The scheme has long been regarded as a transformative entrepreneurial incubator, in which young apprentices learn a trade under a master. Yet the study identifies a cluster of socioeconomic forces eroding that model. Educated youths increasingly view apprenticeship as servitude rather than skill acquisition, and a strong preference for formal education pulls young people away from the market-based training system. The researchers also point to a get-rich-quick mentality among younger generations and systemic failures embedded in the scheme’s reliance on oral agreements and informal settlement practices.

To analyze the decline, the team framed their study around the triple helix model, which examines the interplay of industry, government and academia. The authors propose reconceptualizing Igba boyi as what they term apprenticeprenureship, or nkwado-ogranya — preparation for wealth creation — a reframing intended to restore the scheme’s appeal to younger generations by aligning it with modern entrepreneurship rather than informal servitude.

That reframing is operationalized through the triple helix framework, with distinct roles assigned to each sector. Government would provide legal backing and formal certifications, giving apprenticeship outcomes recognized credentials. Academia would deliver tailored business curricula and digital skills training, equipping apprentices for contemporary markets. Industry, meanwhile, would adopt standardized codes of conduct to professionalize the master-apprentice relationship and address the settlement failures that currently undermine confidence in the system.

The study’s authors describe this integrated model as a sustainable pathway for preserving a vital indigenous economic institution. Because the work is framed through a sustainability lens, its contribution lies less in documenting nostalgia for a fading tradition and more in specifying which institutional reforms — legal, educational and commercial — could reposition the scheme as a competitive route to enterprise in modern Nigeria. The perception data, gathered from both sides of the apprenticeship relationship in Onitsha’s markets, offers a measured picture of how indigenous business incubators are faring under the pressures of formal education economies and changing youth aspirations.

Subject of Research: Socioeconomic drivers of the decline of the Igbo apprenticeship scheme in Southeastern Nigeria and pathways for its reinvigoration

Article Title: Socioeconomic drivers of the declining Igbo apprenticeship scheme (Igba Boyi) and sustainable pathways of its reinvigoration

Article References: Onyima, B. N., Nnonyelu, N. A., Nnabuife, E. K., Onyeizugbe, C., & Anazodo, R. (2026). Socioeconomic drivers of the declining Igbo apprenticeship scheme (Igba Boyi) and sustainable pathways of its reinvigoration. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09490-0

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1057/s41599-026-09490-0

Keywords: Igba boyi, Igbo apprenticeship, Nigeria, entrepreneurship, triple helix model, informal economy, Onitsha, mixed-methods survey, indigenous institutions, youth employment, socioeconomic drivers, Socioeconomic

The theoretical starting point is Grossman’s 1972 health investment model, which treats health as a form of human capital that can be invested in and which raises productivity. Public health expenditure is often framed as a burden when it feeds deficits and debt, yet when health is treated as an investment it can deliver social and economic returns across the population, supporting Sustainable Development Goal 3 on healthy lives and Goal 10 on reducing inequalities. Since Newhouse’s pioneering work in 1977, income has been cited as the most important determinant of health expenditure levels, and subsequent studies have confirmed a strong link with economic performance. The direction of causality, however, varies across countries. Baltagi and Moscone’s analysis of 20 OECD countries from 1971 to 2004 found a unidirectional relationship from GDP to health expenditure in Germany but a bidirectional one in Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, while Amiri and Ventelou reported mutually reinforcing interactions between per capita income and per capita health expenditure across OECD economies.

What distinguishes the new study is its choice of environmental indicator. Most previous research on the environment-health expenditure relationship has relied on pollution-based metrics, especially CO2 emissions, which measure the intensity of pollution. The ecological footprint reflects human pressure on ecosystems. Biocapacity, by contrast, measures the regeneration and absorption capacity of ecological systems: it tracks the structure and availability of ecological resources at national scale, capturing nature’s ability to replenish what humans demand from cropland, forest, grazing land and fishing grounds while absorbing the waste they generate. In National Ecosystem Area and Biocapacity Accounts, it is calculated by multiplying the physical area by a yield factor and an appropriate equivalence factor, and it is expressed in global hectares. Because it can vary from year to year with climate, governance and economic conditions, biocapacity offers a broader picture of sustainability than pollution intensity alone, reflecting environmental resilience and the long-term capacity of ecosystems to support human well-being.

The data reveal striking contrasts between the seven economies. Domestic general government health expenditure averaged 7.64 percent of GDP, ranging from 5.42 to 10.60 percent. Life expectancy at birth averaged 80.78 years, from 76.33 to 84.56. Biocapacity averaged 3.87 global hectares but ranged enormously, from 0.61 to 17.76, while annual GDP growth averaged 1.41 percent, spanning −10.05 to 8.93 percent. When the three research variables are plotted together, biocapacity shows no significant positive relationship with life expectancy — the correlation across all observations is about −0.10. Public health spending and life expectancy co-occur weakly to moderately, with a correlation of roughly 0.21, though the authors caution that this cannot support a causal claim that spending raises longevity. The biocapacity-health expenditure correlation is very weak and negative, about −0.11. Canada is particularly noteworthy: despite far higher biocapacity than its peers, it does not have the highest life expectancy. Japan shows the opposite pattern, combining relatively low biocapacity with the highest average life expectancy at 83.5 years.

Methodologically, the study follows a rigorous panel sequence. Breusch-Pagan and Pesaran tests detected cross-sectional dependence in all series at the 1 percent level, necessitating second-generation unit root procedures. The Im, Lee and Tieslau panel unit root test, which determines structural break dates endogenously for each country and tests stationarity under single-break and two-break specifications with constants and trends, rejected unit roots for all variables at level, meaning the series are stationary once breaks from crises, reforms and policy changes are accounted for. The Blomquist-Westerlund slope homogeneity test then rejected homogeneous slope coefficients at the 1 percent level, with a Delta statistic of 6.29 and an adjusted Delta of 7.07. Because the relationships between the explanatory variables and health expenditure differ across countries, the authors employed the Random Coefficient Model developed by Swamy in 1970, which treats unit-specific coefficients as random deviations around a mean and constructs an efficient estimator that weights each country’s estimate by its precision.

For the panel as a whole, life expectancy carries a positive coefficient of 0.368, statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that longer life spans generally co-occur with higher health expenditure, consistent with rising chronic disease prevalence, population ageing and growing demand for long-term care, although the relationship is not strong or uniform across the entire panel. Annual GDP growth carries a negative coefficient of −0.048, also significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that faster growth mitigates health spending ratios. The authors attribute this to improved resource allocation efficiency, better income and living conditions, and easier access to preventive healthcare, which can partially relieve financial pressure on health systems. Biocapacity carries a negative coefficient of −3.519, significant at the 5 percent level. As the natural environment’s capacity to regenerate and absorb ecological pressure increases, health expenditure falls. In countries where natural resources are conserved and air and water quality is higher, people face fewer environmental risks, reducing respiratory diseases, chronic illnesses and other environmentally linked health problems.

The country-specific estimates reveal substantial heterogeneity that a common-coefficient framework would conceal. Life expectancy is positive and statistically significant in France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, with coefficients of 0.281, 0.375, 0.219, 1.341 and 0.558 respectively, but statistically insignificant in Canada and the United States. Japan presents one of the most striking findings in the model: its life expectancy coefficient is about 2.4 times that of the United Kingdom and roughly 6.1 times Italy’s. The authors link this to Japan’s high proportion of elderly people, long life expectancy and the resulting increased need for care, treatment and social support. Japan also records the highest average life expectancy in the sample at 83.5 years, so demographic structure and macroeconomic developments appear more tightly bound to its healthcare spending than in any other G7 economy. The pattern indicates that demographic ageing translates into spending pressure very differently across high-income countries, depending on healthcare systems, institutional arrangements and the composition of care demand.

Economic growth affects health expenditure in every country except the United Kingdom, where the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The effect is negative in Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United States, with the United States showing the largest magnitude at −0.117, followed by Canada at −0.101. In these economies, rising individual incomes, improved living standards and better access to nutrition, housing and healthcare services appear to improve overall societal health, reducing the need for publicly funded care. Technology accompanying the growth process also matters: digital health applications, early detection systems and preventive services contribute to more controlled spending management, and stronger early detection policies can reduce excessively costly treatment expenses over the long term. Japan is the exception, with a positive and significant growth coefficient of 0.051. Economic growth there does not reduce health spending; rather, it supports more comprehensive and higher-quality services, funding advanced healthcare technologies, expanding elderly care services and strengthening healthcare infrastructure for one of the world’s longest-lived populations.

Biocapacity improvements are negatively associated with health expenditure in every country except Italy, where the coefficient is statistically insignificant, and France, where it is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level. The negative coefficients are statistically significant in Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, reaching −7.22 in the United States and −5.96 in the United Kingdom. The authors interpret this as evidence that environmentally friendly technological transformation and innovative production structures can create cost-reducing effects on health systems, since conservation of natural resources, better air and water quality and stronger ecological balance reduce environmentally induced disease. They caution, however, that the estimated relationships represent statistical associations within the variables and period examined, not proof that changes in biocapacity directly cause changes in health expenditure. The analysis is restricted to seven high-income economies over 2000 to 2023 and does not capture all relevant factors. Its two main contributions — bringing biocapacity into health expenditure analysis and explicitly modelling cross-country heterogeneity — suggest that environmental policies aimed at increasing biocapacity may yield significant gains in health economics.

Subject of Research: Government health expenditures, economic growth, biocapacity and life expectancy in the G-7 countries: evidence from panel data analysis (2000–2023)

Article Title: Government health expenditures, economic growth, biocapacity and life expectancy in the G-7 countries: evidence from panel data analysis (2000–2023)

Article References: Akyol, M., Beken, H. G., Henni, M. D., & Si Mohammed, K. (2026). Government health expenditures, economic growth, biocapacity and life expectancy in the G-7 countries: evidence from panel data analysis (2000–2023). Environmental Challenges, 25, Article 101693. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envc.2026.101693

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1016/j.envc.2026.101693

Keywords: Government, health, expenditures, economic, growth, biocapacity, life, expectancy, countries, evidence, panel, data

It describes the circular economy as a framework for resource efficiency, waste reduction and greater integration of renewable and alternative energy sources. These practices are linked in the study to Sustainable Development Goal 7 on affordable and clean energy, Goal 9 on industry, innovation and infrastructure, Goal 12 on responsible consumption and production, and Goal 13 on climate action. For the statistical analysis, the researchers used a Cross-Sectionally Augmented Autoregressive Distributed Lag model, or CS-ARDL.

The reported estimates show that circular economy practices positively influence energy diversification over both horizons. Four additional variables are associated with energy diversification in the reported results. Energy use, environmental taxation and urbanization each have positive relationships with the diversity of the energy system, whereas dependence on energy imports has a negative relationship.

The findings therefore identify import dependence as a factor associated with less diversification, while taxation, urban development and energy use coincide with broader energy mixes. Because the evidence comes from an observational panel model of country-level data, these relationships should not be interpreted as proof that a particular policy instrument or development trend directly produced the reported outcomes. Within this model, the results position government governance as part of the conditions under which circular economy practices are associated with a more diversified energy system.

The authors identify the advancement of circular economy policies and the reduction of import dependency as complementary strategies for fostering a diversified, resilient and sustainable European energy system. The scope of the evidence is the European panel from 2000 through 2023, with short-run and long-run model estimates accounting for energy use, energy imports, environmental taxation and urbanization.

Subject of Research: How governance and circular economy practices relate to energy diversification in European countries

Article Title: Government governance as a strategic enabler of resilient energy systems: insights from the circular economy transition in European countries

Article References: Abbas, Q., & Ramzan, M. (2026). Government governance as a strategic enabler of resilient energy systems: insights from the circular economy transition in European countries. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09491-z

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1057/s41599-026-09491-z

Keywords: circular economy, energy diversification, government governance, energy imports, European energy systems, resource efficiency, environmental taxation, urbanization, CS-ARDL model, energy resilience, Government, governance

The study rests on a conceptual framework borrowed from social theory. Oboh anchors his analysis in Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, the notional space in which governments, media, and citizens exchange views on matters of common interest. Since Habermas’s work was translated into English in 1962, scholars have used the idea to explain how democratic societies negotiate collective concerns. Contemporary researchers of counterpublics have extended the model, arguing that the public sphere is better understood as a multiplicity of overlapping publics rather than a single unified arena. Social media, Oboh notes, has accelerated this transformation: citizen journalists now create virtual spaces where people process their thoughts and share ideas on any issue of public interest, much as Habermas envisioned for the print-era bourgeois public sphere.

Within that framework, the media occupy a pivotal position. They are, metaphorically, the nexus that connects countries and regions in a notional space, and for most people they are the primary source of political information, including information on the conduct of governments and citizens. Oboh argues that the thoughts and feelings people hold about Africa are partly built on what media report about the region, and that media can also serve as ideological weapons projecting the views of their proprietors. A government that performs well in office, he observes, gains little public credit if the media fail to report that commitment, which is why objective coverage matters both for accountability and for image formation.

To test these propositions empirically, the study adopted a survey method with a non-probabilistic, purposive sampling technique. The sample was drawn from staff and students of Benson Idahosa University and from media practitioners in Benin City, Nigeria. A total of 384 questionnaires were distributed and 368 were retrieved, an attrition rate of 4.3 percent. The instrument was a structured questionnaire with 29 items in four sections, covering respondent background, the effects of media coverage, the effects of government actions, and the effects of citizens’ conduct on the African image. Responses were recorded on a five-point Likert scale, with mean scores above 3 indicating general agreement and standard deviations capturing the dispersion of opinion. Three null hypotheses were then evaluated using the Pearson correlation coefficient.

The results on media coverage were the clearest. The statement that media coverage of the good things done by Africans creates a good image for Africa recorded the highest mean in its block, 4.26, signaling strong agreement, while the claim that media reports of government actions do not affect Africa’s image scored a low 2.18, indicating disagreement. The grand mean of 3.44 for the media block suggested that respondents broadly accepted that the media exert a reasonable influence on how Africa is viewed. Statistically, the Pearson correlation between media coverage of African affairs and the public view of the African image was r = 0.365, a positive moderate relationship, with a significance value of 0.000, well below the 0.05 threshold. The null hypothesis of no correlation was therefore rejected: the more the media cover African affairs, the more other regions are likely to know about the continent.

Government actions also proved consequential. The single strongest item in this block was the statement that corruption by some African leaders has an impact on the image of Africa, with a mean of 4.11. The grand mean of 3.21 indicated that respondents believed government conduct shapes public assessment of the region, although a fairly high standard deviation of 1.32 revealed considerable diversity of opinion. The Pearson correlation between government actions and the public view of the African image was r = 0.340, again a positive moderate relationship significant at 0.000, leading to rejection of the second null hypothesis. In plain terms, when governments act in ways aligned with public expectations, the image of the region improves; corruption and misgovernance do measurable reputational damage.

The evidence on citizens was weaker but still significant. The grand mean of 2.95 for the citizen block showed respondents were essentially neutral about how much individual conduct shapes the continental image, and a standard deviation of 1.28 confirmed a fair diversity of views. Yet the Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.229, significant at p = 0.000, indicated a weak positive relationship between the actions of African citizens and the public view of the African image. The third null hypothesis was rejected as well. Oboh interprets this to mean that how African citizens relate to members of other regions, including what they share on social media, does feed into external perceptions, even if the effect is smaller than that of media and government.

Beyond the survey, the study situates Africa’s image problem in the structures of global politics and economics. Oboh argues that the region’s difficulties today stem less from colonialism than from misplaced priorities by past and present leaders who ignored citizens’ welfare. He highlights the debt burden as a central constraint: between 1970 and 2002, Africa received 540 billion dollars in loans, paid back 550 billion, and still owed 293 billion at the end of 2002. Some African nations remain aid-dependent, with foreign assistance exceeding 50 percent of government expenditure in certain cases, a dependency that erodes economic sovereignty. He also points to the absence of a permanent African seat on the United Nations Security Council, noting that UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called for reform of the council’s outdated structure and criticized its lack of representation for Africa as undermining the body’s credibility and legitimacy.

The digital dimension runs throughout the analysis. Oboh argues that technological development is not value neutral, and that Western control of digital technology shapes how virtual spaces frame discussions of globalization and digital governance. He urges African governments to use both legacy and new media to project their positions, and to exploit social media networking sites to share the continent’s own narratives and correct impressions that have undermined its image. At the same time, he warns that citizen journalists sometimes circulate untrue stories about African governments, and that such stories carry negative consequences precisely because audiences abroad are more likely to believe accounts shared by African citizens about their own governments than accounts shared by outsiders.

The study’s conclusions come with candid limitations. Because the sample was purposive and drawn entirely from Nigerian academia and media, the findings reflect an African perspective on Africa’s image and cannot be generalized to non-African audiences; Oboh recommends that future research survey international respondents or compare African and non-African viewpoints directly. His recommendations are nonetheless pointed: media organizations should report factual accounts of government actions; governments should encourage inclusive, participatory democracy; citizens, at home and in the diaspora, should feel a sense of ownership in their governments’ success and report on them objectively; and the United Nations should consider making Africa a permanent member of the Security Council to enhance both the continent’s image and its contribution to global peace. The overarching message is that Africa’s reputation is a joint enterprise, and that governments, media, and citizens who work more closely together on socioeconomic development will, in the process, reshape how the committee of nations sees the region.

Subject of Research: Public perceptions of how African governments, media, and citizens influence Africa's global image

Article Title: Impact of the actions of governments, media, and citizens on public view of African image

Article References: Oboh, G. E. (2026). Impact of the actions of governments, media, and citizens on public view of African image. Discover Global Society, 4(1), Article 206. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-026-00373-y

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s44282-026-00373-y

Keywords: Africa, public sphere, media coverage, governance, citizenship, survey research, Habermas, correlation analysis, African image, UN Security Council, foreign debt, social media