The theoretical backbone of the research is Group Threat Theory, a framework rooted in the work of Herbert Blumer in 1958 and later developed by scholars such as Lincoln Quillian. The theory holds that prejudice stems from a

The multilevel design of the study deserves particular attention, because it reflects a methodological consensus that has gradually taken hold in research on immigration attitudes. Attitudes toward migrants are formed at two distinct levels simultaneously: the individual level, where personal circumstances such as education, employment, and age shape how people interpret their surroundings, and the national level, where macroeconomic conditions and the scale of migration set the broader backdrop against which those interpretations unfold. By combining the 2020 Latinobarometro survey with country-level data on immigration shares and per capita GDP, the authors were able to disentangle these two layers rather than collapsing them into a single aggregate picture. This matters because studies that rely solely on individual-level surveys risk attributing to personal characteristics what are actually responses to national conditions, and vice versa. A respondent in a prosperous economy and a respondent in a struggling one may hold identical personal profiles yet encounter very different labor markets, very different public debates, and very different densities of migrant presence in daily life.

The counterintuitive initial finding—that higher per capita GDP was associated with greater perceptions of immigration as harmful—invites careful interpretation. One plausible reading is that wealthier countries in the region, such as Chile, have attracted larger and more visible migrant flows precisely because their economies offer more opportunities. Prosperity, in other words, is not independent of migration: it is partly a magnet for it. If richer countries host more migrants, then a naive correlation between GDP and negative attitudes may simply be picking up the fact that citizens of destination countries with substantial migrant populations are more exposed to the perceived competition that Group Threat Theory describes. This is precisely why the inclusion of the share of Venezuelan migrants in the model proves so consequential. Once the composition of the migrant population is held constant, the effect of GDP reverses direction and becomes negative and statistically significant, aligning with the theoretical expectation that economic security should dampen perceived threat. The economic context, in this reading, does mitigate hostility—but only when the analysis accounts for who the migrants are, not merely how many of them there are.

The prominence of the Venezuelan share as a variable raises broader questions about how the salience of particular migrant groups shapes public opinion. Venezuelans arriving in neighboring countries after 2015 were not an undifferentiated mass of foreigners; they were refugees and migrants fleeing a highly publicized political and economic collapse, often arriving with visible needs for housing, healthcare, and employment. Their presence dominated regional news coverage, featured prominently in political campaigns, and became entangled with domestic ideological battles in countries such as Peru and Colombia. Group Threat Theory would predict that a group perceived as numerous, culturally distinct, and economically competitive would attract heightened hostility, but the Venezuelan case suggests an additional layer: the political and social salience of the group itself. Public attitudes may respond not just to the volume of migration but to the narratives that surround it, and those narratives can differ dramatically from one origin country to another. A study that measured only total migrant stocks would have missed this distinction entirely.

The individual-level findings echo patterns documented extensively in the international literature. The association between lower educational attainment and more negative perceptions of migrants has been replicated across dozens of countries and is often interpreted through the lens of labor market competition: workers with fewer credentials perceive themselves as more directly substitutable by newcomers, and therefore experience migration as a more immediate economic threat. Education may also correlate with broader exposure to diverse perspectives, cosmopolitan values, and information environments that temper exclusionary attitudes. The role of employment status is similarly consistent with theory. Economic insecurity—whether actual unemployment or the precariousness of informal work—intensifies the sense that resources are scarce and that outsiders are competitors for them. In Latin America, where informality rates are among the highest in the world and social safety nets are often thin, this mechanism may operate with particular force. A worker without formal protections has little cushion against perceived labor market shocks, making the symbolic figure of the migrant competitor more psychologically potent.

Age, the third significant individual-level predictor, fits a well-established generational pattern. Older respondents across many societies express more negative views of immigration, a finding variously attributed to cohort effects—formative experiences during different historical periods—or to life-cycle effects, in which accumulated concerns about pensions, healthcare, and established social arrangements heighten sensitivity to change. Disentangling cohort from life-cycle effects is notoriously difficult, but the practical implication is similar either way: attitudes toward migration in the region may shift gradually as younger, more educated cohorts age into positions of greater social and political influence.

The ambivalence documented in Latin American attitudes—solidarity coexisting with economic anxiety—deserves emphasis, because it distinguishes the region from some of the more polarized debates in North America and Europe. Survey research cited in the article suggests that many Latin Americans recognize the hardship from which migrants flee, often because their own families have experienced displacement, whether through internal conflict, economic crisis, or natural disaster. Countries that were major sources of emigration for decades have become transit and destination countries within a single generation, and this recent reversal may complicate simple ingroup-outgroup dynamics. A Peruvian respondent whose relatives once sought work abroad may feel empathy toward Venezuelan newcomers while simultaneously worrying about competition for jobs in Lima. The coexistence of these sentiments helps explain why anti-immigrant political rhetoric in the region has often met with resistance even as restrictive policies have gained traction.

The country cases sketched in the research illustrate how national context conditions these dynamics. Argentina’s historical openness to migration, enshrined in policies dating back over a century, has come under strain as recurrent economic crises sharpen anxieties about jobs and public services. Peru’s experience with Venezuelan arrivals has been marked by political polarization that transformed migration into a partisan issue, accelerating restrictive measures. Uruguay’s stable economy and inclusive policy framework have facilitated smoother integration, though concerns persist about labor market access in vulnerable sectors. Chile’s simultaneous reception of Venezuelan and Haitian flows has concentrated public concern on pressure points in healthcare and education, intersecting with pre-existing structural inequalities. Costa Rica’s long history of receiving Nicaraguan migrants shows how relatively stable economic conditions and labor demand can sustain absorption capacity, even as downturns reignite tensions. Mexico’s evolution from transit country to destination adds yet another configuration, with Central American arrivals facing precarity and discrimination despite a range of policy responses. These variations underscore that national economic conditions, policy regimes, and political discourse jointly shape how migration is experienced on the ground.

The finding that perceptions of threat do not necessarily track actual economic competition is among the most consequential implications of the Group Threat literature, and the present study reinforces it. Political discourse and media narratives can amplify fears even where migration levels remain modest, and conversely, communities with substantial migrant populations may exhibit little hostility when integration proceeds smoothly and economic conditions are favorable. This decoupling of perceived from objective threat complicates policy design: simply reducing migrant numbers may not reduce hostility if the underlying anxieties are driven by economic insecurity among the host population rather than by the presence of migrants themselves. Policies that address labor market precarity, expand formal employment, and strengthen social protections may do as much to improve intergroup relations as migration management measures narrowly conceived.

The economic literature on migration’s fiscal and labor market effects offers a useful counterweight to threat perceptions. Studies cited in the article indicate that migrants, when effectively integrated into labor markets, tend to contribute positively to host economies over the long term, boosting domestic demand, diversifying labor supply, and fostering growth. The World Bank has documented how Venezuelan migrants expanded the labor forces and consumer bases of host countries across the region. Yet the article also identifies a structural obstacle that undermines these potential gains: the disproportionate concentration of Venezuelan migrants in the informal sector. Informality limits access to legal protections, social benefits, and stable employment, suppressing both the migrants’ economic contribution and their visibility as legitimate participants in the economy. It also feeds a vicious cycle, since informally employed migrants are more easily framed as competitors operating outside the rules, which in turn hardens host-country perceptions and political resistance to regularization.

For policymakers across the region, the study’s results suggest several priorities. First, the composition effect implies that integration strategies should be tailored to the specific origin groups and narratives involved, rather than treating migration as a homogeneous phenomenon. Second, the reversal of the GDP effect once composition is controlled suggests that sustained economic growth, by itself, will not automatically soften attitudes unless accompanied by policies that manage the visibility and framing of migration. Third, the significance of education and employment status points to the value of investments in human capital and formal labor markets as instruments of social cohesion, not merely economic policy. Finally, the regional scope of the analysis—spanning South and Central America and Mexico—highlights the value of comparative, multilevel approaches in a part of the world where migration research has historically emphasized individual case studies. As the Venezuelan displacement continues to evolve and as climate pressures promise new flows in the decades ahead, understanding how economic context and group composition jointly shape public perceptions will remain central to both scholarship and policy in Latin America.

Subject of Research: A multilevel study of Latin American countries links migrant perceptions to economic context and Venezuelan migration share.

Article Title: Economic context and migrant perceptions: a multilevel study of Latin American countries

Article References: Mazzette, P., & Ruiu, G. (2026). Economic context and migrant perceptions: a multilevel study of Latin American countries. SN Social Sciences, 6(9), Article 383. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-026-01653-9

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43545-026-01653-9

Keywords: migration, Latin America, Venezuelan migrants, Group Threat Theory, multilevel analysis, Latinobarómetro, GDP per capita, xenophobia, economic insecurity, social sciences, Economic, context

The research team searched PubMed and Web of Science for peer-reviewed original studies published between March 2010 and March 2025, following the PRISMA guidelines for scoping reviews. From an initial pool of 2,463 papers, the screening process narrowed the field to just 31 studies that met the inclusion criteria. To qualify, studies had to report data on discrimination in medical settings as perceived by forcibly displaced people in LMICs, aim to investigate discrimination in healthcare or barriers to healthcare access, and be available in English. Studies were excluded if they reported discrimination from the perspective of healthcare workers rather than migrants, if results were not separated from other migrant or non-migrant groups, or if they were conducted in high-income countries.

The geographical footprint of the included studies was narrow. South Africa led with eight studies, followed by Lebanon with five, while Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Türkiye and Uganda each contributed three. Brazil, Iran, Jordan and Kenya each had two studies, and Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Rwanda each had one. Notably, when the researchers cross-referenced their findings against the UNHCR’s list of the top ten refugee-hosting countries between 2010 and 2024, only five of those countries—Colombia, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan and Türkiye—were represented in the literature. Major hosts such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen had no studies meeting the inclusion criteria at all.

The populations studied were similarly concentrated. Refugees from Syria were the most frequently studied group, appearing in ten studies, followed by refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo in eight. People displaced from Rwanda, Venezuela, Burundi, Somalia, Zimbabwe and Afghanistan also featured prominently, while refugees from countries including the Central African Republic, Myanmar and Yemen were entirely absent from the evidence base. Perhaps most strikingly, the review identified no studies at all on internally displaced people, even though they account for nearly 60 percent of all forcibly displaced people worldwide—a gap the authors describe as especially striking given the scale of internal displacement.

Methodologically, the evidence base is dominated by qualitative work. Twenty-six of the 31 studies used qualitative methods, primarily interviews and focus group discussions, and only five used quantitative approaches. None of the quantitative studies employed standardized instruments such as the Discrimination in Medical Settings Scale, which limits the comparability of findings across studies and settings. Only four studies had discrimination against forcibly displaced people in healthcare as their single main objective; the rest explored it as one barrier among many in broader investigations of healthcare access. This methodological imbalance means that robust, generalizable data on the prevalence and context of discrimination in LMICs remain scarce.

Despite these limitations, the quantitative findings that do exist are consistent in direction. Across the studies reporting numerical data, between 10 and 44 percent of refugees reported experiencing discrimination while seeking healthcare. In South Africa, Kibiribiri and colleagues found that 39.2 percent of African refugee women would not return to the same facility if pregnant again due to staff attitudes and neglect, 43.6 percent perceived xenophobia, and 42.3 percent reported carelessness. In Uganda, Rustad and colleagues found that the risk of perceived discrimination among Sudanese refugee mothers rose from 4 percent among host-community women to 10 percent among refugees, attributed mainly to refugee status or language barriers. In Colombia, Unternaher and colleagues found that 12 to 15 percent of displaced Venezuelan women reported experiencing or witnessing discrimination during prenatal care, which was associated with a 42.8 percent lower likelihood of completing at least four prenatal visits. In Jordan, Ay and colleagues found that 40.8 percent of non-camp Syrian refugees reported discrimination by health personnel as a barrier to access, and 29.1 percent expressed distrust in healthcare providers.

The qualitative evidence, while harder to aggregate, is often more visceral. Refugees across multiple studies described being yelled at, treated as though they were unintelligent, denied information, blamed for expressing pain, questioned about their right to bear children in the host country, threatened, accused of burdening the health system, or told to go back to their country of origin. Some reported physical abuse by healthcare providers. Discrimination was also perceived in subtler forms—in the tone and wording of questions about nationality, in longer waiting times, in exclusion from services, in neglect, misdiagnosis, inadequate pain management, and in higher healthcare costs charged on the basis of country of origin. These experiences were frequently identified as barriers to accessing care, leading refugees to delay seeking treatment until their condition had reached a critical stage, to avoid specific facilities altogether, or to disengage from care entirely.

The consequences extend beyond missed appointments. The review found that experiences of stigma and mistreatment contributed to mistrust of health systems and confidentiality concerns, and that refugees reported feelings of worthlessness, heightened stress and trauma, and compromised emotional wellbeing as a result of discriminatory treatment. These findings align with the broader literature on discrimination as a social determinant of health. As the authors note, drawing on the Lancet Series on Racism, Xenophobia, Discrimination and Health, discrimination adversely affects all key elements of adequate care—availability, acceptability, accessibility and quality—and is associated with poorer physical and mental health outcomes, increased mortality and reduced life expectancy.

Why does this discrimination occur? The review found that the underlying reasons often remain unclear in the existing literature. In many cases it was not possible to distinguish whether perceived unfair treatment reflected actual discrimination based on personal characteristics or a more general mistreatment affecting all patients, such as staff shortages or resource scarcity. Some studies that included healthcare providers’ perspectives pointed to contributing factors including resentment toward refugees, work overload, general scarcity of resources, discriminatory policies and language barriers. But study designs rarely allowed direct comparison or objectification of these explanations. The authors argue that understanding the underlying reasons is essential for developing effective strategies, even if the effect on health-seeking behavior is likely to be the same regardless of whether the discriminatory acts can be objectively verified.

Based on the evidence, the review identifies four broad avenues for reducing discrimination in healthcare. First, healthcare providers need training to recognize the specific needs and barriers faced by refugees, including education in cultural diversity, anti-discrimination strategies and legal healthcare entitlements. Second, health systems must be strengthened with adequate staffing, infrastructure, information systems and supply chains, alongside the use of professional interpreters, trained refugee healthcare workers and telemedicine to reduce miscommunication and build trust. Third, inclusive policies are needed that remove legal barriers, ensure access to healthcare regardless of legal status, protect migrants from violence and deportation, and translate global health commitments into national and local frameworks supporting Universal Health Coverage. Fourth, further research is needed—research that uses validated measures of self-reported discrimination, clearly defines study populations, includes appropriate control groups, and examines where, when, why and against whom discrimination occurs. The authors emphasize that improving healthcare alone will not be sufficient: discrimination must ultimately be addressed as a fundamental social determinant of health, requiring action on the deeper systems of categorization, marginalization and oppression that underpin racism and xenophobia in all their forms.

Subject of Research: Perceived discrimination against forcibly displaced people in healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries

Article Title: Discrimination in medical settings as perceived by forcibly displaced people within low- and middle-income countries: a scoping literature review

Article References: Grosheintz-Laval, K. M., Kwizera, P., & Winkler, M. S. (2026). Discrimination in medical settings as perceived by forcibly displaced people within low- and middle-income countries: a scoping literature review. Public Health Reviews, 47, Article 1609595. https://doi.org/10.3389/phrs.2026.1609595

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/phrs.2026.1609595

Keywords: refugees, forcibly displaced people, healthcare discrimination, low- and middle-income countries, scoping review, health equity, xenophobia, maternal health, health systems, migrant health, PRISMA, public health

The research, led by Sipho Sibanda of the University of Western Australia and the University of Pretoria, together with Poppy Masinga, Lekopo Alinah Lelope, and Francis Lynch, focused on Atteridgeville, a township roughly 12 kilometres west of Pretoria. Established in 1939 under apartheid spatial planning, Atteridgeville is home to approximately 64,425 people and reflects many of the social and economic pressures typical of South African urban settlements, including unemployment, crime, and strained public services. In recent years, it has also experienced recurring xenophobic incidents targeting foreign nationals, particularly those operating small businesses, with episodes frequently involving looting and physical violence.

The scale of the broader problem is sobering. According to the Xenowatch database cited in the study, between 1994 and March 2024 xenophobic incidents in South Africa reportedly resulted in 669 deaths, more than 5,310 looted businesses, and 127,572 displacements. The researchers frame these outcomes using Nancy Fraser’s multidimensional theory of social justice, which distinguishes economic maldistribution, cultural misrecognition, political misrepresentation, and misframing of the boundaries of justice. Xenophobic violence, the authors argue, embodies all of these injustices simultaneously: livelihoods are destroyed, refugees are dehumanised through derogatory labels, and their voices are excluded from political discourse that increasingly blames foreigners for the country’s socio-economic difficulties.

To understand the psychological roots of this hostility, the study also draws on Social Identity Theory, which holds that people derive self-worth from group membership and tend to favour their in-group while discriminating against outsiders. In the South African context, citizens are often positioned as a unified national in-group while migrants are cast as out-groups competing for scarce jobs, housing, and services. The researchers complement this psychosocial lens with a human rights-based approach, which treats refugees as rights-holders and host states as duty-bearers responsible for protecting fundamental rights regardless of nationality. Together, these frameworks illuminate both the structural and the interpersonal dynamics that make refugee entrepreneurs especially vulnerable.

Methodologically, the study employed a qualitative, exploratory design. Because no reliable records exist of refugee entrepreneurs in Atteridgeville, the researchers used snowball sampling, recruiting participants through existing social networks until data saturation was reached after ten in-depth interviews. All participants were men, averaging 38 years of age, who had lived in South Africa for an average of seven years. Five came from Ethiopia, two from Nigeria, two from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and one from Burundi. Every participant operated a spaza shop, the informal convenience stores whose name derives from an isiZulu word meaning hidden, reflecting their emergence during apartheid when formal economic participation for Black entrepreneurs was severely restricted. Data were collected between November 2018 and February 2019 through semi-structured, face-to-face interviews of roughly one hour each, conducted at participants’ business premises and analysed thematically following Creswell’s systematic approach to qualitative inquiry.

The findings paint a grim picture of the physical toll of xenophobic violence. Several participants reported being assaulted and injured during attacks on their shops. One described being beaten while perpetrators emptied his store of goods, clothing, and money, leaving him with nothing. Another recounted how looters broke his leg when he tried to stop them from stealing his stock, an injury that still prevents him from walking properly. These accounts align with documented patterns of extreme violence during xenophobic outbreaks elsewhere in South Africa, and the authors interpret them as evidence that such attacks extend beyond economic motives into deeper processes of dehumanisation and misrecognition within host communities.

The emotional consequences proved equally severe. Participants described lasting psychological distress, with some experiencing trauma so profound that they perceived death as an escape. One participant said he sometimes wished someone would stab him so he could die, while another described contemplating self-harm before his faith deterred him. The researchers note that these responses are consistent with wider evidence of elevated anxiety, depression, and trauma among migrants affected by xenophobic violence, and that prolonged exposure to such stressors has been associated with more serious conditions including post-traumatic stress disorder. Importantly, the psychological damage extends to family members, particularly children, who may experience secondary trauma and disruption to their education.

The study also documents how violence destabilises family structures. Several participants reported that their relatives left South Africa because of safety fears or because business losses made it impossible to support them. One man explained that his family returned to their home country after his shop was broken into and he could no longer pay rent, while another described being unable to afford food, school fees, or transport for his children after losing his enterprise. The authors characterise this as a compound vulnerability, in which economic shocks translate directly into broader social and familial instability, echoing earlier research showing that xenophobic attacks can drive affected families into destitution and dependence on external support.

Economically, the destruction was often total. Participants reported repeated break-ins, looting, and vandalism, with some losing their businesses multiple times. One entrepreneur who invested 50,000 rand in his shop now works for a salary of 2,000 rand, while another who previously earned a monthly profit of 5,000 rand after expenses survives on 300 rand per week from an employer. Those who managed to rebuild often did so by selling land in their countries of origin or relying on co-national networks for employment and shared resources. The authors observe that this reliance on informal social capital demonstrates remarkable resilience, but that such coping mechanisms are limited in scope and cannot address the structural conditions underpinning vulnerability. Many participants reported rebuilding their lives without meaningful state intervention, reinforcing concerns about the inadequacy of institutional responses.

Notably, the findings are not uniformly bleak. One participant emphasised that not all South Africans display xenophobic attitudes, describing kind and loving people whose support enabled his survival. The researchers argue that such solidarity, alongside assistance from faith-based organisations and community members, shows that hostility is not universal, though existing support remains fragmented and insufficient. The study recommends integrated psychotherapeutic, material, and financial assistance for affected refugees, including post-incident help desks, community support groups, and joint business forums bringing together local and refugee entrepreneurs. At the macro level, it calls for coordinated, evidence-based strategies, public education campaigns, and stronger legal protections to prevent future violence. The authors also acknowledge limitations, including the small, all-male, single-township sample, and urge future research with mixed methods and gender-diverse samples. As vigilante movements such as Operation Dudula continue to normalise exclusionary rhetoric, the study stands as a reminder that xenophobia is not only a human rights crisis but also an economic one, undermining the township economies, national development goals, and the African ethic of Ubuntu that the country’s constitution aspires to embody.

Subject of Research: The socio-economic effects of xenophobic attacks on refugee entrepreneurs in South Africa

Article Title: A qualitative enquiry into the socio-economic effects of xenophobic attacks on refugee entrepreneurs in South Africa

Article References: Sibanda, S., Masinga, P., Lelope, L. A., & Lynch, F. (2026). A qualitative enquiry into the socio-economic effects of xenophobic attacks on refugee entrepreneurs in South Africa. SN Social Sciences, 6(10), Article 504. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-026-01806-w

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43545-026-01806-w

Keywords: xenophobia, refugee entrepreneurs, South Africa, spaza shops, Atteridgeville, social identity theory, human rights, qualitative research, informal economy, psychological trauma, social justice, migration