The intellectual genealogy the authors reconstruct begins with Sigmund Freud’s theory of symptom formation. In his 1895 work with Josef Breuer, Freud proposed that clinical symptoms are “overdetermined”—that a seemingly trivial triggering event, such as a hysterical reaction to a cat jumping on a girl’s shoulder, actually draws its power from a history of prior adverse experiences, many of them unconscious. Freud later formalized this into an “etiological equation”: neurosis results from a combination of a disposition, rooted in early infantile experiences and sexual constitution, and an incidental traumatic event that activates it. The clinical logic is elegant: recurring adversity sets the stage, and a triggering event produces the symptom.

What the review reveals is how thoroughly this clinical template colonized the psychology of ideology. Wilhelm Reich, in The Mass Psychology of Fascism, argued that sexual inhibition imposed by rigid, puritanical families creates a submissive character predisposed to fascist ideology—mirroring Freud’s overdetermination, with sexual inhibition as the recurring adversity and economic crisis or sex-negating education as the trigger. Erich Fromm, in Escape from Freedom, made the parallel explicit, writing that “the phenomena which we observe in the neurotic person are in principle not different from those we find in the normal.” For Fromm, submission to a harsh father breeds anxiety, isolation, and powerlessness; economic crisis or declining class prestige then activates these dispositions, driving people to surrender freedom to authoritarian mass movements. The Frankfurt School’s Authoritarian Personality study extended the same logic, proposing that harsh discipline produces a sadomasochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex, with suppressed hatred of parents redirected toward minorities the individual has never actually met.

Even contemporary models that explicitly reject psychoanalysis carry this inheritance. The Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice, developed by John Duckitt, holds that Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)—endorsement of coercive measures, uncritical submission to authorities, and traditional values—expresses Dangerous World Beliefs, while Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)—support for hierarchical intergroup relations—expresses Competitive World Beliefs. But the model’s account of origins echoes the Freudian equation: its 2001 formulation proposed that strict socialization breeds dangerous-world beliefs and RWA, while unaffectionate upbringing breeds competitive-world beliefs and SDO. Its 2017 revision shifted from parent-child relations to socialization in environments of threat, poverty, and inequality—yet the underlying logic linking formative adversity to later ideology remained intact.

The problem, the authors argue, is that this logic works for clinical symptoms but not for ideologies. The trauma literature robustly documents that adverse experiences predict depression, anxiety, and stress: a meta-analysis by Sahle and colleagues found adverse experiences increase the probability of anxiety disorders by roughly 94 percent, and experiencing four or more adverse events raises suicide attempt probability by more than 3,000 percent. But when Vilanova and colleagues compared the predictive effects of adverse experiences on clinical symptoms versus worldviews and ideologies in a sample of 901 adolescents, the contrast was stark. Adversity significantly predicted depression, anxiety, and stress—yet showed essentially no relationship with Dangerous World Beliefs (β = 0.02) or Competitive World Beliefs (β = 0.04), and only weak, slightly negative associations with RWA and SDO. The mean association between adversity and clinical symptoms was over 3.6 times larger than its association with worldviews and ideologies.

The pattern holds across large, representative samples. De Neve’s analysis of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, covering 15,701 Americans, found that childhood verbal violence, corporal punishment, and sexual assault produced only a marginal association with political self-placement (r = 0.07). Unnever and colleagues, using General Social Survey data from 10,352 American adults, found that burglary or robbery victimization in the past year predicted ideological measures with coefficients between −0.01 and 0.02. Kerry and colleagues found that living in high-crime neighborhoods did not correlate with believing the world is dangerous (r = −0.03), that lower family income did not reliably predict seeing the world as less abundant, and that even cancer survivors showed no significant worldview differences from healthy controls. Biographical evidence points the same way: Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill all experienced harsh, abusive, or distant fathers—yet endorsed Nazism, Communism, and liberal democracy respectively. Lula da Silva and Bill Clinton both endured childhood deprivation and domestic violence while pursuing social-democratic politics.

How, then, to reconcile these null findings with the experimental evidence that seems to support the Dual Process Model? The authors’ answer hinges on distinguishing individual from collective experience. Laboratory studies presenting participants with fictional scenarios of unemployment, burglary, or muggings do increase dangerous-world beliefs and authoritarianism. But real-world indicators—national income, GINI inequality indices, local crime rates—fail to reliably predict individual SDO or worldview levels across countries. The resolution, they propose, lies in recognizing that what shapes ideology is not personal exposure but public awareness. Terrorist attacks raise RWA not only among direct survivors but among people who never witnessed them; the critical factor is how widely the event is communicated. Media coverage creates a shared ideological effect across the population regardless of who was actually harmed.

This media mechanism operates asymmetrically. Violence receives saturation coverage: in 23 of 27 Gallup surveys between 1993 and 2024, most Americans said crime had risen the previous year, even as violent and property crime rates declined for most of that period. Prime-time television violence significantly predicts national fear of crime, and frequent consumers of local crime news report being “extremely” concerned about crime even when rates are falling. Inequality, by contrast, is chronically under-covered: it was among the least-mentioned topics in American media in 2023, and the limited coverage rarely includes solutions or detailed analysis. Fewer than half of Americans see economic inequality as a “very big problem”—which in turn reduces support for welfare spending. The framework draws on Cultivation Theory, the finding that sustained media narratives shape worldviews over time, and extends it to social media and streaming platforms.

The Collective Experiences Model that emerges makes several counterintuitive predictions. Where the Dual Process Model holds that rising inequality and resource scarcity should increase competitive worldviews and SDO, the new framework predicts the opposite: collective disruptions that increase inequality should lower CWB and SDO, because historical evidence shows that periods of acute inequality have generated support for redistributive policies—from the wealth taxes of the New Deal after the Great Depression to mass movements in Brazil, Iran, Vietnam, and Cuba. The model also incorporates ingroup conformity: friendship-group average SDO reliably predicts each member’s SDO eight months later, RWA correlates around 0.60 between spouses and roughly 0.40 to 0.47 between parents and children, and the influential ingroup shifts across the life course from parents to schoolmates to university peers to workplace colleagues. Cohort effects add a temporal dimension: the generation that came of age during the Civil Rights movement and Vietnam protests showed lower SDO than adjacent cohorts, and women who lived through National Socialism showed higher SDO than men in their own cohort—an inversion of the usual gender pattern that no parenting-based model can explain.

The implications extend beyond academic theory. If worldviews are shaped by collective forces rather than personal pathology, then prejudice and polarization are not symptoms of damaged individuals but products of media narratives, disruptive events, and group norms—phenomena that can shift when the social context shifts. The authors propose longitudinal panel studies tracking adolescents, an international database of media coverage of violence and inequality, social network analyses of how connections shape beliefs, and multilevel models linking macro-level events to individual orientations. They acknowledge that the model’s components may operate differently across cultures, and they call for engagement with Global South scholarship on ideological development. What they reject is the reductionist reflex: the assumption that authoritarianism stems from punitive parenting, sexual repression, or dysfunctional families. Worldviews, they argue, are not symptoms. They are attitudes—formed, like all attitudes, through the social world we share.

Subject of Research: The origins of worldviews and ideologies in collective rather than individual adverse experiences

Article Title: Challenging the individual adversity paradigm: a shift toward a collective experiences model of worldviews and ideologies

Article References: Vilanova, F., Pratto, F., & Costa, A. B. (2026). Challenging the individual adversity paradigm: a shift toward a collective experiences model of worldviews and ideologies. Frontiers in Social Psychology, 4, Article 1717823. https://doi.org/10.3389/frsps.2026.1717823

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/frsps.2026.1717823

Keywords: social psychology, ideology, worldviews, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, media effects, adverse experiences, Freud, cohort effects, attitude formation, collective events, prejudice