The study tackles a long-standing puzzle in public administration. Decades of scholarship have established that managerial quality matters for government performance, and that chief executives with greater public sector experience tend to preside over more effective organizations. Yet the evidence is inconsistent: some studies find strong effects of leaders’ backgrounds, others find none. The authors argue that much of this inconsistency stems from a neglect of context. Most research on the management-performance relationship has been conducted within a single country, treating the surrounding political environment as background noise rather than as a variable that can strengthen or weaken the link between a leader’s skills and measurable outcomes.

To build their theory, the researchers draw on the classic distinction, developed by the political scientist Arend Lijphart, between majoritarian and consociational models of democracy. In majoritarian systems, two main political blocs compete under a winner-takes-all logic, and the losing side serves as a watchful opposition expecting to alternate in power. This adversarial arrangement, the authors contend, creates powerful incentives for executives to perform well, because citizens can more easily identify and reward or punish the party responsible for policy outcomes. Party leaders, in turn, reward politicians whose performance enhances the party’s reputation, promoting their careers within disciplined, hierarchical organizations.

Consociational or power-sharing systems work very differently. Broad coalitions bring most significant parties into government, blurring the line between administration and opposition. Party leaders have incentives to bargain and collaborate with rivals rather than defeat them, and accountability becomes diffuse: when everyone shares credit, no one can be clearly blamed. The authors point to additional mechanisms that erode performance incentives in such systems, including frequent party switching, coalition-driven rotation of government posts, and the dilution of clear policy platforms through compromise. In these circumstances, a politician’s accumulated experience may simply not matter very much, because the electoral arena is not perceived as a zero-sum contest in which superior management translates into political advantage.

Testing this argument required a comparison of two countries that are alike in many respects but differ sharply in their patterns of political competition. Mexico and Colombia both have presidential systems with separation of powers, both underwent decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s, and both assign their intermediate-level governments, 32 Mexican states and 32 Colombian departments, major responsibility for education and health services. Yet their party systems diverged dramatically. Until 2018, Mexico operated a disciplined three-party system in which the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the conservative National Action Party, and the Party of the Democratic Revolution competed adversarially, with rare party switching and strong party loyalty at the state level.

Colombia, by contrast, carries a deep tradition of power sharing. Between 1958 and 1974, the Liberal and Conservative parties governed together under the National Front pact, alternating in the presidency and splitting cabinet posts evenly, an arrangement designed to end political violence. Even after fully competitive elections resumed, winning politicians continued offering co-governing roles to the losing side. The 1991 constitution opened the field to new parties, more than twenty of which now hold Senate seats, but coalition-building norms persisted. The authors illustrate the pattern with the department of Cundinamarca, where a defeated 2007 gubernatorial candidate supported the victor’s government and then won the 2011 election at the head of a coalition that included the very parties that had beaten him four years earlier.

Quantitative evidence reinforces this contrast. The authors calculated the effective number of parties in subnational elections between 1998 and 2015. Gubernatorial races looked similar in both countries, averaging roughly 2.4 effective candidacies. But assembly elections told a different story: Mexico averaged 2.64 effective parties, close to its gubernatorial figure and reflecting high party discipline, while Colombia averaged 5.43, more than double its gubernatorial figure. Colombian governors, in other words, must assemble sprawling, informal coalitions to govern, while Mexican governors could rely on cohesive partisan majorities.

The empirical analysis used two-way fixed-effects regression models on panel data covering the 32 Mexican states from 1995 to 2010 and the 32 Colombian departments from 2001 to 2015, spanning multiple gubernatorial administrations in each country. Performance was measured with two indicators managed primarily at the intermediate level: high school enrollment rates as an output of education policy, and infant mortality rates, deaths in the first year of life per 1,000 live births, as an outcome of health policy. The researchers hand-collected biographical data on every governor, classifying years of public sector experience at the local, state or departmental, and national levels. Mexican governors averaged 14.2 years of public experience, concentrated in national and state posts, while Colombian governors averaged 9.6 years, distributed more evenly across levels. The models controlled for partisan alignment with national and subnational legislatures, party affiliation, margin of victory, postgraduate education, revenue per capita, rural population density, and violence, proxied by homicide rates in Mexico and internally displaced populations in Colombia.

The results split cleanly along the adversarialism divide. In Mexican states, governors’ prior experience in local and state government significantly reduced infant mortality, with each additional year of local or state experience lowering infant deaths, while each additional year of federal-level experience was associated with worse outcomes. Partisan alignment with the health minister also improved health performance. In Colombian departments, by contrast, none of the experience measures showed a significant relationship with either infant mortality or high school enrollment, and a power analysis confirmed that this null result was not an artifact of sample size. Joint models pooling both countries confirmed the pattern: the effect of state-level experience on infant mortality differed significantly between the two systems, negative in Mexico but not in Colombia. Education enrollment showed weaker effects overall, suggesting that the experience-performance link is strongest for outcomes, like infant survival, that depend heavily on executive coordination of health services.

The authors are careful to note that their findings do not constitute a normative endorsement of adversarial politics over power sharing. Adversarial systems may extract more value from experienced executives, but they also expose governments to stronger opposition and a more turbulent external environment. The practical implications cut both ways. In adversarial systems, candidate recruitment should prioritize managerial and technical skills that translate directly into performance, while power-sharing systems may benefit more from executives skilled in coalition building and networking. And where opposition parties are co-opted rather than competitive, accountability may need to come from civil society and the media instead. More broadly, the study delivers a methodological message to the field: theories of public management built in one country, however elegant, cannot be assumed to travel. What works in Mexico may not work in Colombia, and the difference is not culture or capacity but the structure of political competition itself, a variable that shapes whether a leader’s hard-won experience ever gets the chance to matter.

Subject of Research: The moderating effect of political competition on the relationship between executives' experience and subnational government performance in Mexico and Colombia

Article Title: Adversarialism and power-sharing: the effect of political competition on the management-performance relationship

Article References: Bello-Gomez, R. A., Avellaneda, C. N., & Olvera, J. G. (2024). Adversarialism and power-sharing: the effect of political competition on the management-performance relationship. Global Public Policy and Governance, 4(4), 389-419. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-024-00104-6

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43508-024-00104-6

Keywords: political competition, government performance, public management, adversarialism, power-sharing, governors, Mexico, Colombia, subnational governments, infant mortality, education enrollment, comparative public administration

The research, led by Chris Béné of the Alliance of Bioversity International and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture, arrives at a moment when the pressure on global food systems is intensifying from multiple directions simultaneously. Climate change is amplifying the frequency and severity of extreme weather, geopolitical polarization is fueling conflicts that disrupt agricultural production and trade, and the memory of the COVID-19 pandemic has shown how quickly a health crisis can cascade into economic and nutritional distress. In this context, the study’s central finding carries considerable weight: food crises are not inevitable, and the suffering they cause can be avoided when countries—and their food systems in particular—are sufficiently prepared.

Methodologically, the analysis is notable for its scale and its comparative design. Rather than examining a single country or a handful of case studies, the researchers assembled a large dataset covering countries at widely different income levels across all regions of the world, tracked over more than ten years. This longitudinal, cross-national approach allowed them to separate the effects of shock exposure from the effects of shock response. The distinction matters enormously. A country may be hit frequently and hard by disasters, yet still maintain or even improve food security if it possesses the institutional, infrastructural, and social capacities to absorb, adapt, and recover. Conversely, a wealthier nation with weaker preparedness can see a single severe event translate into widespread food insecurity.

Indeed, one of the most striking results of the study is that neither national income nor the sheer severity of disaster exposure determines food security outcomes. The team found several examples—particularly in Asia—of countries showing improving trends in food security even though they were affected by disasters more severely than the rest of the world. This inversion of conventional expectations suggests that the dominant narrative, in which development level and disaster frequency dictate vulnerability, is incomplete at best. What matters, the authors conclude, is how prepared a country is and how much resilience capacity it has deliberately built into its systems before the shock arrives.

To understand what shapes this capacity, the researchers examined a battery of factors: the severity of the shocks themselves, the effectiveness of national governments, the quality and reach of infrastructure, the degree of economic and social cohesion, and—critically—the structural characteristics of each country’s food system. By analyzing these variables across countries with different income levels, they were able to identify which elements consistently distinguish nations that weather crises without spiraling into hunger from those that do not. The result is not a single magic bullet but a coherent set of principles that governments, development agencies, and financial institutions can act upon.

The first and perhaps most actionable principle concerns diversity. The study found that having multiple ways to obtain food clearly reduces the risk of a crisis. A food system that depends on a single staple crop, a single import corridor, or a small number of corporate supply chains is brittle: cut one thread and the whole fabric unravels. A system with diverse production zones, varied crops, multiple trade partners, and redundant distribution networks can lose one pathway and reroute through another. This insight carries a pointed critique of contemporary food economics, which has long privileged efficiency and just-in-time logistics over redundancy. Co-author Jose-Luis Vivero-Pol argues that resilience requires the opposite emphasis: promoting diversity and redundancy in food systems rather than optimizing solely for efficiency or just-in-time food chains.

The second principle centers on government effectiveness—how well public and civil services actually function in practice, not merely on paper. Countries whose administrations can anticipate shocks, coordinate emergency responses, maintain social protection programs, and deliver assistance quickly are far better positioned to prevent a temporary disruption from becoming a prolonged food crisis. Alongside institutional capacity, the study highlights greater human capabilities and better access to new technologies and financial markets as critical ingredients. Farmers who can access credit, insurance, weather information, and modern agricultural tools can adapt their practices before and during a crisis rather than simply absorbing its losses.

The third principle is social capital: the networks, connections, and relationships that bind communities together. In the long run, the study finds, these intangible assets appear to play an important role in sustaining food security through turbulent periods. Community networks can redistribute food and resources when formal systems fail, spread early warnings, and mobilize collective action for recovery. This finding aligns with a growing body of resilience science showing that social cohesion is not a soft luxury but a hard infrastructure of survival, one that determines how quickly and equitably a society can rebound after disaster strikes.

Translating these findings into policy, Vivero-Pol offers a clear prescription: governments, development agencies, and financial institutions should prioritize reinforcing government capacities to anticipate and respond better to shocks and disasters, promoting diversity and redundancy in food systems, and investing in human capabilities at the household and community level to protect nutrition and household assets. Each element addresses a different layer of vulnerability. Institutional preparedness operates at the national scale, structural diversity protects the food system itself, and household-level investment builds a final line of defense that ensures families can maintain adequate nutrition even when broader systems are strained.

Amid the growing number of tragic stories emerging from drought-stricken regions, flooded farmlands, and conflict zones around the world, this study stands as a measured voice of hope grounded in data rather than optimism. It does not claim that disasters can be predicted or prevented—many cannot. What it demonstrates is something arguably more useful: their consequences can be reduced, sometimes dramatically, through deliberate choices made in advance. The link between shock and hunger is a policy variable, not a natural constant. As climate change accelerates and the world grows more polarized, the countries that treat resilience as an investment rather than an afterthought may find that the difference between a disaster and a catastrophe is measured not in the intensity of the shock, but in the strength of the systems built to absorb it.

Subject of Research: Food system resilience and the decoupling of food insecurity from shocks and disasters

Article Title: How can countries prevent shocks and disasters from turning into food crises? Science points to Resilience

Article References: How can countries prevent shocks and disasters from turning into food crises? Science points to Resilience. (n.d.). Original publication

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: Not provided

Keywords: food security, resilience, food systems, disasters, climate change, shocks, government effectiveness, social capital, PNAS, hunger, preparedness, redundancy

The stakes could hardly be higher. Maternal mortality is defined as the annual number of female deaths from any cause related to or aggravated by pregnancy or its management, excluding accidental causes, during pregnancy and childbirth or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy. Of the roughly ten categories of hundreds of thousands of women who die each year during pregnancy or childbirth, two out of three live in Africa. A woman on the continent faces a lifetime risk of dying from a high-risk pregnancy of about 1 in 41, compared with roughly 1 in 11,000 in high-income countries. The ten countries with the highest maternal mortality ratios are all African. According to United Nations Maternal Mortality Estimation Interagency figures cited in the study, maternal deaths in Africa fell from 727 per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 442 in 2023—a near-halving—yet the continent remains far off track for the Sustainable Development Goal target of fewer than 70 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030. In 2023, Nigeria recorded 993 deaths per 100,000 live births, Chad 748, and South Sudan and the Central African Republic 692 each.

The economic backdrop to these numbers is bleak. The study documents a disturbing resurgence of acute lived poverty across the continent, reversing hard-won gains of the previous two decades. Acute lived poverty manifests as widespread deprivation of cash income, inadequate access to medicines and insufficient food—a constant denial of life’s basic necessities. Nearly 464 million Africans lived in severe poverty in 2024, and roughly 440 million survived below the global extreme poverty line of US$2.15 per person per day, limiting access to education, healthcare, and infrastructure, particularly in rural and socially excluded communities. The World Bank put the figure at more than 476 million people in abject poverty in 2024, up from 490 million in 2021, split into 241 million males and 249 million females. At current rates, only 2.6 people escape poverty per minute on the continent. The researchers identify high debt distress risks, limited investment in income-generating sectors, lingering inflation, cuts in donor aid, weak governance, corruption, and inefficient institutions as the drivers. In countries spending more on debt interest than on health infrastructure, they argue, pregnant women bear the greatest burden.

The geography of deprivation maps directly onto the geography of maternal death. The study notes that maternal mortality ratios are dramatically higher in institutionally fragile countries than in stable ones, a pattern tied to what researchers call fragile settings—nations afflicted by severe instability, collapsed infrastructure, or food insecurity, where health systems simply cannot function. When clinics close and supply chains for essential medicines disappear, women lose their only line of protection during delivery. East and West Africa account for about 73 percent of the continent’s poor, while Southern and North Africa have the fewest people in poverty. The campaign slogan that has electrified African political leaders—Africa cares: no woman should die while giving life—has propelled governments to treat high maternal mortality as a policy failure rather than an unfortunate and expensive occurrence. The evolution from the Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa to CARMMA Plus in 2021 marks, in the authors’ view, a shift from naming the problem to building structures to solve it.

Methodologically, the research breaks new ground by moving beyond the single-variable, country-specific studies that have dominated the literature. Anchored in Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach, which holds that income and wealth are means toward human development rather than ends in themselves, the study models maternal mortality as a function of female employment, female education, the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita, domestic general government health expenditure, and government effectiveness. The authors justify female employment and education as proxies for poverty reduction because they generate income, empowerment, and access to resources, while GDP per capita serves as a standardized gauge of economic output per person. Data came from the World Development Indicators, the World Health Organization, and the World Bank, covering Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Nigeria’s peers such as Chad and the Central African Republic, and 32 other nations where data were available.

The econometric machinery behind the findings is sophisticated. The team employed Dynamic Fixed Effect estimation and Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag models, comprising Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group techniques, chosen over Generalized Method of Moments for their simplicity, efficiency, and ability to handle endogeneity and autocorrelation. Im, Pesaran, and Shin unit root tests confirmed a mixture of stationarity orders among the variables, and the Westerlund panel cointegration test produced a statistically significant statistic of 3.892 with a p-value of 0.000, establishing a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables at the 1 percent significance level. Descriptive statistics revealed stark heterogeneity: the average maternal mortality rate across the panel was 436 deaths per 100,000 live births, ranging from a low of 17 to a devastating high of 1,650, while average female employment stood at 43.3 percent, female primary completion at 49.5 percent, and government effectiveness averaged −0.59 on a scale from −2.5 to 2.5.

The long-run results are the study’s core contribution. Under the Pooled Mean Group estimator, female employment showed a negative and statistically significant relationship with maternal mortality, with a 1 percent increase reducing the mortality rate by roughly 0.98 percent. Female education was likewise negative and significant at the 5 percent level, decreasing mortality by 0.06 percent, reflecting the power of education to spur awareness and help women navigate healthcare services. Log GDP per capita proved the most ambiguous variable: under Dynamic Fixed Effects, a 1 percent increase cut maternal mortality by 1.3 percent, but under Pooled Mean Group it slightly increased mortality by 0.3 percent, a contradiction the authors attribute to whether national wealth is fairly distributed and to bottlenecks such as delayed access to health facilities and shortages of physicians. Domestic general government health expenditure reduced mortality by 0.0207 percent per unit increase, and government effectiveness by 0.0598 percent per unit—both significant, suggesting that well-monitored health budgets and proactive institutions genuinely save lives at scale.

The short-run picture, however, complicates the narrative in ways that matter for policymakers. In the short run, female employment and female education showed positive and significant relationships with maternal mortality under the Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group estimators. The authors offer several explanations: early employment income may fall short of expectations, leaving little to invest in maternal health; work-related stress among pregnant women who lack sufficient rest may trigger complications; and educated women unable to find gainful employment may lack the money to access care during pregnancy and childbirth. GDP per capita was likewise positive and significant in the short run under Mean Group, possibly because additional income accompanied more pregnancies than households could adequately nourish or treat. Health spending, meanwhile, was positive but insignificant in the short run—money alone, the study warns, is insufficient when corruption diverts resources or when skilled birth attendants, emergency obstetric care, functioning referral systems, and motivated health workers are missing.

The study’s recommendations converge on a single message: the poverty reduction agenda is the maternal health agenda. African governments, the authors argue, should prioritize female employment, expand women’s access to education, pursue well-distributed growth in per capita income that reaches women in particular, increase and carefully monitor domestic health expenditure free of embezzlement, and strengthen the effectiveness of the institutions charged with delivering care. They acknowledge the limitations of their design—the analysis covers 35 of Africa’s 54 countries over a 24-year window, uses only three poverty proxies, draws on a single theoretical framework, and excludes other continents—and they call on future researchers to expand the country sample, lengthen the timeframe, add variables, and apply alternative estimators such as System GMM. Yet the central conclusion stands firm: with maternal deaths halved since 2000 but the continent still accounting for seven of every ten maternal deaths worldwide, the evidence shows that lifting women out of poverty—through work, education, and equitable growth backed by accountable institutions—is among the most reliable paths to making Sustainable Development Goal 5 a reality before 2030. As the authors put it, with joint efforts Africa can raise all boats of prosperity for women, and now is the right time to act.

Subject of Research: The relationship between poverty reduction strategies and maternal mortality rates across African countries

Article Title: Poverty reduction and maternal mortality in African countries

Article References: Adegbola, O., Ebenezer, O. A., & Benedict, O. D. (2026). Poverty reduction and maternal mortality in African countries. Discover Global Society, 4(1), Article 251. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-026-00406-6

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s44282-026-00406-6

Keywords: maternal mortality, poverty reduction, Africa, female employment, female education, GDP per capita, health expenditure, government effectiveness, Sustainable Development Goals, panel econometrics, Pooled Mean Group, public health

The research team, led by Ojarotade Adegbola of the University of Ilesa in Nigeria, together with Adeleye Ebenezer Oloniluyi and Dayo Benedict Olanipekun of Ekiti State University, analyzed secondary panel data from 2001 to 2023 for countries ranging from Nigeria and Kenya to Botswana, Egypt and Morocco. Their measure of healthcare quality was deliberately stark: the infant mortality rate, defined as the number of infant deaths for every 1,000 live births. To capture the extent of medical brain drain, they used physicians’ density per capita, a barometer of how many doctors are actually available to serve a given population. When physicians leave, that density falls; when they stay, it rises.

The econometric machinery behind the study was a two-step system Generalized Method of Moments estimator, a dynamic panel technique prized for its robustness to endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Because infant mortality tends to persist over time, the researchers included the lagged infant mortality rate as a regressor, and its coefficient of 0.911 confirmed strong temporal persistence. The Arellano-Bond tests found no problematic serial correlation in the residuals, while Sargan and Hansen statistics confirmed the validity of the instruments, meaning the estimated relationships are unlikely to be statistical artifacts.

The headline finding is strikingly concrete. A 1 percent rise in physicians’ density per capita, the result of doctors staying rather than migrating, was associated with a 0.290 percent drop in infant deaths, statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Read in reverse, the implication is equally stark: every percentage-point erosion of physician availability through emigration translates into a measurable increase in infant mortality. In other words, the loss of a single cohort of migrating doctors is not merely an administrative inconvenience; it shows up, within the data, in the number of babies who do not survive their first year.

The control variables told a coherent story about what else shapes survival. A 1 percent increase in gross domestic product per capita cut infant deaths by 0.150 percent, significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that economic growth matters most when it trickles down into genuine access to facilities and medicines. Domestic general government health expenditure carried a coefficient of −0.044, significant at the 1 percent level, confirming that public investment in health saves infant lives, provided spending is shielded from corruption. Remittances showed the expected negative sign at −0.025 but fell short of statistical significance, hinting that money sent home by the diaspora is largely channeled into construction and consumption rather than directly into child survival.

One result startled the researchers. Government effectiveness, scored between −2.5 for weak governance and 2.5 for strong governance by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, returned a positive coefficient of 1.900, meaning that a rise in government ineffectiveness was associated with a 1.9 percent increase in infant deaths. The finding underscores the authors’ central warning that health outcomes depend not only on how many doctors a country has, but on whether its institutions can deliver public services competently, free of political interference and waste. A well-staffed hospital in a poorly governed state, the data suggest, still fails its smallest patients.

The scale of the underlying shortage is difficult to overstate. According to figures cited in the study, sub-Saharan Africa has roughly 2 doctors and 11 nurses per 10,000 patients, compared with 19 doctors and 49 nurses in the Americas and 32 doctors and 78 nurses in Europe. Africa carries more than 24 percent of the global burden of disease but commands only 3 percent of the world’s health workers. A World Health Organization report cited by the authors found that 55 countries now fall below the threshold of 49 healthcare workers per 10,000 people, and 37 of them are African, an increase from 47 such countries in 2020, driven by surging demand for health workers in wealthy nations and the lingering aftershocks of COVID-19.

The study is anchored in the classic push-pull theory of migration, first formalized in the nineteenth century by E.G. Ravenstein. Push factors include poor remuneration, inadequate working conditions, insecurity and limited career progression at home; pull factors include higher salaries, modern equipment, professional development and political stability abroad. Migrants, in this framing, perform an implicit cost-benefit calculation, relocating when the economic pull of the destination outweighs the push of their home country. The theory explains why the exodus persists despite its obvious costs: individual doctors are acting rationally, even as the aggregate effect drains their nations of irreplaceable human capital. Critics note that the framework understates the role of deliberate recruitment by wealthy countries’ health systems, which actively fill staffing gaps with talent trained at poor countries’ expense.

The study distinguishes itself from earlier work by operating at the macro level. Prior investigations, including survey-based studies in Enugu State, Benin City and Akwa Ibom State in Nigeria, found negative effects on treatment outcomes and service delivery but were confined to single institutions or states. One influential cross-country analysis covering 188 countries between 2000 and 2015 found that medical brain drain could paradoxically coincide with falling child mortality, but it used static estimation and did not isolate African countries. By restricting the panel to 35 African nations, extending the timeline to 2023, introducing remittances and government effectiveness as regressors, and applying dynamic GMM estimation, the new study closes those gaps and delivers a sharper, Africa-specific picture.

The policy prescriptions are direct. African governments, the authors argue, must raise salaries to levels that allow health workers to live decently, guarantee job security and timely retirement benefits, expand career development pathways, and increase annual medical school enrollment, ideally in partnership with international institutions, to offset continuing losses. They call for economic growth that genuinely reaches ordinary citizens, sustained and streamlined diaspora remittance flows, larger national budget allocations to health, and vigilant, corruption-free oversight of the health sector. The authors also frame the problem as a shared responsibility: Western employers who recruit African doctors, as the British Medical Association has acknowledged, are effectively importing trained personnel that the world’s poorest countries paid to produce. If the recommended measures are implemented seriously, the study concludes, the brain-drain syndrome can be curtailed, physician densities can recover, and the continent’s fragile health systems can begin delivering the quality of care that African infants, and all African patients, deserve.

Subject of Research: Quantitative analysis of how the emigration of skilled medical workers affects infant mortality and quality healthcare delivery in 35 African countries from 2001 to 2023.

Article Title: Medical brain-drain and quality healthcare delivery in African countries

Article References: Adegbola, O., Oloniluyi, A. E., & Olanipekun, D. B. (2026). Medical brain-drain and quality healthcare delivery in African countries. Discover Global Society, 4(1), Article 250. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-026-00556-7

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s44282-026-00556-7

Keywords: medical brain drain, Africa, infant mortality, healthcare delivery, physician density, remittances, government effectiveness, health expenditure, push-pull migration theory, system GMM, health workforce crisis, Discover Global Society