but also structurally more complex—especially when conflicts shift toward insurgencies and terrorist campaigns rather than conventional interstate battles.
In the Gaza war, for example, the U.S. urged limits on the conflict, stressing that fully destroying Hamas was likely impossible. Rand’s sources suggest Israeli leadership did not fully absorb that message at senior levels. Moreover, the U.S. and Israel reportedly lacked shared agreement on duration and overall strategy, with the U.S. prioritizing hostage release and Israel prioritizing complete organizational destruction.
The report argues that leverage could matter most early, including through calibrated threats or withholding of specific weapons to incentivize moderation. It also notes that modern conflicts generate prolonged uncertainty: militant groups rarely declare an end state and can disperse into clandestine networks, extending fighting long after public milestones are reached.
Rand proposes operational improvements for U.S. decision-makers. First, allies and the U.S. should align on strategic plans and goals at the outset. Second, security assistance should be reviewed through a structured interagency process that explicitly accounts for humanitarian obligations and compliance with the laws of armed conflict.
Finally, the report warns that U.S. messaging must be internally consistent and externally legible. Mixed signals—such as simultaneously offering unequivocal support while other agencies communicate more tentative intent—can confuse allied leadership about what Washington truly expects. It also urges that key U.S. messages reach fragmented allied decision structures, including siloed bureaucracies and influential non-executive channels.
Overall, Rand concludes that conflict management requires not only resources, but also coherent communication, early alignment, and the strategic use of leverage before war becomes harder to exit than it is to enter.
Subject of Research: People
Article Title: N/A
News Publication Date: 27-Jul-2026
Web References: https://www.brookings.edu/people/dafna-rand/
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Keywords: war, civil wars, warfare, international law, international cooperation, globalization, international relations, government, public policy, terrorism
