The paper, published on 24 September 2026, makes a technical but consequential argument. The standard paradigm typology descends from a specific tradition, the researcher-defined paradigm model articulated by Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln in 1994. Recent work by R. Chafe has shown that this is one paradigm conception among several, not a neutral framework. Kuhn’s discipline paradigms and Burrell and Morgan’s sociological positions perform different functions and rest on different assumptions. The Guba-Lincoln model holds that paradigms are worldviews possessed by individual researchers, declared at the start of every project, and grounded in basic beliefs accepted on faith. Crucially, all of its available positions are organised around a single axis: how the relation between subject and object is configured. Positivism says the subject can access an independent object. Constructivism says the subject builds the object. Poststructuralism, even in Foucault’s sophisticated historicisation of the knower and the known, keeps that relationship at centre stage. None of these options questions whether the two-pole structure itself is fundamental.

That question is precisely what nondualism raises. The position, as the authors define it, is that the subject-object distinction is not a basic feature of reality but a derived, pragmatic structuring within experience. This is easy to mishear. Nondualism is not monism, which answers the question of how many fundamental kinds of things exist with the number one; nondualism declines the question altogether. It is not idealism, which collapses matter into mind, nor eliminative materialism, which collapses mind into matter; both still operate within the two-pole framing. And it is not mysticism. The position requires no special states of consciousness, asserts no hidden unity behind ordinary experience, and does not treat the everyday world as illusory. Its claim is structural: the organisation of experience into a knower in here and a known out there is one way experience gets organised, not the way reality fundamentally is.

The authors are careful about genealogy. There is no generic nondualism, and no single Buddhist nondualism either. The lineage they draw on runs from Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka analysis, which argued that all phenomena, including subject and object, lack intrinsic self-standing existence, through Yogācāra and Chan/Zen, and into the modern Kyoto School founded by Nishida Kitarō. Nishida’s concept of pure experience, a pre-reflective awareness in which subject and object have not yet been distinguished, and his later logic of place and absolute nothingness, gave nondualism a rigorous philosophical articulation that requires no scriptural authority. The authors deliberately avoid Advaita Vedānta, whose nonduality rests on the positive theological claim that Brahman is real. Madhyamaka-derived analysis, by contrast, proceeds by negation and asserts nothing of its own, which is why the authors argue it fits with empirical science, a discipline that likewise asks for no article of faith.

To make this philosophy usable for working researchers, the paper builds on a recent framework called unitlessness, introduced by Krägeloh in 2025. The framework distinguishes three structural levels. The first is units: the level of language, categories, and description, where all standard research methods operate, from quantitative measurement to qualitative coding. The second is unity: pre-discursive experience, what Nishida called pure experience, which is not yet divided into subject and object. The third is unitlessness: the enveloping ground from which both units and unity arise, which cannot be described because description requires units. The levels are connected by bidirectional movement, and the framework is trans-discursive rather than non-discursive: it does not reject language but locates it at one level among others. Nothing in the framework rejects standard methods; it simply recognises the level at which they operate.

The methodological consequences are more modest than one might expect, and the authors are explicit about what does not change. Research methods are left entirely untouched. A researcher adopting a nondual paradigm position uses the same statistical tests, coding procedures, and interview techniques as anyone else. What changes is how findings are worded and what they are taken to show. First-person and third-person methods are located at the same structural level rather than ranked on a hierarchy of fundamentality. The framework does not elevate first-person inquiry, does not privilege practitioners, and does not require researchers to meditate or to have had any nondual experience. The argument is philosophical and structural, not experiential. Nondualism enters paradigm debate on the same terms as any other position, succeeding or failing by whether it generates productive research.

The paper illustrates the difference with a concrete case from neuroscience. A well-replicated finding is that experienced meditators show reduced activity and altered connectivity in the default mode network, a brain system associated with self-referential processing. Framed postpositivistically, such a study measures the neural correlates of a thing called the self, assumed to exist independently of the measurement. Framed nondually, the same data support a different conclusion: the study has correlated two descriptions, both at the units level, one being neural activity parsed into regions and intervals, the other being experience parsed into report categories. What the data show is that the sense of being a bounded self can fade while awareness continues, suggesting that the observer side of experience is something the mind builds and maintains rather than a fixed starting point. The statistics are identical; the interpretation and its scope are not.

The authors also apply a sharp caution to fashionable hybrid methods. Neurophenomenology and micro-phenomenology aim to integrate experiential reports with neural measurement, and the authors accept that reaching pure experience is not their stated aim. But from a unitlessness framing, such methods necessarily parse experience into units: verbal reports become experiential categories, neural activity becomes measurement intervals. The resulting correlations are between two units-level descriptions, not between measurement and experience itself. When this is forgotten, findings can drift into reifying experience as a countable, locatable phenomenon. Similarly, the authors deflate reflexivity: positionality statements are themselves units-level acts that add more units rather than bridging the researcher-researched gap, because that gap is itself a units-level structuring. Reflexive declarations remain useful where methodologically warranted, but they carry no special weight in a nondual framing.

The practical stakes reach beyond philosophy of method. Mindfulness-based programmes are now delivered at scale in health systems, schools, and workplaces, and the research base is vast but uneven, with documented problems of overclaiming when questionnaire scores or neural signatures are quietly taken to be the thing itself. The authors argue that a nondual paradigm supplies principled grounds for methodological honesty: wording results as claims about descriptions of experience rather than experience as such, and stating openly that no method reaches experience before it is put into words. Because first-person and third-person methods sit at the same structural level, qualitative accounts, including reports of adverse experiences that standard scales miss, could enter the evidence base with equal standing. For a field whose findings inform clinical guidelines and public spending, the authors contend, this is a practical contribution rather than an abstract one.

The paper closes with careful boundaries. This is not relativism: empirical adequacy, internal consistency, explanatory scope, and transparency remain in force at the level of scientific discourse. It is not idealism: denying subject-object dualism does not mean reality is all in the mind, and the recognition that phenomena lack inherent existence does not license ignoring their practical reality. Nor does the framework settle disputes between quantitative and qualitative researchers; it locates them. What it offers is a clarification of the paradigm landscape. Researchers whose underlying commitments are nondual, a group the authors suggest may be far larger in mindfulness and consciousness research than the explicit literature admits, can now state those commitments plainly and defend them in methodological terms. Researchers who do not share those commitments lose nothing. What everyone gains is the recognition that the standard typology never exhausted the options.

Subject of Research: Nondualism as a research paradigm for mindfulness and contemplative science methodology

Article Title: Nondualism as a Research Paradigm for Mindfulness Research and Beyond

Article References: Medvedev, O. N., & Krägeloh, C. U. (2026). Nondualism as a Research Paradigm for Mindfulness Research and Beyond. Mindfulness. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-026-02992-7

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s12671-026-02992-7

Keywords: nondualism, mindfulness research, research paradigms, qualitative methods, unitlessness, Kyoto School, Nishida Kitarō, contemplative science, subject-object distinction, neurophenomenology, default mode network, methodological honesty