The theoretical backbone of the research is Group Threat Theory, a framework rooted in the work of Herbert Blumer in 1958 and later developed by scholars such as Lincoln Quillian. The theory holds that prejudice stems from a

The multilevel design of the study deserves particular attention, because it reflects a methodological consensus that has gradually taken hold in research on immigration attitudes. Attitudes toward migrants are formed at two distinct levels simultaneously: the individual level, where personal circumstances such as education, employment, and age shape how people interpret their surroundings, and the national level, where macroeconomic conditions and the scale of migration set the broader backdrop against which those interpretations unfold. By combining the 2020 Latinobarometro survey with country-level data on immigration shares and per capita GDP, the authors were able to disentangle these two layers rather than collapsing them into a single aggregate picture. This matters because studies that rely solely on individual-level surveys risk attributing to personal characteristics what are actually responses to national conditions, and vice versa. A respondent in a prosperous economy and a respondent in a struggling one may hold identical personal profiles yet encounter very different labor markets, very different public debates, and very different densities of migrant presence in daily life.

The counterintuitive initial finding—that higher per capita GDP was associated with greater perceptions of immigration as harmful—invites careful interpretation. One plausible reading is that wealthier countries in the region, such as Chile, have attracted larger and more visible migrant flows precisely because their economies offer more opportunities. Prosperity, in other words, is not independent of migration: it is partly a magnet for it. If richer countries host more migrants, then a naive correlation between GDP and negative attitudes may simply be picking up the fact that citizens of destination countries with substantial migrant populations are more exposed to the perceived competition that Group Threat Theory describes. This is precisely why the inclusion of the share of Venezuelan migrants in the model proves so consequential. Once the composition of the migrant population is held constant, the effect of GDP reverses direction and becomes negative and statistically significant, aligning with the theoretical expectation that economic security should dampen perceived threat. The economic context, in this reading, does mitigate hostility—but only when the analysis accounts for who the migrants are, not merely how many of them there are.

The prominence of the Venezuelan share as a variable raises broader questions about how the salience of particular migrant groups shapes public opinion. Venezuelans arriving in neighboring countries after 2015 were not an undifferentiated mass of foreigners; they were refugees and migrants fleeing a highly publicized political and economic collapse, often arriving with visible needs for housing, healthcare, and employment. Their presence dominated regional news coverage, featured prominently in political campaigns, and became entangled with domestic ideological battles in countries such as Peru and Colombia. Group Threat Theory would predict that a group perceived as numerous, culturally distinct, and economically competitive would attract heightened hostility, but the Venezuelan case suggests an additional layer: the political and social salience of the group itself. Public attitudes may respond not just to the volume of migration but to the narratives that surround it, and those narratives can differ dramatically from one origin country to another. A study that measured only total migrant stocks would have missed this distinction entirely.

The individual-level findings echo patterns documented extensively in the international literature. The association between lower educational attainment and more negative perceptions of migrants has been replicated across dozens of countries and is often interpreted through the lens of labor market competition: workers with fewer credentials perceive themselves as more directly substitutable by newcomers, and therefore experience migration as a more immediate economic threat. Education may also correlate with broader exposure to diverse perspectives, cosmopolitan values, and information environments that temper exclusionary attitudes. The role of employment status is similarly consistent with theory. Economic insecurity—whether actual unemployment or the precariousness of informal work—intensifies the sense that resources are scarce and that outsiders are competitors for them. In Latin America, where informality rates are among the highest in the world and social safety nets are often thin, this mechanism may operate with particular force. A worker without formal protections has little cushion against perceived labor market shocks, making the symbolic figure of the migrant competitor more psychologically potent.

Age, the third significant individual-level predictor, fits a well-established generational pattern. Older respondents across many societies express more negative views of immigration, a finding variously attributed to cohort effects—formative experiences during different historical periods—or to life-cycle effects, in which accumulated concerns about pensions, healthcare, and established social arrangements heighten sensitivity to change. Disentangling cohort from life-cycle effects is notoriously difficult, but the practical implication is similar either way: attitudes toward migration in the region may shift gradually as younger, more educated cohorts age into positions of greater social and political influence.

The ambivalence documented in Latin American attitudes—solidarity coexisting with economic anxiety—deserves emphasis, because it distinguishes the region from some of the more polarized debates in North America and Europe. Survey research cited in the article suggests that many Latin Americans recognize the hardship from which migrants flee, often because their own families have experienced displacement, whether through internal conflict, economic crisis, or natural disaster. Countries that were major sources of emigration for decades have become transit and destination countries within a single generation, and this recent reversal may complicate simple ingroup-outgroup dynamics. A Peruvian respondent whose relatives once sought work abroad may feel empathy toward Venezuelan newcomers while simultaneously worrying about competition for jobs in Lima. The coexistence of these sentiments helps explain why anti-immigrant political rhetoric in the region has often met with resistance even as restrictive policies have gained traction.

The country cases sketched in the research illustrate how national context conditions these dynamics. Argentina’s historical openness to migration, enshrined in policies dating back over a century, has come under strain as recurrent economic crises sharpen anxieties about jobs and public services. Peru’s experience with Venezuelan arrivals has been marked by political polarization that transformed migration into a partisan issue, accelerating restrictive measures. Uruguay’s stable economy and inclusive policy framework have facilitated smoother integration, though concerns persist about labor market access in vulnerable sectors. Chile’s simultaneous reception of Venezuelan and Haitian flows has concentrated public concern on pressure points in healthcare and education, intersecting with pre-existing structural inequalities. Costa Rica’s long history of receiving Nicaraguan migrants shows how relatively stable economic conditions and labor demand can sustain absorption capacity, even as downturns reignite tensions. Mexico’s evolution from transit country to destination adds yet another configuration, with Central American arrivals facing precarity and discrimination despite a range of policy responses. These variations underscore that national economic conditions, policy regimes, and political discourse jointly shape how migration is experienced on the ground.

The finding that perceptions of threat do not necessarily track actual economic competition is among the most consequential implications of the Group Threat literature, and the present study reinforces it. Political discourse and media narratives can amplify fears even where migration levels remain modest, and conversely, communities with substantial migrant populations may exhibit little hostility when integration proceeds smoothly and economic conditions are favorable. This decoupling of perceived from objective threat complicates policy design: simply reducing migrant numbers may not reduce hostility if the underlying anxieties are driven by economic insecurity among the host population rather than by the presence of migrants themselves. Policies that address labor market precarity, expand formal employment, and strengthen social protections may do as much to improve intergroup relations as migration management measures narrowly conceived.

The economic literature on migration’s fiscal and labor market effects offers a useful counterweight to threat perceptions. Studies cited in the article indicate that migrants, when effectively integrated into labor markets, tend to contribute positively to host economies over the long term, boosting domestic demand, diversifying labor supply, and fostering growth. The World Bank has documented how Venezuelan migrants expanded the labor forces and consumer bases of host countries across the region. Yet the article also identifies a structural obstacle that undermines these potential gains: the disproportionate concentration of Venezuelan migrants in the informal sector. Informality limits access to legal protections, social benefits, and stable employment, suppressing both the migrants’ economic contribution and their visibility as legitimate participants in the economy. It also feeds a vicious cycle, since informally employed migrants are more easily framed as competitors operating outside the rules, which in turn hardens host-country perceptions and political resistance to regularization.

For policymakers across the region, the study’s results suggest several priorities. First, the composition effect implies that integration strategies should be tailored to the specific origin groups and narratives involved, rather than treating migration as a homogeneous phenomenon. Second, the reversal of the GDP effect once composition is controlled suggests that sustained economic growth, by itself, will not automatically soften attitudes unless accompanied by policies that manage the visibility and framing of migration. Third, the significance of education and employment status points to the value of investments in human capital and formal labor markets as instruments of social cohesion, not merely economic policy. Finally, the regional scope of the analysis—spanning South and Central America and Mexico—highlights the value of comparative, multilevel approaches in a part of the world where migration research has historically emphasized individual case studies. As the Venezuelan displacement continues to evolve and as climate pressures promise new flows in the decades ahead, understanding how economic context and group composition jointly shape public perceptions will remain central to both scholarship and policy in Latin America.

Subject of Research: A multilevel study of Latin American countries links migrant perceptions to economic context and Venezuelan migration share.

Article Title: Economic context and migrant perceptions: a multilevel study of Latin American countries

Article References: Mazzette, P., & Ruiu, G. (2026). Economic context and migrant perceptions: a multilevel study of Latin American countries. SN Social Sciences, 6(9), Article 383. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-026-01653-9

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43545-026-01653-9

Keywords: migration, Latin America, Venezuelan migrants, Group Threat Theory, multilevel analysis, Latinobarómetro, GDP per capita, xenophobia, economic insecurity, social sciences, Economic, context