The distinction the authors draw between AI and earlier waves of digital government is technical as well as institutional. Previous generations of e-government technology primarily improved the efficiency, connectivity, and accessibility of administrative processes, digitising forms and speeding up workflows while leaving the underlying logic of human decision-making intact. AI, by contrast, increasingly performs the knowledge work of administration: it predicts, classifies, optimises, and generates scenario analyses that feed directly into judgements about rights, resources, and sanctions. The central analytical question, the review argues, is therefore no longer how governments digitalise administrative processes, but how administrative intelligence is governed and distributed across human and computational actors. In the authors’ framing, AI is best understood not as a discrete application but as a systems phenomenon whose consequences ripple across power structures, public values, institutions, decision-making, organisations, and frontline bureaucracy.

That systems perspective, drawing on the tradition of systems thinking associated with Barry Richmond and Donella Meadows, rejects the idea that AI’s effects can be assessed by examining any single agency or decision point in isolation. An algorithm deployed in one part of government depends on professional norms, institutional rules, data infrastructures, and frontline judgements that translate algorithmic outputs into real-world action. To capture these interdependencies, the editorial proposes a six-dimension framework covering the full administrative life cycle of AI. The framework moves from the strategic conditions under which governments acquire AI capacity, through the public values used to justify adoption, the institutions that authorise its use, the decisions officials make with it, and the organisations that implement it, to the street-level encounters where algorithms meet citizens. Each dimension, the authors insist, is a location where AI enters, circulates, and becomes institutionalised in government.

The first dimension, power structures, may be the most politically charged. The review argues that public administration scholarship has too often examined AI only after it arrives inside government, ignoring the political economy of the systems being procured. Governments frequently do not own the capabilities their AI depends on: digital infrastructure, specialist talent, computational resources, and research pipelines are concentrated in large technology firms. Drawing on scholarship on platform capitalism and technological sovereignty, the authors describe a fundamental asymmetry in technical capacity, epistemic authority, and regulatory knowledge between states and major tech companies. This dependence shapes what AI systems are available to governments, what officials can know about risk, bias, and explainability, and how much bargaining power agencies have when seeking access to proprietary source code or audit evidence. Supporting research in the special issue, using OpenAlex bibliometric data, finds that Big Tech’s presence in critical technology research is growing, particularly in AI, raising questions about who controls the knowledge on which public-sector AI increasingly rests.

Public value forms the second and normative core of the framework. The authors stress that in government, unlike the commercial sector, AI adoption cannot be justified by productivity or cost reduction alone; it must serve public purposes such as fairness, transparency, responsiveness, and trust. An algorithm that improves technical accuracy does not settle questions of proportionality or legitimacy, because public agencies must justify how decisions are reached and whose interests are served. A service that reduces processing time but increases exclusion or distrust cannot simply be counted as administrative improvement. Contributing papers in the collection develop this argument in detail: one proposes a value-chain approach for tracking where public value is created or lost across the stages of an AI-enabled service, while another maps 3,268 studies using BERTopic modelling and finds that after 2022, work on algorithmic fairness, ethics, and state-society relations has overtaken earlier emphases on efficiency and service delivery.

Institutions constitute the third dimension, translating public purposes into enforceable rules about who may use AI, under what conditions, and subject to which review. The editorial highlights a structural puzzle: most regulatory sandboxes were designed for private-sector innovation, where regulators supervise firms testing products, but in public-sector AI the state is simultaneously regulator, user, implementer, and accountable authority. One contributing paper adapts the sandbox model into an experimentalist governance framework for government AI, emphasising supervised testing, stakeholder participation, iterative learning, and institutional feedback. The authors connect this to Elinor Ostrom’s nested levels of institutional rules, showing how operational rules govern day-to-day AI use, collective-choice rules govern how those rules are revised, and constitutional-choice rules keep experimentation consistent with administrative law, procurement requirements, and rights protection. Institutions, in this account, do not merely permit or prohibit AI; they define the terms under which algorithmic systems can be tested, trusted, and treated as legitimate parts of public administration.

The framework’s fourth dimension turns to administrative decisions, where the editorial examines experimental evidence on whether public officials actually accept AI-assisted judgement, particularly in budgeting, a domain long understood as political rather than purely technical. The review contrasts two views of human-AI collaboration: augmentation, in which algorithms provide forecasts and rankings without displacing human responsibility, and de facto automation, in which officials defer to algorithmic outputs they lack the expertise or organisational backing to challenge. Extending Nathan Caplan’s two-communities theory, the authors suggest that technical experts, vendors, and data scientists may produce algorithmic knowledge that bureaucrats do not regard as usable or congruent with their problems, producing a decoupling between formal AI adoption and practical utilisation. Bureaucratic acceptance, they argue, is an overlooked condition for successful AI reform: officials must come to see algorithmic inputs as credible, legitimate, and compatible with the responsibilities attached to public office.

Organisations and street-level bureaucrats complete the framework. Implementation, the editorial stresses, is rarely smooth: public agencies inherit legacy systems, fragmented data arrangements, risk-averse cultures, and budget constraints, so AI reforms may look successful at launch yet lose momentum as maintenance costs rise and staff revert to familiar practices. Contributing research on AI-powered platform government shows that organisational inertia is not mere resistance but a mechanism through which prior investments and routines govern the pace and direction of AI use. At the frontline, drawing on Michael Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy, the authors argue that AI does not eliminate discretion but redistributes its materials, changing what officials see, how cases are categorised, and how departures from system recommendations must be justified. Ethnographic work in Finnish public organisations introduces the concept of the moral crumple zone: bureaucrats become accountability buffers who absorb blame for algorithmic failures while lacking meaningful control over the systems that shape their decisions. Experimental evidence from policing further finds that AI-supported enforcement can shift officers toward more formal, coercive styles, depending on the accountability mechanisms in place.

The editorial’s conclusion is stark in its ambition: AI represents a genuine paradigm shift rather than the latest phase of digital government, because it begins to change the nature of administration itself. If digital government changed the machinery of administration, the authors write, AI is displacing the human monopoly over administrative judgement. The review closes with a forward research agenda calling for scholarship to move from national AI policy to AI ecosystems, from AI ethics to AI legitimacy, from adoption to institutional capability, and from street-level discretion to behavioural adaptation. The decisive question for democratic governance, the authors argue, is no longer how governments digitalise administrative processes, but how they govern administrative systems in which computational actors increasingly participate alongside human ones, and whether citizens can still recognise, understand, and challenge the decisions that shape their lives.

Subject of Research: A systems framework for understanding how artificial intelligence enters, circulates, and becomes institutionalised across the public administration system.

Article Title: Artificial intelligence across the public administration system: public values, institutions, and bureaucrats in the algorithmic age

Article References: Cho, W., Fan, Z., & Zheng, Y. (2026). Artificial intelligence across the public administration system: public values, institutions, and bureaucrats in the algorithmic age. Global Public Policy and Governance, 6(2), 103-123. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-026-00151-1

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43508-026-00151-1

Keywords: artificial intelligence, public administration, public value, bureaucracy, street-level bureaucracy, algorithmic governance, technological sovereignty, regulatory sandboxes, digital government, administrative discretion, AI accountability, public sector innovation

The research was conducted by Ge Wang, Haixin Teng, and Zengyang Xu of the School of Public Administration at Central China Normal University in Wuhan, and it addresses one of the most persistent blind spots in the study of algorithmic governance. Scholars have long argued that automation transforms street-level bureaucracy, echoing Michael Lipsky’s classic insight that frontline workers are the ultimate policymakers because they exercise discretion in every individual encounter. Earlier work by Bovens and Zouridis described a drift from street-level to system-level bureaucracy, in which decision-making migrates from human judgment to automated systems. But the new study asks a sharper question: what happens to how bureaucrats enforce — not just what they decide — when AI enters the loop, and how does felt accountability reshape that relationship?

To answer it, the team designed a preregistered survey experiment embedded in the real-world context of honking violations, a common and familiar enforcement scenario for traffic police. Participants were 356 street-level police officers drawn from a representative sample, making this one of the more methodologically robust attempts to measure enforcement style directly among practitioners rather than students or hypothetical respondents. Invalid questionnaires were excluded before hypothesis testing, based on substantial missing data, incomplete experimental responses, or failure to pass embedded attention-check items, and the experimental design was preregistered to guard against selective reporting. Data supporting the findings are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request, and the preregistration is publicly archived on the Open Science Framework.

The experiment crossed two manipulations: whether officers received AI support in the enforcement scenario, and which type of accountability they experienced. In public administration, accountability is conventionally divided into process accountability, where officials must justify the procedures and reasoning behind their decisions, and outcome accountability, where they are judged by the results those decisions produce. Decades of psychological research, from Tetlock onward, have shown that these two forms of felt accountability trigger distinct information-processing strategies, often in opposite directions. The Chinese enforcement context makes the setting particularly instructive, given its documented history of campaign-style enforcement and shifting regulatory styles among frontline officials.

The core findings are cleanly delineated. AI-supported enforcement, on its own, pushed officers toward a more formal and coercive style of enforcement — rule-invoking, sanction-first, procedural — while weakening the educational component, the practice of explaining, persuading, and teaching violators why compliance matters. This matters because enforcement style is not cosmetic. A substantial body of regulatory scholarship, including work by May and Wood on inspectors at the regulatory front lines and by Braithwaite and colleagues on enforcement pyramids, links style directly to compliance outcomes, citizen trust, and the legitimacy of the state. A coercive turn among officers algorithmically nudged into formalism could therefore ripple outward into how millions of daily encounters between citizens and the state actually feel.

Accountability, meanwhile, produced effects of its own that align closely with prior experimental literature. Officers who felt process accountability gravitated toward a more educational, prioritization-focused, and accommodative enforcement style — they reasoned more about how and why they enforced, reserved harsh measures for the cases that mattered most, and left more room for discretion and dialogue. Officers under outcome accountability moved in the opposite direction, reinforcing a more formal and coercive posture, consistent with the idea that being judged purely on results encourages defensive, box-ticking enforcement designed to be blame-proof.

The most consequential and arguably most surprising result is the interaction. Process accountability did not buffer officers against the algorithmic push toward formalism and coercion; it intensified it. Under process accountability, the presence of AI support further reinforced formal and coercive enforcement while further weakening the educational approach. The authors’ interpretation, grounded in the combined-effects framework they develop, is that when officers must justify their processes, the documented, auditable recommendation of an algorithm becomes an attractive anchor — a defensible procedural basis for action. Following the machine feels procedurally safe, and in doing so officers may shed the relational, educative practices that algorithmic systems cannot capture or document. The accountability mechanism designed to make officers more thoughtful may, in the presence of AI, make them more mechanical.

These findings carry immediate implications for governments racing to deploy AI in policing, from automated violation detection to algorithmic risk assessment and case triage. The study suggests that technology procurement and accountability reform cannot be designed in isolation. An agency that pairs algorithmic enforcement tools with process-oriented oversight — often considered the ethically preferable arrangement — may inadvertently deepen the very dehumanization of frontline encounters that critics of algorithmic governance fear. Conversely, outcome accountability’s independent drift toward coercion compounds the problem. If policymakers want AI to augment rather than hollow out street-level discretion, the results imply that accountability frameworks must be engineered to explicitly protect and incentivize the educational, judgment-rich dimensions of enforcement that machines neither practice nor document.

The study also speaks to a growing theoretical conversation about artificial discretion — the hybrid of human and machine judgment described by Young, Bullock, and Lecy — and about why bureaucrats trust AI recommendations, with recent experimental work suggesting that confirmation of professional judgment drives algorithmic acceptance. By demonstrating that enforcement style is a joint product of technology and institutional design, the Chinese policing experiment moves the field beyond the simple question of whether bureaucrats accept algorithmic advice toward the richer question of what they become when they do. As cities worldwide wire AI into everything from traffic cameras to welfare fraud detection, the transformation of the frontline worker may prove to be the most important, and least visible, policy outcome of the algorithmic state.

Subject of Research: Experimental study of how AI support and accountability mechanisms transform street-level police enforcement styles

Article Title: Artificial intelligence, accountability mechanisms, and the transformation of street-level enforcement style: experimental evidence from frontline policing

Article References: Wang, G., Teng, H., & Xu, Z. (2026). Artificial intelligence, accountability mechanisms, and the transformation of street-level enforcement style: experimental evidence from frontline policing. Global Public Policy and Governance, 6(2), 176-198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-026-00146-y

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43508-026-00146-y

Keywords: artificial intelligence, street-level bureaucracy, policing, enforcement style, accountability, process accountability, outcome accountability, algorithmic governance, police discretion, survey experiment, public administration, coercion