The research team, led by Robert Ugochukwu Onyeneke of Alex Ekwueme Federal University together with Chukwuemeka Chinonso Emenekwe and Chinedum Uzoma Nwajiuba of Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, mined the fourth wave of Nigeria’s Living Standard Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture, a nationally representative household survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with the World Bank. Of the 3,229 farm households in the sample, 1,846 — about 57 percent — practiced crop diversification. The study then merged the survey data with gridded agro-climatic variables from the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia, linking each household’s geo-referenced location to historical rainfall, temperature, and elevation data at half-degree resolution.

What makes the study stand out is its econometric machinery. The central problem in measuring whether a practice like crop diversification actually improves welfare is self-selection: farmers who choose to diversify may differ systematically from those who do not, in ways both visible and invisible to the analyst. A naive comparison of adopters and non-adopters would confound the effect of the practice itself with the effect of these underlying differences. To solve this, the team employed an endogenous switching regression model, estimated by full information maximum likelihood, which simultaneously models the adoption decision and separate welfare functions for adopters and non-adopters while correcting for selection bias arising from both observed and unobserved household heterogeneity.

The model also required an exclusion restriction — at least one variable that affects the probability of adoption but has no direct effect on welfare except through the adoption decision. The researchers used elevation, mean temperature, and rainfall shocks as instruments, arguing on agronomic grounds that these biophysical factors shape the physical suitability of a plot for cultivating multiple crops rather than a single dominant crop. A falsification test supported their validity: the instruments significantly influenced the adoption decision but showed no significant relationship with welfare outcomes among non-adopting households, where they cannot operate through the adoption channel.

The headline results are striking. In the counterfactual scenario where adopting households had not diversified, their expected per capita consumption expenditure would have been about 63,640 naira — roughly 51 percent lower than the 130,875 naira they actually achieved. Nigeria’s 2018/19 national poverty line, set using the same survey round as the data underlying this study, was 137,430 naira per person per year. The expected expenditure of adopters under actual adoption sits close to that threshold, whereas their counterfactual expenditure falls well below it. For the average adopting household, crop diversification is closely associated with the difference between living near the national poverty line and living in deep poverty.

The dietary effects are equally consequential. The Household Dietary Diversity Score, which counts the number of food groups a household consumes over a seven-day recall period on a scale from 0 to 12, rose by an average treatment effect of 2.03 points among adopters. Because the score is bounded, that gain corresponds to adopters consuming roughly two additional food groups per week, moving the average adopting household from just under three-quarters of the maximum possible dietary diversity toward its upper range — a magnitude consistent with a meaningful improvement in micronutrient adequacy rather than a marginal statistical effect. The average treatment effect on per capita consumption expenditure was 0.72 log points, effects the authors describe as large relative to national poverty and dietary diversity benchmarks.

But the study also uncovered a set of counterintuitive adoption barriers that complicate the usual policy playbook. Each additional year of a household head’s schooling was associated with a 4.3 percentage-point reduction in the probability of adopting crop diversification — a magnitude similar to that of formal access to finance, which reduced adoption probability by 3.7 percentage points. The authors suggest that more educated household heads in Nigeria are more likely to pursue off-farm employment or specialized, market-oriented monocropping, and may substitute formal risk-management instruments such as savings, insurance, and non-farm income for the informal risk-spreading function that diversification provides. Extension and commercial input-supply networks organized around specific cash crops may also steer better-educated farmers toward input-intensive production of a single crop.

Access to finance itself showed a negative association with adoption, upending the assumption that credit relaxes the liquidity constraints limiting new practices. One explanation is that formal credit in this context is disproportionately extended for, or used to finance, specialized and input-intensive monocropping — certified seed and fertilizer packages for a single cash crop — rather than diversified cropping portfolios. Meanwhile, distance to road was positively associated with adoption while distance to market was negatively associated with it, a pattern consistent with a subsistence-oriented risk-spreading rationale: households remote from roads face higher transaction costs for market-oriented specialized production and rely more heavily on cultivating multiple crops to meet household food needs directly. Similar patterns have been reported among remote indigenous communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon, where diversification functions as a subsistence strategy rather than a commercial one.

The single most binding constraint, however, was climate itself. Exposure to a rainfall shock reduced the probability of adoption with a marginal effect of −0.717 — more than seven times larger in magnitude than the effect of education or access to finance, and more than an order of magnitude larger than the effect of distance to market. Rather than hedging ex ante against climate risk by diversifying, households that experienced a rainfall shock appear to have depleted the savings, labor, or seed stocks needed to expand into additional crops, retrenching instead toward fewer, more familiar staple crops to secure immediate food needs. The negative sign is consistent with an ex-post liquidity-constraint mechanism, in which shocks leave households without the capital needed to diversify.

The policy implications follow directly from these mechanisms. The authors argue that government agricultural and nutrition agencies should jointly fund a targeted conversion program that removes the specific barriers suppressing adoption: redesigning credit products to explicitly support diversified cropping portfolios rather than specialized monocropping, pairing rural road investment with market-access interventions so that improved connectivity does not simply erode the subsistence rationale for diversification without offering a viable alternative, and bundling diversification advice with climate information services and weather-index insurance in drought-prone areas. Because rainfall shock is the most binding barrier, an initial phase should prioritize scaling index-based weather insurance and post-shock input support in the most drought-exposed local government areas, with credit-product redesign and road–market pairing as complementary second-phase interventions. Extension services may also need two differentiated messaging tracks — one framed around resilience and food security for households already pursuing subsistence-oriented diversification, and another framed around risk-adjusted returns and market access for the more commercially oriented, better-educated households that currently favor specialization. The study’s limitations are acknowledged: the cross-sectional data cannot track how adoption and welfare evolve over time, the binary diversification measure does not capture intensity or interactions with other climate-smart practices, and the welfare measures do not capture asset accumulation, income volatility, or subjective wellbeing. Still, as the first nationally representative evidence on the welfare impacts of crop diversification in Nigeria using an endogenous switching regression framework, the study offers a sobering and actionable message: the practice works, but the systems surrounding it — credit, roads, markets, and climate shocks — currently work against it.

Subject of Research: Climate-Smart Agriculture

Article Title: Crop diversification as a climate-smart agriculture strategy and household welfare in Nigeria: evidence from living standard measurement survey

Article References: Onyeneke, R. U., Emenekwe, C. C., & Nwajiuba, C. U. (2026). Crop diversification as a climate-smart agriculture strategy and household welfare in Nigeria: evidence from living standard measurement survey. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 10, Article 1957540. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2026.1957540

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/fsufs.2026.1957540

Keywords: crop diversification, climate-smart agriculture, Nigeria, household welfare, dietary diversity, poverty, LSMS-ISA, endogenous switching regression, food security, smallholder farmers, Crop, diversification

Poverty in Ghana is heavily concentrated in rural areas, and the northern regions fare worst of all. National statistics consistently show that households outside the major southern cities face limited livelihood opportunities, weaker access to markets, and lower levels of education and health care. Against this backdrop, successive governments have experimented with programs that aim to build productive capacity rather than simply transfer cash. The Rural Enterprises Project is one of the flagship examples, offering business development services, commonly abbreviated as BDS, to small producers and entrepreneurs. These services range from business skills training and technical assistance to support with technology, marketing, and access to finance.

What has been missing, the authors argue, is rigorous evidence linking these services directly to poverty reduction. Earlier studies of business development services tended to focus narrowly on enterprise performance, measuring whether firms grew or became more profitable, without tracing the effects through to household well-being. Where poverty outcomes were examined, the results were often conflicting, leaving policymakers uncertain about whether the investments were worthwhile. The new study set out to close that gap by examining the full pathway, from the services delivered to enterprises, through improved business performance, to changes in household income, food security, savings, health care access, and schooling.

The research team adopted a mixed-methods design, combining quantitative questionnaires with qualitative interviews. Data were collected from 274 respondents in the Zabzugu District, a predominantly rural area where the Rural Enterprises Project has been active. On the quantitative side, the researchers used descriptive statistics to profile the respondents and their enterprises, and then applied two complementary statistical tests to measure change. The paired-samples t-test compares the means of the same group of people before and after an intervention, while the Wilcoxon signed-rank test performs a similar comparison without assuming that the data follow a normal distribution. Using both tests together strengthens confidence that observed improvements are genuine rather than artifacts of the measurement scale. The qualitative interview data were analyzed thematically, following the widely used approach of Braun and Clarke, in which recurring patterns across interviews are systematically identified and organized into themes.

The results paint a coherent picture of improvement across the board. Business development services were delivered at three distinct levels: the enterprise level, where individual businesses received direct training and support; the meso level, involving intermediary organizations and service providers; and the macro level, encompassing the policy and institutional environment. The study found that services at all three levels provided substantial benefits to participating enterprises. Firms strengthened their business practices and performance, and those gains translated into tangible household outcomes. Respondents reported increased income, improved food consumption, greater savings, better access to health care, and increased school attendance for children.

This combination of income and non-income improvements is the study’s central contribution. Poverty researchers increasingly argue that measuring poverty by income alone misses much of what deprivation means in practice. A household may earn slightly above a poverty line yet still lack reliable food, be unable to pay for medical treatment, or withdraw children from school to save costs. The Ghana Statistical Service has itself embraced this multidimensional view in recent national reports, which document that poverty in the country extends well beyond low earnings. By showing that enterprise support improved food consumption, savings behavior, health care access, and education simultaneously, the Zabzugu findings align with and reinforce the multidimensional poverty framework that now guides much of Ghana’s official statistics.

The mechanism, in simple terms, is that better-run businesses generate more stable and higher earnings, and those earnings are then converted into household welfare. Training in record-keeping, costing, and marketing helps entrepreneurs price their goods correctly and manage cash flow. Technical assistance can raise product quality, opening access to better-paying markets. Support in accessing appropriate technology raises productivity. As profits rise, households can smooth consumption across lean seasons, build savings buffers against shocks, pay for health services when illness strikes, and keep children enrolled in school rather than pulling them into work. Each of these outcomes, in turn, protects the household against falling back into poverty, creating a virtuous cycle that single-shot interventions often fail to achieve.

Yet the study is equally clear that the intervention fell short of its full potential. Three constraints stood out. Inadequate funding meant that services were stretched thin or delivered late, undermining their timeliness and quality. Logistical constraints hampered the reach and consistency of support, a familiar problem in rural districts where roads, transport, and communication infrastructure are weak. Most tellingly, beneficiaries’ limited literacy reduced their ability to absorb and apply the business training on offer. Many rural entrepreneurs in the district have little formal schooling, and training materials and methods designed for literate audiences can leave them behind. This finding echoes a broader lesson from the international literature on small business training, which has repeatedly shown that the effectiveness of such programs depends heavily on how well they are adapted to participants’ educational backgrounds.

Based on these findings, the researchers recommend three concrete reforms. First, funding for business development services should be increased and released on time, so that training and support arrive when enterprises can actually use them. Second, the logistical capacity of the implementing agencies should be strengthened, ensuring that services reach remote communities reliably. Third, and perhaps most innovatively, non-formal education should be integrated into the delivery of business development services. This would mean embedding basic literacy and numeracy instruction within enterprise support, or redesigning training to use oral, visual, and hands-on methods that do not presuppose reading skills. Such an approach would allow the poorest and least-educated entrepreneurs, who are often those with the most to gain, to participate fully in the program.

The implications extend well beyond one district in Northern Ghana. Countries across sub-Saharan Africa are searching for interventions that promote productive inclusion, helping poor households generate income rather than merely receiving it. The Zabzugu evidence suggests that well-designed enterprise support can deliver measurable multidimensional gains, but it also warns that design details matter enormously. Underfunded, poorly logistically supported programs that ignore participants’ literacy levels risk squandering scarce development resources. For governments and donors weighing investments in rural enterprise development, the message from Northern Ghana is one of cautious optimism: business development services can move the needle on poverty, provided the programs are funded adequately, delivered competently, and tailored to the real capabilities of the people they aim to serve.

Subject of Research: The effect of business development services delivered through the Rural Enterprises Project on multidimensional poverty reduction among rural households in Northern Ghana.

Article Title: Business development services and rural poverty reduction in Northern Ghana: evidence from the Rural Enterprises Project

Article References: Fuseini, M. N., Sulemana, M., Ibrahim, M. G., Abdulai, I. A., Sulahudeen, M., & Ibrahim, M. M.-E. (2026). Business development services and rural poverty reduction in Northern Ghana: evidence from the Rural Enterprises Project. SN Social Sciences, 6(9), Article 409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-026-01690-4

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43545-026-01690-4

Keywords: business development services, rural poverty reduction, Northern Ghana, micro and small enterprises, multidimensional poverty, Rural Enterprises Project, Zabzugu District, mixed methods research, productive inclusion, Ghana, enterprise training, household welfare

The team, led by Toon Vandyck and including Umed Temursho, Florian Landis, David Klenert and Matthias Weitzel, built their analysis around three comprehensive, budget-neutral scenarios that all deliver the same target: a 55 percent reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. The first scenario relies purely on regulation, tightening renewable energy and efficiency directives, vehicle CO2 standards and building performance rules. The second leans entirely on price signals, strengthening the existing Emissions Trading System and extending it to buildings and road transport through the new ETS2, with all additional revenue recycled as uniform lump-sum transfers to households. The third, called the mix scenario, combines enhanced regulation with a moderate carbon price and splits the extra revenue between household transfers and subsidies for decarbonising residential buildings.

To trace how these policies ripple through the economy, the researchers coupled a detailed bottom-up energy system model, PRIMES, with an economy-wide computable general equilibrium model, JRC-GEM-E3, calibrated on the GTAP 10 database. This hybrid framework captures how carbon prices and technology costs propagate through supply chains into consumer prices, and how they simultaneously affect wages and capital returns in factor markets. The results were then mapped onto harmonised household survey data, merging the Household Budget Survey with the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions through a random hot-deck statistical matching procedure, producing a dataset that records both what each household spends and where its income comes from.

The headline finding concerns the difference between two kinds of equity. Vertical equity describes how policy burdens are distributed across income groups, from the poorest to the richest decile. Horizontal equity describes how evenly the burden falls within each income group, among households that are otherwise similarly situated. When the researchers measured welfare impacts as compensating variation relative to household income, they found that average impacts per decile were remarkably modest, ranging between roughly minus one and plus one percent across all scenarios. Yet the variation within each decile dwarfed the differences between deciles, confirming earlier evidence from the United States that within-group dispersion is the dominant feature of climate policy impacts.

Each instrument shaped this dispersion in a distinctive way. The carbon-price scenario with uniform transfers was mildly progressive on average, because the poorest decile received more in dividends than it lost to higher energy prices. But the transfers were uncorrelated with household energy intensity, so two neighbours with identical incomes could experience sharply different outcomes depending on how much fossil fuel they still burned. Research cited in the study suggests that in Germany, a carbon tax with lump-sum transfers would leave around 70 percent of households worse off despite its progressive design, a pattern that helps explain limited political support. The regulation scenario, by contrast, compressed within-group differences by avoiding a direct price on remaining emissions, but it was mildly regressive overall, since standards raise relative costs for low-income households that spend a larger share of their income on energy, and it generated no revenue to compensate them.

The decomposition of impacts revealed three distinct channels. The expenditure side produced the strongest regressive effects, driven by the fact that residential energy expenditure shares fall as income rises. The transfer channel delivered large relative gains at the bottom of the distribution but also created unequal gains within lower deciles, because the same absolute dividend represents a different relative amount for households with slightly different incomes. The income channel proved surprisingly important: even modest wage changes contributed meaningfully to both between- and within-group variability, because labour income constitutes the bulk of household resources. Carbon pricing raises the cost of energy-intensive production, and part of that cost is borne by labour and capital, compounding pre-existing distortions in factor markets in what economists call the tax-interaction effect. Stricter standards, modelled as an implicit tax on energy inputs with a rebate on output, produced more muted wage effects.

To compare the scenarios on a principled footing, the team constructed a social welfare metric that combines two established frameworks. The first, rooted in Atkinson’s classic work on inequality measurement, embeds aversion to income inequality through a parameter epsilon, ranging from zero, which reduces the metric to a pure efficiency test, to two, which places heavy social weight on the poorest households. The second component adds a horizontal equity penalty, scaled by a weight gamma between zero and one, that deducts from social welfare when households within the same income decile experience divergent impacts, drawing on concepts of equal sacrifice and loss aversion. Setting gamma to zero recovers the canonical inequality-aversion framework, while setting epsilon to zero recovers a purely horizontal perspective, with a continuum of hybrid views in between.

The results of this evaluation were striking. When aversion to income inequality was high, the carbon-tax-and-transfer design won out, echoing earlier findings on the poverty and inequality dividends of price-based policies with compensating transfers. But that dominance broke down when inequality aversion was moderate or low, or when the horizontal equity weight was sufficiently large. With no income inequality aversion and moderate horizontal concern, pure regulation emerged as the preferred option, because standards limit factor market distortions and narrow the within-group impact spread. For moderate inequality aversion combined with meaningful horizontal equity concern, the mixed package of standards, prices, subsidies and transfers outperformed both alternatives, using carbon pricing to lift low-income households through transfers while subsidies, which directly target the households bearing retrofit and technology costs, compressed the within-group distribution of impacts.

The authors argue that this provides an explicit, quantified, equity-based rationale for the comprehensive climate policy packages observed in many countries, over reliance on any single instrument. The findings arrive at a politically charged moment: the European Parliament and Council recently postponed the introduction of ETS2 by one year and adjusted the Market Stability Reserve, decisions that showcase how distributional questions sit at the heart of EU climate politics. The study notes that uniform transfers are inherently temporary, since revenue streams dry up as emissions approach zero, whereas targeted subsidies and standards can shield households from higher energy prices while limiting horizontal disparities and keeping carbon prices in check. The researchers point to the Member State Social Climate Plans as an opportunity to weigh both equity dimensions, while cautioning that future work should incorporate home ownership patterns, energy poverty, incomplete subsidy take-up, wealth inequality and richer labour market heterogeneity. The broader message is that fairness in climate action is not a single dial to be tuned, but a balance to be struck, and that striking it well may be the key to making the transition to climate neutrality politically durable.

Subject of Research: Distributional equity impacts of EU climate policy packages combining carbon pricing, regulation, subsidies and transfers

Article Title: Enhancing fairness in climate action through policy packages

Article References: Vandyck, T., Temursho, U., Landis, F., Klenert, D., & Weitzel, M. (2026). Enhancing fairness in climate action through policy packages. Nature Climate Change. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-026-02751-5

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1038/s41558-026-02751-5

Keywords: climate policy, carbon pricing, horizontal equity, vertical equity, revenue recycling, EU Emissions Trading System, energy transition, policy design, household welfare, computable general equilibrium, climate justice, subsidies

The review, led by Condro Puspo Nugroho of Universiti Putra Malaysia and the University of Brawijaya together with colleagues, screened 2,193 records from the Scopus and ScienceDirect databases and, after a rigorous PRISMA-guided selection process and quality appraisal with the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool, retained 75 peer-reviewed studies published between 2000 and 2025. The authors set out to resolve a puzzle that has long frustrated development economists: individual country studies point in contradictory directions, with some finding that remittances ease poverty and stimulate investment while others report dependency, labor withdrawal and deepening inequality. By synthesizing evidence across income, health, education, agriculture and living standards, the team hoped to identify whether the contradictions reflect genuine regional differences or a smaller set of underlying conditions that determine outcomes.

The theoretical backbone of the review is the New Economics of Labor Migration, which reframes migration not as an individual gamble but as a collective household strategy. In this view, the family that stays behind effectively insures the migrant against local income shocks, and remittances are the mechanism through which that insurance is paid out, smoothing consumption and financing education, small businesses or agricultural investment. Neoclassical theory reaches a similar empirical prediction through different logic, treating migration as a rational response to wage differentials, while push-pull theory adds structural forces such as poverty and political instability at origin and jobs and healthcare at destination. Where the frameworks diverge, the review notes, is in who within the household is expected to benefit, and none of them fully explains how remittance income reshapes the labor decisions of the family members who do not migrate.

On the positive side of the ledger, the evidence is remarkably consistent. Remittances universally raise disposable income and relax the credit constraints that keep poor households from investing. In Kenya, receiving households spend more on healthcare; in Jordan, remittances boost school attendance; in Vietnam, domestic remittances reduce child labor and raise enrollment more strongly than international transfers. Food security improves too: rural migration in Ethiopia was linked to a 22 percent increase in daily calorie consumption and reduced food poverty, while in Ghana and Vietnam remittance expectations increased food expenditure, calorie intake and dietary diversity. In Moldova, transfers financed irrigation and mechanization that offset labor losses, and in Nepal they supported the adoption of improved agricultural technologies, though with effects that varied by local ecology.

Yet almost every advantage traced in the review comes with an accompanying disadvantage. The most robust negative finding is a reservation-wage effect: when transfer income reduces the household’s need for earned income, local labor supply contracts. In Tajikistan, labor-force participation fell by 10.2 percent among remittance-receiving populations even as credit constraints eased; in Kosovo, the retreat from work was concentrated among youth and women; in Vietnam, per-capita income rose while work incentives for remaining family members weakened. In Ethiopia, overreliance on remittances impaired domestic labor participation and agricultural production, and in Jiangxi, China, labor scarcity caused by migration reduced forest management despite higher incomes. The agricultural impact, the authors conclude, is best understood as the net balance between an investment effect that raises productivity and a labor-withdrawal effect that lowers it.

The review’s most politically charged finding concerns distribution. Across otherwise unconnected economies, remittances consistently reduce absolute poverty but tend to worsen inequality, a trade-off the authors describe as recurring with striking regularity. In Cambodia, remittances cut national poverty by about 2 percent while raising the Gini coefficient by 1 percent; in Pakistan, external transfers raised per-capita expenditure at the cost of greater inter-household inequality. The decisive moderator is who can afford to migrate in the first place. In Burkina Faso, remittances from migration within Africa reduced both poverty and inequality, whereas intercontinental transfers benefited wealthier households and reinforced disparity, because only relatively well-off families can fund the high cost of moving to developed countries. In Kosovo, remittances lifted roughly 40 percent of migrant households out of economic vulnerability, but their reach among the very poorest was limited by skill-based selection, potentially reinforcing social inequality.

Consumption patterns add another layer of nuance. In lower-income settings, remittances increase food spending and dietary variety, consistent with households moving beyond subsistence. But in higher-baseline contexts such as Uzbekistan, transfers shifted spending toward durable goods and housing while shrinking the budget share devoted to food and health, a pattern the authors read as Engel’s law rather than deprivation. More troubling, in Sri Lanka increased purchasing power diversified diets but also boosted consumption of less healthy processed foods and threatened local food production, while in a minority mountainous region of southwestern China, migration stabilized household finances yet lowered spending on staples such as wheat and pork, reducing nutritional intake for those who stayed behind. More money and more calories, in other words, do not automatically translate into better nutrition.

The review also distinguishes sharply between developing and least developed countries. In developing economies, remittance use clusters around human capital investment, which accounted for 18 percent of documented impacts, and household consumption and spending patterns at 15 percent, with agriculture and resource management also at 18 percent. In least developed countries, by contrast, human capital investment falls to 14 percent while food security rises to 14 percent and agriculture to 15 percent, reflecting transfers spent on survival needs rather than long-term advancement. Only 8 percent of remittance use in developing countries went toward productive capital formation, suggesting that even in relatively better-off settings, most transfers finance daily consumption rather than investments capable of generating sustainable income. The authors caution that these aggregate shares describe broad tendencies across the reviewed studies, not uniform effects experienced by every household or country.

Perhaps the most sobering thread running through the synthesis is the question of durability. Remittances secure household welfare in the short run, but the reviewed studies converge on a common warning: these gains are fragile, and if migration or its profits stop, families tend to revert to their earlier conditions. In Rajasthan, India, remittances improved living standards but the benefits proved short-lived as migration translated into longer-term instability. In rural Mexico, transfers even dampened political engagement by offsetting grievances over local conditions, weakening pressure on officials to improve economic accountability. The authors argue that whether remittances ultimately promote or constrain development depends on whether they are channeled into education, entrepreneurship and productive sectors rather than transient consumption, and they call for longitudinal research, greater attention to gender and generational dynamics, and studies in local languages to capture the full texture of how these global money flows reshape the families they are meant to sustain.

Subject of Research: The role of migrant remittances in household welfare across developing and least developed countries

Article Title: A systematic review of global evidence on the role of remittances in household welfare

Article References: Nugroho, C. P., Man, N., Ramli, N. N. B., Repin, M. F. B., & Hanani, N. (2026). A systematic review of global evidence on the role of remittances in household welfare. Discover Global Society, 4(1), Article 211. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-026-00553-w

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s44282-026-00553-w

Keywords: remittances, labor migration, household welfare, poverty, inequality, food security, human capital, agriculture, systematic review, developing countries, rural livelihoods, migration economics