<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>operational outcomes of C2M strategies &#8211; Science</title>
	<atom:link href="https://scienmag.com/tag/operational-outcomes-of-c2m-strategies/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://scienmag.com</link>
	<description></description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 06:37:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.3</generator>

 
<site xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">73899611</site>	<item>
		<title>Green platforms share demand data when C2M efficiency hits a middle ground</title>
		<link>https://scienmag.com/green-platforms-share-demand-data-when-c2m-efficiency-hits-a-middle-ground/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Courtney Benton]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 06:37:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Social Science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[C2M investment efficiency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[C2M strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[consumer surplus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[demand]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[demand data sharing in C2M platforms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[demand information asymmetry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital business models]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[game theory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[game-theoretical analysis of supply chains]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[green service platforms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[green services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[green supply chain management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[impact of demand data sharing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[information sharing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[manufacturer-platform collaboration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[open-access supply chain research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[operational outcomes of C2M strategies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sharing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[social welfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain decision-making]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supply Chain Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sustainable manufacturing practices]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://scienmag.com/?p=339359</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A game-theoretical model shows a green service platform is inclined to share demand information with its manufacturer when C2M investment efficiency is at a moderate level, creating mutually beneficial outcomes for both supply chain members.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A new game-theoretical study finds that a green service platform is most willing to share demand information with its manufacturer partner when the manufacturer&#8217;s Consumer-to-Manufacturer (C2M) investment efficiency sits at a moderate level, a result the authors say runs counter to traditional assumptions in supply chain research.</p>
<p>The paper, published in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications as an open-access article, models a supply chain made up of a single manufacturer and a green service platform. The platform must decide whether to disclose its demand information, and if it does, the manufacturer can adopt a C2M strategy, adjusting pricing and product decisions based on the shared data.</p>
<p>The researchers, Xue Chen, Teng Niu and Shuxia Peng, analyzed three decision scenarios: no information sharing combined with no C2M adoption, information sharing without C2M, and information sharing combined with C2M. This structure allowed them to isolate how each choice affects the platform&#8217;s incentives and the supply chain&#8217;s overall operational outcomes.</p>
<p>According to the authors, the work differs from conventional studies that concentrate on pricing or operational decisions alone. Instead, it integrates platform green services, demand information asymmetry and the C2M strategy into a single analytical framework, revealing how the efficiency of C2M investment reshapes the platform&#8217;s willingness to share information.</p>
<p>The central counterintuitive finding is that information sharing is not always advantageous for the platform. The model shows the platform leans toward disclosure specifically when C2M investment efficiency is moderate, rather than at either extreme of that efficiency range.</p>
<p>Adopting the C2M strategy can itself act as an incentive for the platform to share information, the study reports. In that case, the outcome becomes mutually beneficial for both supply chain members, linking the manufacturer&#8217;s digital business model choice directly to the flow of demand data upstream.</p>
<p>Beyond the two firms, the researchers quantified how information sharing and C2M strategy choices affect consumer surplus and social welfare. These welfare impacts, the paper states, depend closely on the level of C2M investment efficiency, meaning the same strategic choices can produce different societal outcomes under different efficiency conditions.</p>
<p>The authors argue that the study fills a research gap concerning the interactive mechanism among platform green services, demand information sharing and the C2M strategy. They say it also enriches the theoretical system of supply chain information management and digital business model research.</p>
<p>As a theoretical modeling exercise, the findings describe strategic incentives within the constructed game rather than measurements from real supply chains, and the published version is an early, peer-reviewed accepted release that will be replaced by a final Version of Record after further edits.</p>
<p><strong>Subject of Research:</strong> Game-theoretical modeling of demand information sharing strategies in a supply chain with a green service platform and a manufacturer adopting the Consumer-to-Manufacturer strategy</p>
<p><strong>Article Title:</strong> Demand information sharing strategies in supply chains with green services and consumer-to-manufacturer</p>
<p><strong>Article References:</strong> Chen, X., Niu, T., &amp; Peng, S. (2026). Demand information sharing strategies in supply chains with green services and consumer-to-manufacturer. <em>Humanities and Social Sciences Communications</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09517-6" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09517-6</a></p>
<p><strong>Image Credits:</strong> AI Generated</p>
<p><strong>DOI:</strong> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09517-6" rel="noopener noreferrer">10.1057/s41599-026-09517-6</a></p>
<p><strong>Keywords:</strong> supply chain management, information sharing, C2M strategy, green services, game theory, consumer surplus, social welfare, digital business models, Demand, information, sharing, strategies</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">339359</post-id>	</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
