IAMs are the mapmakers of climate policy. They weave together energy systems, economics, technology, land use and emissions into quantitative pictures of the coming decades, allowing analysts to compare long-term decarbonization pathways and their trade-offs. When the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report presents scenarios compatible with limiting warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius, those pathways overwhelmingly come from IAMs. The problem, the authors contend, is that almost every scenario in that report assumes gross domestic product keeps rising until 2100, and that assumption cascades through everything the models produce.

The coupling between growth and environmental harm is the crux of the issue. Historically, economic growth has been tightly linked to rising greenhouse gas emissions, resource extraction and ecological degradation. The concept of green growth, championed by institutions like the World Bank, the OECD and the United Nations Environment Programme, holds that technological improvement can decouple GDP from environmental impact, allowing prosperity to rise while emissions fall. But the empirical record is sobering. Observed decoupling rates remain far too slow to deliver the required emissions cuts, and the only periods of declining absolute resource use have coincided with economic recessions. A widely cited review by Hickel and Kallis concluded that green growth theory lacks empirical support, and that sustained global green growth is incompatible with the 1.5 degrees Celsius carbon budget, fitting within the 2 degrees budget only with near-zero economic growth.

When models assume growth must continue regardless, they are forced into increasingly heroic compensating assumptions. Because GDP and energy demand rise together in these frameworks, the models lean on technology to slash emissions intensity instead. That means unprecedented deployment of negative emissions technologies, such as carbon dioxide removal, alongside extraordinary gains in energy efficiency. The numbers are stark: IPCC-aligned pathways assume an average of 6 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide removed per year by 2050 and 13 gigatonnes per year by 2100. Current intentional removal, excluding forestry, stands at roughly 2 megatonnes per year, primarily from biochar, bioenergy with carbon capture, enhanced weathering and direct air capture. Closing that gap would require growth rates several orders of magnitude beyond anything demonstrated, which experts have described as extremely challenging. If that deployment fails, the planet could be locked into a high-warming trajectory.

The authors dissect how this growth bias is embedded in model architecture. In the MESSAGE model, GDP is an exogenous input, typically calibrated to the shared socioeconomic pathways, all of which assume GDP increases through 2100. In the WITCH model, GDP is computed endogenously, but its key driver, total factor productivity, is calibrated to match those same external projections. Either way, growth is baked in. More fundamentally, the utility functions that IAMs optimize treat welfare as a monotonically increasing function of per capita consumption, so the models are structurally programmed to maximize consumption subject to emissions constraints. Following the classic IPAT framework, where environmental impact depends on population, affluence and technology, they hold population fixed, assume affluence rises, and leave technology to do all the work.

That structure produces two troubling consequences. First, it prioritizes aggregate economic output over equity and wellbeing, and technological fixes over sociopolitical ones. Second, it can lead to ethically fraught conclusions. Because population appears as a demand driver, some studies propose climate mitigation through incentivizing lower birth rates, adjusting the population term in the equation rather than questioning affluence or its distribution. The authors argue that making the math work by shrinking the number of people, while assuming perpetual growth and unequal resource distribution, should prompt serious introspection rather than acceptance.

The empirical case for rethinking the wellbeing-growth link is substantial. GDP correlates with life expectancy, health and subjective wellbeing only up to a point, beyond which returns become marginal. Social and political factors, including income distribution, democratic participation and high-quality public services, mediate that relationship and can matter more than consumption itself. In some high-income countries, wellbeing can actually increase when consumption decreases, a finding that aggregate models simply cannot capture. Meanwhile, growth remains strongly correlated with ecological degradation that directly harms human welfare, even when carbon emissions are accounted for.

Alternatives exist, and the paper surveys them. Degrowth frameworks reject the hegemony of economic growth as an organizing principle, prioritizing the downscaling of production and consumption and the redistribution of resources to improve wellbeing, social justice and environmental sustainability. Notably, degrowth does not require depopulation or reduced quality of life; its focus is not necessarily less, but different. Sufficiency approaches aim to improve wellbeing directly by prioritizing consumption that enhances it and avoiding the rest, recognizing that wellbeing gains stagnate beyond a certain level of energy and material use. Both draw support from movements such as Buen Vivir, commons-based communities and the global justice movement, and both are inherently pluralist, favoring socially and culturally appropriate solutions over a single global prescription.

The authors propose a concrete reframing: models should optimize for service provision and the material requirements of decent living standards, rather than economic proxies. Research by Rao and Min and by Millward-Hopkins and colleagues offers quantifiable benchmarks, including roughly 2,000 to 2,150 kilocalories of food per person per day, 60 square meters of floor space per household, 50 liters of water per person daily, 4 kilograms of new clothing per year, and 5,000 to 15,000 passenger-kilometers of mobility annually. Strikingly, meeting these standards for everyone on Earth would require substantially less per capita energy than most of the world currently uses, though inequality can double the energy needed to secure universal decent living. The authors argue these material wellbeing indicators should sit directly in IAM objective functions, with economic growth treated as a model output rather than an input or constraint, and with scenarios still compared across both growth and post-growth assumptions.

Early evidence suggests the shift is tractable. Li and colleagues modified the MESSAGE model by making GDP endogenous and replacing the logarithmic utility function with a non-monotonic one that peaks at a specified consumption level. Applied to Australia, the modified model showed that reducing consumption lowers greenhouse gas emissions, infrastructure requirements and dependence on negative emissions technologies. The broader implication is that the solution space for climate policy is far larger than current models admit. A robust transition pathway, the authors suggest, requires limited technological optimism and support across models with different foundational assumptions. Without widening the lens, the maps that guide policymakers remain incomplete, and humanity may be pursuing the most technologically perilous route to safety while feasible alternatives go unexplored.

Subject of Research: The role of perpetual economic growth assumptions in integrated assessment models and their effect on climate mitigation pathways

Article Title: Structural green growth assumptions in energy system models obscure alternative transition strategies

Article References: Kamana-Williams, B., & Grubert, E. (2026). Structural green growth assumptions in energy system models obscure alternative transition strategies. Frontiers in Energy Research, 14, Article 1984182. https://doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2026.1984182

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/fenrg.2026.1984182

Keywords: integrated assessment models, climate change mitigation, economic growth, degrowth, green growth, GDP, decent living standards, negative emissions, carbon dioxide removal, IPCC, sufficiency, energy system modeling

The research team, led by Frieder Rubik and including Pauline Deutz, Ulrich Petschow, Anne Kildunne and Florian Hofmann, set out to bridge two literatures that have had a substantially separate existence. The circular economy, with its promise of decoupling economic growth from environmental harm through recycling, reuse and efficiency, has taken firm hold with policymakers, particularly in the European Union, where the 2020 Circular Economy Action Plan forms a key pillar of the European Green Deal. Degrowth, by contrast, calls for a managed, intentional downscaling of the economy to operate within planetary boundaries, and remains politically unpalatable. But the authors argue that the two concepts overlap far more than either camp typically acknowledges, and that circular economy research and practice could learn a great deal from degrowth’s insistence on absolute reductions in environmental impact.

To test these ideas empirically, the team combined integrative literature reviews with two contrasting case studies built on semi-structured interviews. The first focused on textile manufacturers in South West Germany, a region with a proud industrial textile heritage now fighting for survival in specialized market niches. Fourteen interviews were conducted with companies ranging from small firms with fewer than 49 employees to large enterprises employing more than 250 people. The second case study examined plastic packaging stakeholders on the east coast of England, in the North Humberside region encompassing Hull and the East Riding of Yorkshire, where the local economy is concentrated in agriculture and food production. Twenty-two interviews captured perspectives from local authorities, waste companies, retailers, food and packaging manufacturers, and non-profit organizations.

The numbers behind both sectors are stark. Global fiber production more than quadrupled between 1970 and 2023, reaching 125 million tons, with synthetic fibers now accounting for roughly 67 percent of the total. Fast fashion has accelerated into ultra-fast fashion, with companies like Shein launching new lines every five to seven days. Only an estimated 1 to 7 percent of textile waste is recycled, and recycled fibers make up just 0.7 percent of textile production inputs. Plastics tell a similar story: less than 10 percent of plastic waste was recycled worldwide in 2020 according to the OECD, while microplastics have now been detected in rivers and oceans across the globe, with documented health consequences for aquatic organisms and humans alike. Even under optimistic extrapolations of current recycling growth rates, secondary materials would still account for only around 16 percent of total plastics production by 2040, meaning absolute volumes of waste would continue to climb.

Against this backdrop, the researchers applied a framework that sorts the circular economy’s famous R-strategies, from refuse and rethink through to recycling and energy recovery, into three clusters. Long-loop options such as recycling are the most widely implemented but are, in the authors’ assessment, necessary yet insufficient on their own to keep production and consumption within planetary boundaries. Medium-loop strategies like refurbishing and remanufacturing could slow resource consumption but remain marginal in practice. Short-loop options, including reducing consumption, refusing purchases, repairing and reusing, carry the highest potential for genuine absolute reductions, but they demand lifestyle changes and social reorganization that current economic structures actively discourage.

The interview findings from both case studies were strikingly consistent. In Germany, all the textile manufacturers pursued one or more R-strategies, but long-loop recycling and energy recovery dominated, chosen because they are administratively simple and economically viable in the short term. Only one company used recycled textile fibers as input material, and short-loop strategies existed only as small pilot projects. The companies framed circularity as a competitive advantage and a way to keep pace with global rivals, particularly from China. As one interviewee put it, textile waste is an economic loss, and another declared the ambition to be pioneers. Not a single company was contemplating a shift toward sufficiency-oriented business models geared to a stabilizing or shrinking textile market. Barriers cited included customer unwillingness to pay premiums for recycled yarns, unreliable supply relationships, concerns about the quality of recycled fibers, and unpredictable regulation.

The English plastics case study revealed a similar picture, though with an intriguing difference. Interviews conducted in 2019 and 2020, shortly after the BBC’s Blue Planet II brought plastic pollution into living rooms, captured a wave of environmental concern that several respondents attributed to the so-called Attenborough effect. A social enterprise representative stated bluntly that it needs to stop because the planet has finite resources, while a local authority official questioned how long it would take for people to realize the urgency. Yet this personal awareness rarely translated into action beyond long-loop recovery. Recycling remained the default approach, reinforced by policy instruments such as the UK’s plastic packaging tax on packaging with less than 30 percent recycled content. A retailer that described removing packaging as the holy grail still found a packaging-free trial fraught with obstacles, from supplier contracts to transport, storage and consumer expectations. Most respondents saw systemic barriers as beyond their control, and personal environmental convictions were explicitly separated from professional obligations to support economic growth and local jobs.

The literature analysis reinforced what the interviews suggested. Of the dozens of publications examined for each case study, only a small minority engaged with degrowth or post-growth perspectives at all, and no papers were found examining plastic packaging from a post-growth angle. Studies that did take a degrowth view, such as modeling work by Bachmann and colleagues showing that even a circular, climate-optimal plastics industry could transgress sustainability thresholds by up to four times, remain outliers. In the textile field, one notable scenario study found that a consumption-reduction strategy would be more effective than a recycling-focused strategy for the EU by 2030, while design researchers have argued that a paradigm shift away from volume growth is essential. Fast fashion companies’ own sustainability reports, meanwhile, simply do not address growth at all.

The authors argue that these findings expose a significant implementation gap between circular economy and degrowth policies. Businesses in both sectors operate within a green growth paradigm, treating circularity as material optimization and risk diversification rather than a pathway to absolute reductions. Local authorities, bound by obligations to support local economies and impoverished populations, reinforce the same logic. Degrowth scholarship, for its part, focuses on social innovations and system-level transformation but offers little practical guidance on transforming specific large industrial sectors. The researchers propose that closing this gap requires sector-specific transformation strategies linking company, networking and policy approaches, potentially oriented around what they call a precautionary post-growth strategy that prioritizes planetary boundaries while remaining open to technological and social innovation.

Ultimately, the study suggests that a genuinely sustainable circular economy would likely require mandated reductions in global production of materials like plastics and textiles, enforced through international agreements of a kind that have so far proven elusive, as the collapse of UN plastics negotiations in August 2025 demonstrated. Whether framed as a fiber diet for fashion or a packaging diet for food, the message is the same: efficiency alone cannot deliver sustainability on a finite planet. The groundswell of public anxiety over plastic pollution, the authors note, could yet translate into formal concern for planetary boundaries and, from there, into political appetite for the deeper transformation that degrowth thinking has long demanded. Until then, the circular economy risks remaining what the evidence shows it to be today: a greening of growth rather than a scaling down of resource use.

Subject of Research: The intersection of circular economy and degrowth approaches in plastic packaging and textile sectors

Article Title: Learning from degrowth: strengthening circular economy approaches through case studies of plastic packaging and textiles

Article References: Rubik, F., Deutz, P., Petschow, U., Kildunne, A., & Hofmann, F. (2026). Learning from degrowth: strengthening circular economy approaches through case studies of plastic packaging and textiles. Frontiers in Sustainability, 7, Article 1767324. https://doi.org/10.3389/frsus.2026.1767324

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/frsus.2026.1767324

Keywords: circular economy, degrowth, post-growth, plastic packaging, textiles, planetary boundaries, recycling, sufficiency, fast fashion, green growth, R-strategies, sustainability transformation

Degrowth has moved steadily from the margins of ecological economics toward the center of scholarly debate over the past decade. At its core, the idea is a deliberate downscaling of production and consumption in affluent societies, paired with the promise that a good life for all remains possible within planetary boundaries. Crucially, degrowth envisions this contraction not as imposed austerity but as collectively defined self-limitation, a society choosing sufficiency over excess. Green growth, by contrast, is the dominant policy orthodoxy: the proposition that economies can keep expanding while decoupling prosperity from environmental harm through technology, efficiency, and markets. The two visions imply very different appeals to individuals, and that difference is precisely what the new research set out to measure.

The study, conducted by Dallas O’Dell, Frédéric Basso, and Ganga Shreedhar, addressed a gap that has persisted even as degrowth scholarship has flourished. Little empirical work has examined which communication and framing techniques can translate the agenda’s system-level focus into individual consumption decisions and self-limitation practices. Equally neglected, the authors note, is the role of the messenger: whether commercial or non-commercial voices are better positioned to promote sufficiency or to advance the degrowth cause. The team ran two online experiments with U.K. millennial respondents, the first with 969 participants and the second with 933, followed by regression analyses to probe the relationships between exposure, values, and stated or revealed choices.

Study 1 focused on what the researchers call sufficiency-promoting marketing, or SPM, messages. These are communications that borrow the tools of commercial marketing to encourage people to consume less, and the experiment compared versions expressing self-orientation without limits, corresponding to a green growth logic, against versions expressing self-orientation with limits, corresponding to degrowth. The comparison uncovered little difference in consumption attitudes and behaviors between the two conditions. In other words, when sufficiency was packaged as a marketing pitch aimed at the individual, whether or not it carried an explicit message of limits made almost no measurable difference to how respondents thought or acted.

That null result carries a sharper implication than it might first appear. The authors conclude that sufficiency-promoting marketing appeared ineffective at making degrowth values relevant to individuals or at promoting widespread self-limitation, which renders the approach incompatible with any genuine degrowth agenda. The paradox is structural: marketing, by its nature, addresses individuals as self-interested consumers, while degrowth asks people to think collectively and to accept limits on consumption itself. A message that invites people to buy into buying less, framed in the persuasive vocabulary of commerce, seems to dissolve the very idea of collective self-limitation it is meant to convey.

Study 2 shifted the terrain from the marketplace to the civic sphere. Here the researchers tested whether communications framed around degrowth or green growth, delivered by a non-commercial messenger, affected civic-oriented values and policy support for collective limitations. The results diverged in an instructive way. Green growth framing garnered higher support for environmental policy, suggesting that its familiar promise of prosperity without sacrifice remains the more effective route to building a political coalition. Degrowth framing, meanwhile, increased the likelihood that respondents would choose degrowth or a-growth positions when asked to take a stance in the growth-versus-environment debate.

Read together, the two studies sketch a division of labor that degrowth advocates may find bittersweet. Degrowth framing, the authors write, inspires values, while green growth spurs policy support. The vocabulary of limits and downscaling can shift where people stand in the abstract debate about economic growth, nudging them toward post-growth or agnostic positions on the question itself. But when the outcome that matters is concrete backing for environmental policy, the green growth frame outperforms it. The message that resonates philosophically is not the message that mobilizes politically, at least not in the forms tested here.

The research also flags a potentially counterproductive psychological dynamic. Degrowth messaging that concentrates on system-level problems and on solutions based on reductions may disengage individuals from mobilizing for societal change. This is a familiar pattern from the broader literature on climate communication: framing problems at scales too large for individual agency, or defining solutions primarily in terms of what people must give up, can produce resignation rather than resolve. For a movement whose central demand is collective self-limitation, the finding poses a genuine strategic dilemma, since the system-level framing that gives degrowth its coherence may be the same framing that leaves potential supporters passive.

The authors present these results as exposing the paradoxical nature of sufficiency-promoting marketing while also revealing psychological implications of degrowth messaging that can guide advocates developing communication strategies in non-commercial contexts. The practical takeaway is not that degrowth communication is futile, but that its current forms may be mismatched to the outcomes advocates seek. If the goal is value change and a repositioning of the public in the growth debate, degrowth framing has demonstrable traction. If the goal is policy support, the evidence favors green growth’s more familiar promise. Messengers, too, matter: the experiments suggest that non-commercial voices are the appropriate channel for testing these frames, since commercial messengers promoting sufficiency appear to undermine the message they carry.

For a field that has often argued about degrowth in theoretical terms, the study offers something rarer: experimental evidence about how real respondents actually respond. With samples approaching a thousand participants in each study, the findings carry weight beyond anecdote, and they complicate a simple narrative in which the right words could unlock public enthusiasm for downscaling. Translating system-level change to individuals, it turns out, is not a matter of finding the perfect slogan. The frames that make people rethink growth are not the frames that make them back policy, and the marketing toolkit that works for selling products may be structurally incapable of selling sufficiency. As debates over post-growth economics intensify, both advocates and critics now have empirical ground to stand on, and it suggests the path from ecological philosophy to political mobilization is narrower and more winding than either side has assumed.

Subject of Research: Experimental comparison of degrowth and green growth message framing effects on sustainability values, behavior, and policy support

Article Title: Translating system-level change to individuals: Experimental evidence on avenues to communicate about degrowth and green growth

Article References: O’Dell, D., Basso, F., & Shreedhar, G. (2026). Translating system-level change to individuals: Experimental evidence on avenues to communicate about degrowth and green growth. PLOS Sustainability and Transformation, 5(5), e0000245. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pstr.0000245

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pstr.0000245

Keywords: degrowth, green growth, climate communication, sufficiency, message framing, environmental policy, consumer behavior, self-limitation, sustainability, online experiments, U.K. millennials, PLOS

The scientific case for looking beyond growth rests on a body of empirical work that has steadily eroded the dominant policy orthodoxy of green growth. Green growth aims to minimize environmental damage while GDP continues to expand, and it remains the preferred response of most governments and international institutions. But the evidence that economies can decouple growth from environmental pressure at the required pace is thin. Research published in The Lancet Planetary Health found that absolute global decoupling of GDP from environmental pressures has not occurred at anything like the speed needed to meet the Paris climate targets. A separate survey of more than 3,000 researchers, co-authored by Suter, revealed strong doubts among experts that global GDP decoupling is compatible with keeping warming below 2 degrees Celsius. Against this backdrop, the authors argue, research must explore how human needs can be fulfilled independently of economic expansion and within planetary boundaries.

The core of their argument is that sustainability research must move beyond explaining why a post-growth transition is necessary and start helping people envision what life in such a world could look and feel like. Consider healthcare. How might a post-growth health system prioritize prevention, community-based care, and equitable access while reducing environmental pressures? The authors acknowledge the complex interdependencies and tensions between sectors, but they insist that sector-specific visions are a crucial first step for revealing how post-growth principles could be realized in everyday practices. Concrete sectoral pictures, they argue, can identify the institutional, cultural, and material transitions required to secure a high quality of life with lower ecological footprints. At the same time, they caution that sectoral boundaries are themselves socially and historically constructed, shaped in part by nation-state structures with roots in colonial modernity, and must remain open to contestation so that a sectoral lens complements rather than obscures the systemic relations of power a transformation must ultimately address.

Why is imagination so hard? The authors draw on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and social practice theory to explain. Past experiences and present social positions shape how people think and act, embedding taken-for-granted habits so deeply that alternatives become literally unthinkable. Yet this does not mean social structures never change. According to Bourdieusian theory, it is precisely in times of crisis that things normally taken for granted come into question. The current polycrisis of ecological overshoot, rising inequality, declining population growth, and slowing global GDP is therefore not only a threat but an opening. To harness it, the authors argue, people should learn about the roots of the crisis and its impacts on their own lives, and citizens should be involved early in the visioning process so that the resulting futures reflect real experiences and hopes rather than technocratic blueprints.

Narratives of preferred futures are powerful catalysts for change, and the scientific literature backs this up. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has noted that such narratives can serve as foundations for social transformation. Shared and attractive visions can build hope, inspire action, and align environmental goals with widely held values such as health, social cohesion, and security. Everyday habits make certain behaviors and values seem normal, but crisis moments offer a chance to challenge and revise them. Without concrete visions, however, the post-growth concept risks remaining abstract and difficult to act upon for policymakers and citizens alike. In this sense, the authors write, sectoral post-growth visions have the potential to bridge scientific insight, public engagement, and policy development, connecting the outputs of systems models to the lived texture of daily life.

To make the approach tangible, the article develops healthcare in high-income countries as a worked example, and the numbers are striking. The sector faces a dual challenge: structural dependence on economic growth and the need to operate within ecological limits. Aging populations, rising health burdens, and expectations of improved outcomes drive ever-increasing demand, while financial incentives push providers and related industries to continually expand the number of patients and treatments in pursuit of profit. Up to 30 percent of care is estimated to be low-value or even harmful, the product of overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and excessive pharmaceutical use. Routine check-ups, frequent screenings, immediate medication, and reliance on specialist interventions reflect a cultural belief that more care equals better care. Current incentives and norms, the authors argue, lock both patients and providers into cycles of overutilization and medicalization.

The environmental footprint of healthcare compounds the problem. The sector accounts for approximately 5 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, and pharmaceutical pollution and the promotion of antibiotic resistance through contamination of natural ecosystems pose further serious risks to humans and the environment. A post-growth healthcare system, by contrast, would emphasize preventative, relational, community-based care and recognize the essential role of informal caregivers and local networks. Localization is a central tenet of post-growth thinking, but the authors are careful to note that many pharmaceuticals rely on globally integrated supply chains that cannot be fully decentralized. The realistic goal is to strengthen local resilience where possible while maintaining essential global interconnections. Ownership models could shift from profit-driven to cooperative, public, or not-for-profit forms, aligning service provision with collective well-being rather than economic expansion.

Achieving such a vision requires questioning normalized daily practices and confronting entrenched assumptions about growth, technology, and progress, and the authors see the current crisis in healthcare as a potential catalyst for exactly this kind of value transformation. They call for interdisciplinary collaboration among economists, health researchers, and behavioral scientists, alongside transdisciplinary engagement with public institutions, the private sector, civil society, and citizens. Navigating conflicting interests and trade-offs, they stress, is critical to co-creating grounded, context-specific visions rather than imposing one-size-fits-all designs. The article also assigns researchers three distinct roles in the visioning process: as solution finders for growth dependencies, as orchestrators who structure the process and engage actors beyond academia, including citizens, organizations, artists, and the media, and as providers of scientific facts and future scenarios, such as information on ecological footprint levels that remain within sustainable limits.

Understanding any sector, the authors emphasize, requires more than technical knowledge of how it functions; it demands a grasp of the social structures that sustain it. That includes identifying what people value, how those values are shaped, and who benefits from maintaining the status quo. Sector-specific norms and assumptions, such as what counts as success, what is seen as necessary, and what is perceived as progress, must be made explicit and open to contestation. It is equally crucial to ask who holds institutional power and which vested interests hinder transition, since each sector has its own constellation of dominant actors, whether corporations, professional bodies, regulatory agencies, or academic institutions, that shape how change is resisted or enabled. To ensure quality, the authors propose that resulting visions be visionary, sustainable, systemic, coherent, plausible, tangible, relevant, nuanced, and motivating, criteria drawn from established sustainability science frameworks.

Finally, the authors insist that for post-growth visions to bring about social change, they must reach people far outside academia. Communication is therefore not an afterthought but a core part of the research agenda. They point to arts, storytelling, and participatory media as underexplored channels with great potential to shape cultural narratives and open space for alternative futures. Future visions, they suggest, could be conveyed through television series, fictional books, or theatrical productions, modes of communication that enable wider public engagement and dialogue across social groups. The bet underlying the whole argument is that when people can see, feel, and even be entertained by a concrete picture of a flourishing life within planetary limits, post-growth stops being an academic provocation and becomes a political possibility. The article, published open access on August 24, 2026, is intended as an invitation to researchers across disciplines to begin that imaginative work, sector by sector.

Subject of Research: Sector-specific visioning for post-growth futures, illustrated through healthcare in high-income countries

Article Title: Make post-growth futures tangible with a sectoral perspective

Article References: Suter, M., Tsuchibuchi, Y., & Koch, M. (2026). Make post-growth futures tangible with a sectoral perspective. PLOS Sustainability and Transformation, 5(8), e0000281. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pstr.0000281

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pstr.0000281

Keywords: post-growth, degrowth, sustainability, healthcare, green growth, decoupling, planetary boundaries, GDP, climate change, social transformation, participatory visioning, PLOS Sustainability and Transformation

The paper examines two recent, high-profile contributions led by Julian Kirchherr, one of the most cited scholars in the field: an essay asking whether the circular economy is a failing sustainability paradigm, and a broader systematic defence of the concept against its critics. Both texts concede a remarkable amount. They admit that the circular economy is embedded in existing economic systems, that mainstream policy uptake favours marginal tinkering and easily measured victories, and that the appeal of the concept lies partly in its win-win optimism. Yet Marjanović’s central claim is that these concessions are folded back into a defence of feasibility, patience and incrementalism, so that the paradigm’s structural limitations are acknowledged but never allowed to destabilise it.

The first and deepest problem, the critique argues, is that the defences reproduce an eco-modernist vision of sustainability in which the goal is to sustain economic growth while reducing environmental harm through better design, efficiency and circular business models. In this framing, firms and markets sit at the centre of the transition: companies are asked to cooperate across industries, adapt their business models and build circular infrastructure, while governments mainly enable these processes and consumers supply market signals through their purchases. Questions of redistribution, labour, ownership, sufficiency and democratic control are pushed to the margins. When critics point out that the circular economy aligns with corporate interests, the defenders respond that the field is now increasingly dominated by academics. Marjanović counters that this conflates the production of knowledge with the distribution of power, especially since academia itself is entangled with industry through funding, advisory roles and pressure to produce commercially useful research.

A second, politically charged issue is what the critique calls depoliticisation. Rather than refuting specific criticisms, the defences recast critical scholarship itself as a potential hazard, warning that overly critical perspectives can undermine legitimacy, deter investment and ultimately entrench the linear economy. Critique is tolerated only insofar as it remains grounded and proportionate. Marjanović argues this gets the relationship between criticism and progress exactly backwards: because the circular economy is a contested political discourse that shapes which actors are empowered and which trade-offs are obscured, systematic scrutiny is not a threat to momentum but one of its essential preconditions. Recent work on so-called agonistic circularity, which shows that contestation can produce more plural and robust forms of governance, suggests that disagreement is not external to circular transition but constitutive of it.

The treatment of systemic change illustrates the pattern. When critics argue that the circular economy ignores deep structural transformation, the defenders reply that systemic concepts underpin the field and that circularity has long been conceived as a whole-of-economy model. But, Marjanović notes, a concept can be systemic in scope without being transformative in substance: addressing the whole economy is not the same as challenging the property regimes, growth imperatives and unequal power structures through which that economy is organised. Similarly, the argument that the circular economy is wholly predicated on incrementalism effectively redefines the terms of judgment, so that modest, institutionally convenient and highly measurable shifts count as success while more radical demands are pushed outside the frame of what the concept is supposed to deliver. The bar is lowered, and then the paradigm is declared successful on its own reduced terms.

The critique also takes aim at the evidential basis of the defences. One paper is explicitly framed as a perspective piece with no original research data, while the other claims to offer a systematic synthesis of critiques, yet both make expansive claims about the field’s maturity, coherence and progress on the basis of selective literature synthesis, definitional reviews and chosen case examples. The handling of degrowth is a case in point: the mere existence of degrowth-related discussion is presented as proof that the circular economy is no longer fundamentally growth-oriented, even though by the defenders’ own figures, degrowth and economic sufficiency appeared in only around eleven to sixteen per cent of circular economy definitions in 2023. The presence of a minority post-growth strand, Marjanović argues, does not show that the field has overcome its growth attachment; if anything, the minority status of degrowth reinforces the critique that radical interpretations remain peripheral to the dominant, business-centred logic.

The response to criticism of the circle metaphor follows a similar pattern. The defenders argue that the metaphor is not misleading because serious scholars do not aim for perfect circularity and influential conceptualisations already acknowledge leakage and trade-offs. But this shifts the discussion from the effects of the metaphor to the intentions of scholars. The original criticism concerns what the circle does in public and policy imaginaries: it can naturalise the image of closure, encourage the fantasy of neat loops and obscure the social and spatial displacements involved in material flows. The defenders themselves briefly concede that the seductive simplicity of the closed loop can obscure questions of justice and power, yet they do not engage that concern directly. A metaphor can be politically powerful, the critique insists, even when its users do not take it literally.

Beyond the circular economy itself, the paper turns a sharper lens on academic culture. The defenders criticise the field for metric-driven opportunism, repetitive reviews and low-quality scholarship, yet Marjanović observes that their own output leans heavily on opinion pieces, definitional reviews and meta-level commentary with little original data, complicating sweeping dismissals of other forms of academic production. They also promote a pracademic ideal, celebrating scholars who move between universities, consultancy and public debate, and praising applied reports by organisations such as the UN for their clarity. Marjanović does not deny the value of practitioner engagement, but argues that this model projects a narrow, elitist hierarchy of scholarly worth in which visibility, applicability and policy influence define value, while slower, less performative and more adversarial forms of critique are cast as excessive or marginal. Teaching, mentoring, methodological rigour and conceptual clarification, he notes, are also central academic contributions, and not all impact is publicly visible.

Perhaps the most pointed section concerns self-positioning. The two defences cite roughly twenty-six publications authored or co-authored by Kirchherr, mobilising his own prior work to define the field, establish its maturity, diagnose its problems and defend its significance. The recommendation that scholars publish in practitioner-oriented venues is illustrated with the Journal of Circular Economy, of which Kirchherr is Editor-in-Chief and co-author Kris Hartley an editorial board member. Marjanović is careful to note that this does not amount to a formal conflict of interest or prove bad faith, but he argues it reflects a deeper epistemic self-positioning: the authors are not merely reviewing the field but shaping the canon through which it is understood, so that the circular economy is defended partly through texts that define what counts as meaningful progress within it.

The critique ends on a conciliatory but firm note. The defenders are right that parts of the critical literature can be schematic and repetitive, that circular economy scholarship has grown more internally plural, and that institutional uptake matters politically. Yet internal plurality does not erase the dominance of growth-compatible interpretations, and the weaknesses of some critical work do not invalidate the need for critique as such. A genuinely convincing defence, Marjanović concludes, would need to show that the circular economy can engage seriously with power, labour, ownership, redistribution, wellbeing and sufficiency, rather than treating them as secondary matters of implementation and design. Until then, the debate over the circular economy is best understood not as a technical dispute about recycling rates, but as a struggle over who gets to define the concept, which critiques count as legitimate, and what kind of academic authority is permitted to shape its future.

Subject of Research: Critical analysis of normative bias, academic elitism and self-positioning in circular economy scholarship

Article Title: What defenders of the circular economy get right, and what they don’t: normative bias, academic elitism, and self-positioning in circular economy scholarship

Article References: Marjanović, M. (2026). What defenders of the circular economy get right, and what they don’t: normative bias, academic elitism, and self-positioning in circular economy scholarship. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 30(4), 2089-2099. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44498-026-00141-w

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s44498-026-00141-w

Keywords: circular economy, sustainability, ecological modernisation, academic critique, degrowth, green growth, scholarly debate, Journal of Industrial Ecology, positionality, environmental policy, self-citation, pracademics

The study’s central conceptual move is deliberately cautious. Rather than claiming that digitalization is inherently green, the authors — T.T. Pham, T.D. Nguyen, H.D. Luu, and colleagues — treat digital transformation as an enabling capability. They construct a five-dimensional Digital Transformation Indicator (DTI) covering digital infrastructure, digital adoption, digital innovation, digital governance, and digital industry development. The index deliberately does not measure environmental performance itself; a province can score high on digital capability while still performing poorly environmentally. What the DTI captures is the capacity to make resource use visible, lower coordination costs, and support the adoption of cleaner technologies when institutions and firms are able to use them.

Building the index required careful handling of Vietnam’s fragmented administrative data. Backbone indicators — such as fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, enterprise broadband adoption, active internet use, ICT-registered enterprise density, e-government readiness, and the digital economy’s share of provincial GDP — were standardized and combined using principal component analysis. The first component explains 63.7 percent of total variance, with loadings ranging from 0.38 to 0.47, and the index passes standard reliability diagnostics including a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 0.83 and Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87. Alternative constructions using equal weights and entropy-weighted TOPSIS correlate at 0.971 and 0.924 with the baseline, confirming that no single dimension drives the findings.

The spatial picture that emerges is stark. Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong, and Da Nang consistently occupy the upper quartile of digital capability throughout the sample period, while provinces in the Northern Uplands and Central Highlands remain in the lowest. Yet relative rankings are remarkably stable — the rank correlation between 2010 and 2022 DTI values is 0.81 — even as absolute digital levels rise nationwide. Energy efficiency displays a parallel hierarchy, with industrially diversified Red River Delta and Southeast provinces outperforming resource-dependent northwestern and highland regions. Global Moran’s I statistics confirm significant positive spatial autocorrelation in both digital capability (0.341) and energy efficiency (0.287) in 2022.

To move beyond description, the researchers employed two-way fixed-effects panel models and Spatial Durbin Models (SDM), which allow both outcomes and explanatory variables to be spatially interdependent. In the preferred specification with full development controls — including log GDP per capita, industrial structure, human capital, FDI intensity, environmental regulation, and population density — a one-standard-deviation increase in DTI corresponds to a 0.049-unit difference in the energy-efficiency measure. Adding the full control vector attenuates the DTI coefficient by 12.3 percent, from 0.381 to 0.334, indicating that observable development gradients explain part, but not all, of the association. An instrumental-variable specification using distance to pre-2009 fiber-optic trunk lines yields a larger estimate of 0.512, but the authors treat this strictly as directional robustness evidence because the instrument’s exclusion restriction is contestable.

The spillover findings are arguably the most consequential. Under queen-contiguity weights, the SDM decomposition attributes a direct association of 0.312 and a spillover association of 0.187 to DTI, meaning 37.5 percent of the total association is spatially indirect. In plain terms, digital capability in one province is associated with better energy efficiency in neighboring provinces — a pattern consistent with infrastructure corridors, labor mobility, supply chains, and policy learning. Positive spillovers persist, though smaller, under inverse-distance and economic-proximity weight matrices, suggesting the phenomenon is not confined to shared borders. A non-spatial model, the authors note, would systematically understate the resource-sustainability relevance of digital investment.

Mechanism analysis points to innovation capacity as a key transmission channel. Provinces with higher DTI scores show stronger patent activity per capita, and when patent activity is included in the model, the DTI coefficient falls from 0.334 to 0.191. The bootstrapped pathway estimate of 0.144 yields a descriptive ratio of 43.1 percent; using R&D intensity instead produces an analogous figure of 34.7 percent. The authors are careful to label this an innovation-capacity pathway rather than a green-innovation mechanism, because the patent data cover all patents, not specifically environmental ones. These ratios describe mechanism-consistent covariance under sequential assumptions, not causal mediation shares.

Perhaps the most intriguing result is nonlinear. Using Hansen’s threshold regression, the study identifies a critical DTI value of 0.487 — near the 60th percentile of the distribution — above which the association with energy efficiency more than doubles, from 0.187 to 0.412. This is consistent with absorptive-capacity theory: digital capability pays off most when complementary skills, innovation assets, and administrative readiness have accumulated. Provinces such as Vinh Phuc, Khanh Hoa, and Can Tho sit near this benchmark, while Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City operate well above it. The threshold is explicitly a Vietnam-specific benchmarking point, not a universal policy cutoff, and remains in the 55th to 63rd percentile range across alternative index constructions and outcome measures.

The authors are unusually candid about limitations. Provincial energy consumption is reconstructed from sectoral activity data rather than directly metered, with roughly 7 percent of activity cells requiring imputation; eight provinces with imputation rates above 15 percent were excluded in a sensitivity check, and Green Total Factor Productivity — computed via a Malmquist-Luenberger index treating CO2 as an undesirable output — serves as an alternative outcome with qualitatively consistent results. Placebo tests randomly permuting provincial DTI series place the observed coefficient at the 99.8th percentile of the placebo distribution. Still, the design remains observational, and the authors explicitly decline to claim causal policy effects.

The policy implications are differentiated rather than uniform. For provinces well below the readiness threshold, the evidence favors foundational investments — reliable broadband, basic digital skills, interoperable reporting standards — over advanced applications that cannot substitute for these bases. Provinces near the benchmark are candidates for bundled support combining energy-management systems, data interoperability, and technology-extension services. High-DTI provinces are better positioned to pilot real-time energy dashboards, digital permitting, and cross-agency analytics, ideally with transparent evaluation designs. And because spillovers operate through multiple proximity channels, the study supports harmonized data standards along shared corridors, infrastructure sharing among geographically proximate regions, and benchmarking platforms among economically similar provinces — a nuanced architecture that treats digital transformation not as an environmental end in itself, but as the connective tissue that determines whether green-growth commitments become measurable efficiency gains.

Subject of Research: The association between provincial digital transformation and resource efficiency in Vietnam

Article Title: Digital transformation as environmental implementation capacity: resource-efficiency associations, spatial spillovers, and threshold evidence from Vietnam

Article References: Pham, T., Nguyen, T., Luu, H., Pham, D., Tran, A., Le, K., & Nguyen, M. (2026). Digital transformation as environmental implementation capacity: resource-efficiency associations, spatial spillovers, and threshold evidence from Vietnam. Environmental Challenges, 25, Article 101645. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envc.2026.101645

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1016/j.envc.2026.101645

Keywords: digital transformation, resource efficiency, energy efficiency, Vietnam, spatial spillovers, threshold effects, environmental implementation capacity, green growth, spatial econometrics, innovation capacity, absorptive capacity, provincial panel data

The intellectual stakes are considerable. Current fiscal practice across most advanced economies remains anchored in the New Economic Consensus, an offshoot of neoclassical economics that treats budget deficits as inherently inflationary, subordinates fiscal policy to central bank interest rates, and largely ignores the environmental damage generated by economic activity. Sustainability researchers have sharpened their critique of this orthodoxy, arguing that its core assumptions fail to capture ecological limits, nonlinear dynamics, and distributional realities. Dimitrieva’s analysis instead draws on post-Keynesian traditions and Modern Monetary Theory, which hold that currency-issuing governments are not financially constrained in the way households are, and that the true limits on public spending are real resources, productive capacity, and inflation risk.

The six frameworks differ profoundly on the desirability of growth itself. Green Growth, championed by the OECD, the UN Environment Programme and the World Bank, rests on the hope of decoupling GDP expansion from environmental harm through technological innovation, carbon pricing and circular economy practices. Yet critics, most prominently in work questioning whether green growth is possible at all, point to the speculative nature of absolute decoupling and the stubborn problem of rebound effects, where efficiency gains simply fuel more consumption. Degrowth takes the opposite stance, insisting that wealthy nations must democratically and deliberately scale down energy and material throughput without compromising wellbeing. Post-Growth, grounded in Herman Daly’s steady-state economics, envisions the destination: an economy of constant stocks and flows operating within the planet’s regenerative and absorptive capacities, where knowledge and culture may flourish even as material extraction stabilises.

Doughnut Economics, developed by Kate Raworth, supplies the study’s normative compass. Its visual logic is elegant: an inner ring of social foundations, from water and housing to gender equality and political voice, derived from the Sustainable Development Goals, and an outer ring of planetary boundaries drawn from the Earth-system science of Johan Rockström and colleagues, whose recent work shows humanity has already breached six of nine boundaries. The band between the rings is the safe and just space where humanity can thrive. Notably, the analysis highlights a structural weakness of the SDGs themselves: their economic assumptions remain largely neoclassical, and Goal 8’s pursuit of GDP growth can directly conflict with the climate and biodiversity goals, a tension researchers have quantified as a sustainable development oxymoron. The paper argues the Goals need recalibration to incorporate distributive and biophysical insights from the more transformative paradigms.

Modern Monetary Theory plays the operational role in the proposed synthesis. Because monetarily sovereign governments, such as those of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan, spend in currencies they issue, they need not wait for tax revenue or bond markets to fund transformative investment. Taxes, in this framing, create demand for the currency, manage inflation, and redistribute income; they are not the financing precondition for spending. This insight, the paper notes, became impossible to ignore after the 2008 financial crisis and the pandemic, when governments ran large deficits without fiscal collapse. MMT therefore unlocks what the author calls fiscal space: the capacity to finance universal public services, renewable infrastructure and a Job Guarantee, an employment buffer stock first proposed by Hyman Minsky that stabilises both prices and livelihoods.

The crucial move is differentiation. The study argues that Green Growth strategies are best suited to low-income countries and sectors naturally amenable to greening, such as renewable energy, transport and tourism, where expanding access to public goods remains essential and clean-technology leapfrogging offers genuine development gains. Degrowth-oriented policies, by contrast, fit high-income, high-consumption economies, where deliberately downscaling throughput is vital for staying within planetary boundaries. These differentiated pathways then converge on a Post-Growth steady-state economy, anchored in the Doughnut’s vision of a safe and just space. The paper’s conceptual pathway diagram traces this progression: MMT-enabled fiscal space at the start, context-specific Green Growth or Degrowth transitions in the middle, and Doughnut-guided steady-state convergence at the end.

The comparative analysis is conducted across five dimensions: vision of the economy, relation to growth, role of the state, role of money, and concrete use of fiscal tools. On money, the frameworks split revealingly. Green Growth treats green finance, green bonds and climate-adjusted central bank operations as instruments within capitalist structures, a critique voiced by degrowth scholars who see financialisation commodifying nature. Degrowth and Doughnut Economics propose more radical redesigns, including full-reserve banking, complementary currencies, and the democratisation of money creation, treating money as a social relationship rather than a neutral medium. MMT reframes money as a sovereign public utility limited only by inflation and real resources. The Sustainable Development Goals camp promotes sovereign green bonds and retooled central bank mandates to close the vast financing gap, particularly the pandemic recovery gap widening between rich and poor nations.

On fiscal instruments themselves, the convergences are striking. Nearly every framework endorses progressive, equity-oriented taxation: shifting the tax base away from labour and toward wealth, resource extraction, rent, inheritance and ecologically harmful consumption. Degrowth scholarship adds minimum and maximum income thresholds, universal basic income, and shorter working weeks, though a systematic review of fifteen years of degrowth research found concrete, empirically grounded proposals remain scarce. Here the author identifies a critical blind spot: mainstream degrowth and post-growth literature often defaults to orthodox fiscal framing, assuming wealth taxes must precede public spending. MMT dissolves that sequencing problem. Eco-social policies can be funded directly through sovereign monetary capacity, with taxation serving afterwards as the instrument for demand management, inflation control and redistribution, tools of governance rather than prerequisites for action.

The paper is candid about limits. Monetary sovereignty is not universal: Eurozone members, low-income countries and states burdened by foreign-currency debt cannot simply spend their way to sustainability, raising urgent questions about how non-sovereign nations can expand fiscal space without deepening vulnerability. The author also acknowledges omitting important perspectives, including the Wellbeing Economy, commons-based approaches, the care economy, and Latin American Indigenous frameworks such as Buen Vivir, and points to the Porter Hypothesis tradition in arguing that well-designed environmental regulation can enhance, rather than erode, competitiveness and innovation.

The implications, if the synthesis gains traction, are significant. Fiscal policy would be repositioned as the central engine of socio-ecological transformation: public investment steered toward renewables, low-carbon infrastructure and social services; subsidies and taxes aligned with throughput limits rather than GDP targets; democratic oversight and international cooperation securing coherence between national development needs and planetary ceilings. The Sustainable Development Goals, recalibrated to shed their internal contradictions, could serve as the institutional scaffold for a global consensus. What emerges is not a single doctrine but a pluralist meta-framework, one that treats Green Growth, Degrowth, Post-Growth, Doughnut Economics, MMT and the SDGs as complementary lenses on a shared problem: how to raise and allocate public resources so that economies serve people and planet alike, within the biophysical limits of a finite Earth.

Subject of Research: A comparative analysis of six sustainability-oriented economic frameworks and their integration into a meta-framework for sustainable fiscal policy

Article Title: Sustainability and fiscal policy: bridging economic frameworks for global equity and ecological balance

Article References: Dimitrieva, I. (2026). Sustainability and fiscal policy: bridging economic frameworks for global equity and ecological balance. International Review of Economics, 73(2), Article 35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-026-00549-7

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s12232-026-00549-7

Keywords: fiscal policy, green growth, degrowth, post-growth, doughnut economics, modern monetary theory, sustainable development goals, planetary boundaries, steady-state economy, just transition, ecological macroeconomics, monetary sovereignty