The editors begin by situating populism within the major theoretical approaches that have dominated the field. Scholars have variously treated populism as a thin ideology, as a discursive style that divides society into a pure people and a corrupt elite, as a political strategy employed by charismatic leaders, and as a performative political style communicated through media and spectacle. Yet, as Otova and Staykova argue, no single model can fully account for the manifestations of populism in Central and Eastern Europe. The region’s political development has been shaped by diverse nation-building processes, a shared but specific legacy of authoritarianism and communism, the turbulence of democratic transition, the demands of European integration, and persistent geopolitical pressures. These conditions are significant, the editorial insists, but they are not automatic causes. They acquire political significance only through processes of agency, articulation, and institutionalization.

One of the central methodological contributions comes from a study of Romania that criticizes the field’s tendency to treat populism as a purely contemporary phenomenon. The author introduces the concept of populist configurations, a framework that situates conditions, institutions, actors, and events within a single analytical structure and across historical time. This approach is particularly suited to Central and Eastern Europe, where state formation, contested sovereignty, external domination, and successive regime transformations have repeatedly reshaped the political landscape. Using the Romanian case, the study constructs a typology, a timeline, and an illustrative example of a populist anti-Semitism configuration, demonstrating how historical grievances and exclusionary narratives can be reactivated and repackaged by modern political actors. The aim is not to identify a single historical trajectory but to replace ahistorical explanations with a comparative and configurational approach that accounts for the diversity, persistence, and transformation of populism both within the region and beyond it.

A second Romanian study shifts the analytical lens from history to contemporary political communication, examining media coverage of protests and parliamentary debates between 2020 and 2024. Rather than assuming a straightforward cause-and-effect relationship between street mobilization and parliamentary populism, the researchers analyzed elements such as people-centredness, anti-elitism, exclusionary othering, claims of sovereignty, and crisis framing across both civic and institutional spheres. The findings are striking: there is no consistent pattern of populist themes spreading from protests to parliament or vice versa. Instead, the study reveals a pattern the authors call parallel politicisation. Parliamentary discourse discusses populist themes in a stable and routine manner, while protest communication is irregular, fragmented, and heavily dependent on specific events. The limited temporal and semantic connection between these arenas suggests that populist politicization can persist independently of continuous transmission between civic and institutional spaces.

This finding carries significant implications for how scholars and policymakers understand the resilience of populist discourse. If populism becomes embedded in the routine communication practices of political institutions, it can survive and even flourish even when civic mobilization is sporadic. The study challenges simple supply-side models, which locate the engine of populism in opportunistic elites, and demand-side models, which attribute it to grievances among voters. Both models, the evidence suggests, are incomplete. Routine political communication itself plays a crucial role in maintaining populist framing, meaning that the normalization of populist language can proceed quietly within parliaments regardless of what happens in the streets.

The Bulgarian case, analyzed by the editors themselves, addresses the question of normalization directly. Their analysis argues that since 2001, populist ideas and practices have become enduring features of the Bulgarian political system rather than episodic disruptions. The proposed typology distinguishes between anti-elitist and nationalist orientations, and between analog and digital forms of populist communication. Migration narratives emerge as one key mechanism through which normalization unfolds. Crucially, the analysis shows that crisis cannot be reduced to demographic scale alone; it is politically and discursively produced. Through what the authors describe as the politics of fear, migration is constructed as an existential threat, while the people are elevated to the status of a morally privileged object of protection. This form of radical demophilia, a politics that claims to speak for and protect the authentic people, can legitimize exclusionary policies and erode liberal norms, all while wrapping itself in the language of democratic care.

Hungary offers a related but distinct perspective on threat construction through the concept of the imported enemy. The 2015 migration crisis, often cited as the turning point that propelled right-wing populism to dominance in the country, is reframed here as less a primary cause and more a catalyst that triggered pre-existing identity-related anxieties amid an already normalized hostility. The study demonstrates how a marginalized or numerically rare group can become a powerful object of fear when state discourse, legal measures, media campaigns, and normative prejudices converge to transform it into a symbol of cultural danger, loss of sovereignty, and national vulnerability. Long-standing anti-Roma prejudices are significant in this regard, forming part of an established pattern of exclusion that predates the migration debate. Once such mechanisms are institutionalized, they can normalize exclusion and cement the boundaries of belonging and citizenship within a moralized understanding of us and them.

The Polish case, examined through the lens of Brexit, provides an original analytical framework for assessing the likelihood of a populist-led exit from the European Union in other member states. Applying this framework to Poland under the Law and Justice government, the study examines the country’s structural positioning within the EU, including its economic dependence on the bloc, the absence of constitutional enshrinement of its EU membership, and the government’s efforts to provoke legal conflict with EU institutions while promoting populist Eurosceptic narratives across the Union. By comparing the trajectory of Brexit with the hypothetical possibility of Polexit, the researchers differentiate among three elements: political agency, structural distance, and inherited structure. All three must be present simultaneously for an exit process to become possible, yet political agency emerges as the decisive factor. Poland proves particularly instructive, because strong public support for EU membership coexisted with a government that strategically cultivated antagonism toward EU institutions.

Taken together, the studies in this Research Topic analyze the historical, discursive, political, and institutional processes that convert existing conditions into populist politics and help normalize them. The collective picture that emerges is one in which Central and Eastern Europe should not be viewed as regions inherently prone to populism, a framing that risks essentializing the region and obscuring the contingent political work that populism requires. Instead, the editors present these countries as ideal cases for studying how populism integrates into history, is politically mediated by actors and institutions, is reproduced through routine communication, becomes normalized over time, and ultimately impacts democracy and its quality. The editorial’s contribution lies in shifting the analytical question from why populism happens in this region to how it is made, sustained, and embedded, a reframing with consequences that extend well beyond the borders of Central and Eastern Europe.

Subject of Research: The causes and normalization of populism in Central and Eastern Europe

Article Title: Editorial: Populism's rise in Eastern and Central Europe: causes and implications

Article References: Otova, I., & Staykova, E. (2026). Editorial: Populism's rise in Eastern and Central Europe: causes and implications. Frontiers in Political Science, 8, Article 2003619. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.2003619

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2026.2003619

Keywords: populism, Central and Eastern Europe, political science, normalization, migration narratives, Euroscepticism, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, democracy, political communication

The research, examined in a News & Views commentary by Raymond I. Orr of the University of California, Santa Barbara, sits at the intersection of political science and social psychology. Its central finding is a paradox: land acknowledgements raise awareness of Indigenous peoples, yet they reduce people’s interest in learning more about them. In other words, the very gesture designed to open a door may quietly close it. Readers who encountered a land acknowledgement came away more conscious that Indigenous peoples exist and have claims to the land, but less curious, less motivated to seek out further information about Indigenous history, politics or contemporary life.

To understand why this matters, it helps to situate land acknowledgements in the broader landscape of settler-state politics. Settler states, governments built on the dispossession of Indigenous populations, have historically managed Indigenous peoples through a mixture of violence, treaty-making, assimilation policy and, more recently, gestures of reconciliation. In recent decades, many of these states have shifted toward symbolic recognition: formal apologies, constitutional mentions, flags, renamed holidays and acknowledgements of traditional territory. Critics have long argued that such gestures can substitute for the transfer of political power, land or resources, offering the appearance of reconciliation without its substance. What made this critique hard to evaluate was the absence of experimental evidence about what these gestures actually do to the people who hear them.

McNamee and Peyton addressed that gap with experiments conducted in the United States and Australia, two settler states where land acknowledgements have become widespread but in different institutional contexts. By randomly assigning participants to encounter or not encounter a land acknowledgement, and then measuring their attitudes and behavioral intentions, the researchers could isolate the causal effect of the gesture itself rather than merely correlating it with pre-existing attitudes. This experimental design matters because land acknowledgements are not distributed randomly in the real world; the institutions that adopt them tend to be more progressive to begin with, making observational comparisons misleading.

The results cut in two directions at once. On the positive side of the ledger, exposure to a land acknowledgement increased awareness. Participants who read one were more likely to recognize the Indigenous presence on the land, an outcome that defenders of the practice can point to as evidence that acknowledgements do at least some of the work they promise. Erasure, after all, is not a trivial problem. Surveys in settler states repeatedly find that large shares of the public cannot name the Indigenous nations near them, and the invisibility of Indigenous peoples in everyday civic life is itself a political condition that benefits the status quo.

On the negative side, however, the same exposure reduced interest in learning more. This is where the psychological machinery becomes important. Social psychologists have described a phenomenon known as moral licensing, in which a small virtuous act gives people a sense of moral credit that licenses subsequent inaction or even less virtuous behavior. The classic formulation, developed in work by Anna Merritt, Daniel Effron and Benoît Monin, holds that expressing a good intention or performing a token good deed can function as a substitute for more costly action. A land acknowledgement, by this logic, may operate as a completed act of respect: having acknowledged the land, the audience feels that the moral work has been done, and the motivation to read Indigenous history, support Indigenous political claims or attend to Indigenous news quietly dissipates.

The Australian context adds a further layer, one that scholars of settler colonialism have explored in depth. Emma Kowal’s work on what she has called the politics of the gesture in Australia examined how official expressions of sorrow and recognition, including the national apology to the Stolen Generations, became entangled with a distinctive discomfort among white settler populations. Recognition, in that analysis, is not simply a gift from the settler state to Indigenous peoples; it is also a performance that manages the settler’s own self-image. The new experimental findings give that theoretical critique empirical teeth. If a gesture of recognition measurably lowers the audience’s appetite for further engagement, then the critique that symbolic recognition substitutes for substantive engagement is no longer just a philosophical worry. It is a documented behavioral effect.

Raymond I. Orr, who writes from the perspective of a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation of Oklahoma and a political scientist specializing in Indigenous politics, frames the findings as a challenge to both sides of the debate. For defenders of land acknowledgements, the results are a warning that good intentions are not enough and that the downstream effects of a gesture must be measured, not assumed. For critics, the results confirm that symbolic recognition can be actively counterproductive, dampening the very curiosity and engagement on which political change depends. But Orr’s commentary also points toward a more nuanced reading: the problem may not be recognition itself but recognition without follow-through, acknowledgement offered as an endpoint rather than an invitation.

That reading suggests concrete directions for institutions that have adopted or are considering land acknowledgements. If the measured effect of a standalone acknowledgement is reduced interest in learning more, then acknowledgements might be redesigned to pair the statement with an immediate, low-cost opportunity for engagement, a link to Indigenous-authored histories, an invitation to a local event, a call to support a specific political claim. The experimental paradigm that McNamee and Peyton have established makes such variations testable. Institutions could, in principle, run their own evaluations, comparing acknowledgement formats and measuring not just awareness but subsequent behavior: clicks, attendance, donations, support for policy. The study transforms land acknowledgements from a matter of etiquette into a matter of evidence.

The broader stakes extend well beyond one ritual. Symbolic recognition is now a central currency of settler-state politics, deployed in constitutions, national apologies, commemorative days and corporate marketing. Whether that currency buys real change or merely buys off the conscience of the majority is one of the defining questions of contemporary Indigenous-settler relations. McNamee and Peyton’s experiments provide the first controlled evidence that the exchange is not neutral: awareness rises, but engagement falls. As settler states continue to multiply gestures of recognition, the burden of proof now shifts to those who offer them. A land acknowledgement, the research suggests, is not a conclusion. It is, at best, a first sentence, and the experiments show that without a second one, audiences tend to stop reading.

Subject of Research: Experimental study of the effects of land acknowledgements on public awareness of and engagement with Indigenous peoples in settler states

Article Title: Recognizing Indigenous peoples

Article References: Recognizing Indigenous peoples. (n.d.). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-026-02619-w

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1038/s41562-026-02619-w

Keywords: land acknowledgements, Indigenous peoples, settler states, moral licensing, political science, social psychology, symbolic recognition, Australia, United States, reconciliation, Nature Human Behaviour, experimental research

The research team, led by Diego Benito, Jose Aguilar, Juan Marcos Ramírez and Antonio Fernández Anta, set out to answer a deceptively simple question. If democracy indices are supposed to capture the quality of democratic life in a country, how much of that quality is actually encoded in the broader social and economic conditions in which democracies operate? Rather than running a handful of regressions, the group constructed classification models for three distinct democracy indices using multiple machine learning techniques and three different dataset configurations: one containing only political variables, one combining political and context variables, and one built exclusively from context variables such as education, health and social development indicators drawn from open repositories including the V-Dem dataset, Our World in Data and World Bank Open Data.

The methodological design is where the study distinguishes itself. The authors trained classifiers on each configuration and then subjected them to a battery of cutting-edge explainability methods: Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME), which probes individual predictions by perturbing inputs; SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP), which distributes credit for each prediction among features using game-theoretic principles; and Feature Importance Based on Random Values (FIRV), which benchmarks feature scores against randomly generated variables to filter out spurious attributions. Crucially, the team added a fourth layer of validation using the RemOve And Retrain (ROAR) technique, in which the supposedly most important features are removed and the model is retrained from scratch. If performance collapses, the explanation was real; if it barely changes, the explanation was likely noise. This combination of explanation and adversarial validation is still rare in social science applications of machine learning.

The results were consistent across all three democracy indices studied. Adding context variables to the political ones consistently improved or at least matched classification performance, meaning the models could distinguish more democratic from less democratic countries more reliably when socioeconomic information was included. More provocatively, models trained on context variables alone achieved predictive performance comparable to — and in some cases superior to — models built exclusively from the political variables that traditionally define these indices. In practical terms, a machine learning model that never sees a single measure of electoral freedom or party competition can still classify countries on a democracy index with remarkable accuracy, simply by examining patterns in education, health, energy and development data.

The explainability analyses then went a step further, identifying which specific context variables carried the most weight. Among the most influential was renewable energy consumption, which emerged as a highly important feature for both the Electoral Democracy Index and the Political Corruption Index. That finding is likely to raise eyebrows in both political science and energy policy circles: it suggests a measurable statistical association between a country’s transition toward renewable energy and its standing on indices of democratic quality and corruption, independent of the political variables usually used to explain those standings. The authors are careful to frame such relationships as insights into the structure of the data rather than proof of causation, but the associations offer new hypotheses about how socioeconomic conditions and democratic quality intertwine.

The study builds on a growing but still contested literature. Previous work had used machine learning to construct new democracy measures, including datasets covering 186 countries from 1919 onward, and a substantial body of research has explored links between democracy and outcomes ranging from economic growth and health to emissions, energy efficiency, public media funding and transparent lobbying. What most of that work shared was a framing in which democracy was the explanatory variable and social outcomes were the consequences. The new analysis inverts the perspective, asking instead whether the social and economic context can reconstruct the democracy measurement itself — and finding that it largely can.

Technically, the researchers faced the standard obstacles of cross-national social data: missing values, class imbalance and the risk of overfitting. Their pipeline drew on established remedies, including synthetic minority over-sampling (SMOTE) to balance classification categories, hyperparameter optimization with the Optuna framework, and careful treatment of missing data following best practices in statistical analysis. Variance inflation factors were used to guard against multicollinearity among features. By applying the same disciplined pipeline across three different indices and three dataset configurations, the team could check whether any single result was an artifact of one index’s particular construction — and the consistency of the findings across indices is one of the study’s strongest points.

The implications extend beyond academic measurement. Democracy indices are not just descriptive instruments; they inform country risk assessments, development aid allocations, governance conditionality and countless comparative studies. If a substantial share of the information in those indices is statistically recoverable from socioeconomic context, then index designers may need to think harder about what their measures actually capture and whether political and social dimensions are being conflated. The authors argue that their findings provide a basis for new data-driven approaches to understanding and strengthening democracy, and specifically for incorporating relevant context variables into the development of future democracy indices and, more importantly, into the design of evidence-based public policies.

There are, of course, limits to what classification models can establish. Machine learning identifies predictive structure, not causal mechanisms, and the study itself does not claim that investing in renewable energy or education will mechanically raise a country’s democracy score. The direction of causality between social development and democratic quality has been debated for generations, and the honest reading of this work is that the two are so deeply entangled that political variables alone were never going to tell the full story. What the study does deliver is a transparent, validated demonstration of that entanglement, using explainability methods that allow other researchers to inspect exactly which features drive which predictions rather than accepting a black box.

For a field that has measured democracy almost exclusively through political lenses for the better part of a century, the message of this research is quietly radical: the context in which democracies exist is not background noise but signal. Education systems, health outcomes, energy choices and broader social development appear to encode enough information to reproduce the judgments of the world’s democracy indices — and sometimes to do so better than the political indicators themselves. As machine learning and explainability tools continue to mature, the study suggests that the next generation of democracy measurement may look less like a checklist of institutional features and more like a multidimensional portrait of the societies in which those institutions either flourish or fail. All data underlying the work comes from open repositories, which means other teams can immediately test, replicate and extend these findings — a fittingly democratic way to advance the science of measuring democracy itself.

Subject of Research: Machine learning analysis of how socioeconomic context variables influence democracy indices

Article Title: Analysis of the impact of context variables on democracy indices using machine learning approaches

Article References: Benito, D., Aguilar, J., Ramírez, J. M., & Anta, A. F. (2026). Analysis of the impact of context variables on democracy indices using machine learning approaches. SN Social Sciences, 6(10), Article 508. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-026-01802-0

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43545-026-01802-0

Keywords: democracy indices, machine learning, explainability, SHAP, LIME, ROAR, political science, socioeconomic variables, renewable energy, classification models, V-Dem, public policy

Scotto’s book, running to 202 pages, takes as its conceptual anchor the theory of intergovernmentalism, the family of approaches in European Union studies that treats member states, and especially their executives, as the decisive actors in European integration. In the classic formulation associated with scholars such as Andrew Moravcsik, national governments negotiate on behalf of domestically defined interests, and the outcomes of those negotiations reflect the relative bargaining power and preferences of the states at the table. A related strand, often called liberal intergovernmentalism, adds a two-level logic in which governments first aggregate domestic preferences and then bargain internationally, with institutions designed largely to lock in credible commitments. The rival view, neofunctionalism, has long predicted the opposite dynamic: crises create functional pressures that push integration forward, transferring authority to bodies such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Justice as spillovers accumulate.

What makes the book’s framing timely, as the review underscores, is the sheer density of crises the Union has navigated in recent years. The eurozone sovereign debt crisis that began around 2010 forced unprecedented interventions, including bailout programs administered with the Commission and the International Monetary Fund, the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism, and the launch of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions program, which signaled a willingness to backstop sovereign debt markets. The migration crisis of 2015 exposed deep fractures over burden-sharing and border control. The Brexit referendum of 2016 marked the first negotiated departure of a member state. And the COVID-19 pandemic produced the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument, a joint borrowing program of historic scale that many observers read as a departure from orthodox intergovernmental caution. Each episode generated its own reform debate, from treaty change proposals to quieter institutional adaptations, and each became a test case for theories of integration.

The analytical stakes of this debate are considerable. If intergovernmentalist accounts are correct, then the Union’s crisis responses should be legible as bargains among powerful member states, with Germany and France setting the terms, smaller states negotiating concessions, and supranational institutions acting primarily as agents of the governments that created them. If neofunctionalist or federalist accounts are correct, crisis responses should show autonomous agenda-setting by the Commission, doctrinal innovation by courts and central banks, and a ratchet effect in which emergency measures, once adopted, are never fully unwound. The empirical record is genuinely mixed. The European Stability Mechanism is an intergovernmental treaty organization outside the EU legal framework, a seemingly intergovernmentalist fact. Yet the ECB’s crisis management, the Commission’s role in policing bailout conditionality, and the community method elements of pandemic recovery spending all point toward supranational entanglement that pure state-centric models struggle to capture.

Scotto’s contribution, as characterized in the review, is to treat these episodes not as isolated stress tests but as a connected sequence through which a particular kind of order, an intergovernmental one, is repeatedly strained and repeatedly repaired. The notion of fragility in the title is doing real conceptual work. It suggests that the EU’s intergovernmental architecture is neither robust in the way federal systems are nor disposable in the way purely contractual arrangements are. Instead, it survives crisis through improvisation: new instruments are bolted on, informal norms are stretched, and the boundary between what member states control collectively and what has been delegated to Union institutions is continuously renegotiated. This resonates with a broader trend in EU studies away from grand theories of integration and toward fine-grained analysis of governance modes, differentiated integration, and the politics of emergency.

The review situates the book within a scholarly conversation that includes long-standing frameworks for analyzing decision-making in the European Union, such as the analytical typology advanced by John Peterson in the mid-1990s, which distinguished among different levels and arenas of EU decision-making, from the day-to-day management of policies to the system-defining choices made at European Council summits. It also connects to comparative work on regional institutions, including the volume Crafting Cooperation by Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, which examined how regional organizations across the world design institutions to manage cooperation and conflict. Placing the EU in this comparative frame matters because it resists the temptation to treat European integration as sui generis, an exception to every rule. Seen alongside ASEAN, Mercosur, or the African Union, the EU’s intergovernmental core looks less like an anomaly and more like one variant of a general problem: how sovereign states build durable collective institutions without surrendering the sovereignty that defines them.

For readers outside the specialized field, the practical implications are easier to grasp than the theoretical vocabulary might suggest. The way the EU handles crises determines who pays, who decides, and who is accountable. Intergovernmental crisis management tends to concentrate decision-making in European Council meetings and finance ministry negotiations, venues where heads of government answer to national electorates but where transparency is limited and smaller states have thin margins of influence. Supranational crisis management routes decisions through the Commission and the Parliament, adding layers of legal constraint and democratic oversight but also slowing responses and insulating decision-makers from direct national control. The pandemic recovery fund illustrated the trade-off vividly: joint borrowing on that scale would have been unthinkable under a strictly intergovernmental settlement, yet its distribution was negotiated in marathon summits in which national leaders, notably the so-called frugal states, extracted rebates and conditions. The resulting instrument was neither purely federal nor purely intergovernmental but a hybrid forged under emergency conditions.

The book’s attention to the reform process, as the review emphasizes, extends the analysis beyond crisis response to the question of what comes after the emergency. Formal treaty revision in the EU is famously difficult, requiring unanimity among member states and, for many changes, ratification in every national parliament and, in some cases, referendums. The bitter experience of the rejected Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the years of institutional wrangling that produced the Lisbon Treaty taught EU actors to prefer instruments that avoid treaty change: intergovernmental treaties among subsets of states, enhanced cooperation among willing members, reinterpretation of existing legal provisions, and informal agreements among institutions. This repertoire of reform without revision is precisely the terrain on which fragile intergovernmental orders are maintained. It allows the Union to adapt to shocks while deferring the fundamental constitutional questions that each shock raises, a strategy that buys time but, critics argue, accumulates democratic and legal ambiguities.

There is also a normative dimension that the review’s framing invites readers to consider. Intergovernmentalism is often defended on democratic grounds: national governments are elected and accountable, so concentrating power in their hands keeps EU decision-making tethered to national electorates. It is criticized on the same grounds: intergovernmental bargaining happens behind closed doors, empowers executives over legislatures, and leaves citizens of smaller or weaker states with little say over decisions that bind them. The fragility Scotto identifies is therefore not only institutional but democratic. An order that survives crisis through executive improvisation may erode the legitimacy it needs to survive the next crisis. As the European Union confronts ongoing debates about enlargement, treaty reform, defense integration, and the rule of law within member states, the question of whether its intergovernmental core can absorb further strain remains open.

The review by Zejin Liu, published on 14 July 2025 in Global Public Policy and Governance, a journal affiliated with the Institute for Global Public Policy at Fudan University, signals that these questions are being read well beyond Europe. For scholars of comparative regionalism and global governance, the EU remains the most institutionally dense experiment in voluntary supranational cooperation ever attempted, and its crisis-driven evolution offers lessons, and warnings, for every other region contemplating deeper integration. Scotto’s book, whatever its ultimate place in the theoretical literature, addresses the central paradox of that experiment: the Union is simultaneously a construction of sovereign states and a force that constrains them, and the tension between those two identities is not a design flaw to be engineered away but the enduring condition of the European order itself. Fragile orders, the book’s title suggests, are the only kind the EU will ever have, and understanding their fragility is the first step toward understanding their resilience.

Subject of Research: Intergovernmentalism in European Union crisis governance and institutional reform

Article Title: Matteo Scotto: Fragile orders: Understanding intergovernmentalism in the context of EU crises and reform process Menaggio, Italy: Villa Vigoni Editore, 2022, 202 pp

Article References: Liu, Z. (2025). Matteo Scotto: Fragile orders: Understanding intergovernmentalism in the context of EU crises and reform process Menaggio, Italy: Villa Vigoni Editore, 2022, 202 pp. Global Public Policy and Governance, 5(3), 297-301. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-025-00119-7

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43508-025-00119-7

Keywords: European Union, intergovernmentalism, EU crises, institutional reform, European integration, eurozone crisis, Brexit, COVID-19 recovery, EU governance, regional institutions, book review, political science