Economists Jude Igyo Ali and Patricia Lindelwa Makoni of the University of South Africa analyzed an unbalanced panel of 35 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2005 to 2023, testing whether the developmental payoff of financial deepening and renewable energy depends on the quality of governance. Their answer is strikingly nonlinear. Below a precisely estimated governance breakpoint — a composite score of −0.421 on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators scale — expanding bank credit to the private sector produces no statistically significant gain in sustainable development at all. Above that line, the same expansion of credit delivers a developmental return roughly four times larger. Governance, in other words, behaves less like a dial and more like a switch.

The technical machinery behind this claim is considerable. Because economies in the region are tightly interlinked through trade blocs such as SADC, ECOWAS and the East African Community, and exposed to common shocks like commodity-price swings and global financial conditions, the authors first confirmed pervasive cross-sectional dependence using Pesaran’s CD test. Standard first-generation panel methods assume independence across countries and would have been invalid here. They therefore turned to second-generation tools: the CIPS unit-root test, which augments the Dickey-Fuller framework with cross-sectional averages, and Westerlund’s bootstrap-based cointegration test, which established that finance, energy, governance and sustainable development share a common long-run equilibrium across the panel.

With that foundation laid, the team estimated dynamic relationships using two-step system GMM with the Windmeijer finite-sample correction, instrumenting endogenous regressors with collapsed internal lags following Roodman’s procedure to prevent instrument proliferation. The diagnostic tests passed cleanly: first-order but no second-order serial correlation, and a Hansen overidentification test with a comfortably non-significant p-value of 0.632. The headline result from this baseline is that financial intermediation — measured as domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP — significantly promotes sustainable development, while governance quality itself carries a first-order effect, with the coefficient implying that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of governance raises the sustainable-development index by roughly 1.15 points.

The most eye-catching result, however, concerns renewable energy. The coefficient on renewable energy consumption is negative — a finding that seems to fly in the face of a large literature linking clean energy to growth, jobs and environmental quality. The resolution lies in what the indicator actually measures. Because both the World Bank and the International Energy Agency classify traditional biomass — fuelwood, charcoal and agricultural residues burned for cooking and heating — as renewable, a high renewable share in Sub-Saharan Africa often signals continued household dependence on wood fires rather than a flourishing solar or wind sector. Biomass accounts for roughly half of the region’s primary energy supply, and modern renewables remain a comparatively small slice of the mix. The negative coefficient, the authors argue, is an energy-composition effect, not a verdict on clean energy itself.

The centerpiece of the analysis is Hansen’s panel threshold regression, which endogenously locates a governance breakpoint rather than imposing one. The single-threshold specification is statistically significant, with a bootstrap p-value of 0.021, and the estimated cutoff of −0.421 splits the sample into two regimes. Below it — where 392 of 570 country-years, or 69 percent of the sample, still sit — credit deepening is statistically inert for development. Above it, the credit coefficient jumps from 0.0312 to 0.1284 and becomes highly significant. The countries clustered below the threshold, including Chad, Burundi, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo, are marked by conflict, regulatory instability and weak state capacity, while Botswana, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa and Ghana generally sit above it.

One of the most consequential details is which dimensions of governance appear to matter at the threshold. Mapping the composite cutoff back onto its six constituent indicators suggests that the binding constraints are administrative-capacity dimensions — government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law — rather than accountability dimensions such as voice and political stability. In practical terms, it is the operational ability to enforce contracts, supervise banks and implement regulation that unlocks the developmental returns to finance, not democratic openness per se. The authors also note that the threshold reflects institutional quality rather than income status: Rwanda consistently outperforms several resource-rich economies despite lower income levels, showing that sustained governance reform can move countries across the institutional frontier over time.

The quantification is vivid. At the sample-average credit-to-GDP ratio of about 27 percent, crossing the governance threshold increases the estimated development return to a country’s existing credit stock by roughly 2.6 points on the 0–100 sustainable-development index — about 30 percent of one standard deviation — without a single additional unit of lending. And because sustainable development is highly persistent in the data, with a lagged-dependence coefficient of 0.68, these short-run effects compound: the long-run multiplier for governance is 4.51 index points per unit, more than three times its first-year impact. Institutional reform, on these estimates, is not a soft complement to financial policy; it is the multiplier that makes financial policy work.

The authors are candid about the limits of their evidence. A robustness re-estimation with a reduced instrument set, run independently in Python rather than the original Stata environment, failed to replicate the financial-intermediation and governance coefficients, a discrepancy they report transparently and attribute to implementation differences and non-random sample attrition, recommending re-verification before those conclusions are treated as fully robust. They also acknowledge that they cannot disaggregate modern renewables from traditional biomass within the World Bank indicator, and that the resource-curse pattern they observe — resource-intensive economies clustering below the threshold — remains descriptive rather than formally tested.

Even so, the policy implications are hard to ignore. The findings support a governance-sequenced agenda: in the short run, strengthen banking supervision, creditor-rights enforcement and commercial courts; over the medium term, condition development finance on measurable governance improvements and build green development banks; and in the longer run, channel carbon-market revenues toward clean cooking and decentralized solar to accelerate the shift away from biomass. For the two-thirds of the region still below the institutional line, the message is blunt: pouring more credit into weak institutions buys little, while the same investment of political effort into governance could be worth several years of development progress on its own.

Subject of Research: Sustainable Energy Policy

Article Title: Governance thresholds, financial intermediation and the renewable energy transition: implications for sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Article References: Ali, J. I., & Makoni, P. L. (2026). Governance thresholds, financial intermediation and the renewable energy transition: implications for sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Frontiers in Sustainable Energy Policy, 5, Article 1946675. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsuep.2026.1946675

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/fsuep.2026.1946675

Keywords: Governance, thresholds, financial, intermediation, renewable, energy, transition, implications, sustainable, development, Sub-Saharan, Africa