The research arrives at a moment when the question of state capacity has become urgent far beyond South Asia. Classic accounts of state-building, from Charles Tilly’s work on war-making to Fukuyama’s writing on governance and world order, have long treated capacity as something that accumulates slowly through revenue extraction, bureaucracy and coercive reach. Wealthy, well-staffed agencies were assumed to be the precondition for effective policy. Yet scholars such as David Leonard, Erin McDonnell and the ‘pockets of effectiveness’ literature have documented a puzzling counter-pattern: effective agencies and successful reforms sometimes flourish inside institutionally fragile states. The new study pushes this idea further by asking not whether such pockets exist, but what mechanisms allow them to emerge and to operate across multiple scales of government simultaneously.

To answer that question, the authors assembled three policy cases that span the full vertical architecture of Indian governance. At the national level they examined the National Action Plan on Climate Change, the flagship framework unveiled in 2008 that organized India’s climate response into a set of national missions. At the sub-national level they turned to law and order reforms in Bihar, an eastern Indian state that for decades was synonymous with poor governance before undergoing a striking turnaround in policing and criminal justice after 2005. At the city level they studied climate action in Rajkot, a fast-growing Gujarati municipality that developed a climate-resilient city action plan with help from international networks such as ICLEI and the CapaCITIES programme. Three cases, three scales, one central puzzle: how did low-capacity settings produce real policy outcomes?

The answer, the authors argue, lies in four interconnected strategies that recur across all three cases. The first is socio-political learning, the process by which policymakers absorb lessons from other jurisdictions, from their own past failures and from shifting social expectations, and convert those lessons into new policy designs. The concept echoes Hugh Heclo’s famous description of politics as ‘puzzling’ as well as powering, and the study revives that pairing as an analytical toolkit. Learning in weak states, the authors show, is not a luxury reserved for rich bureaucracies; it can be a substitute for them, allowing governments to borrow, adapt and improvise rather than build every institutional component from scratch.

The second strategy is what the literature calls puzzling: deliberate, iterative experimentation in which officials treat policy problems as puzzles to be solved rather than commands to be transmitted. In the Bihar case, police leadership experimented with fast-track courts, conviction-rate monitoring and organizational restructuring to attack a justice system that had effectively collapsed. In the national climate case, policymakers cycled through paradigms, from early framings that treated climate change as an environmental side-issue to later framings that embedded it within development and energy policy. The study draws on prior work by Deshpande and colleagues on India’s policy styles to show that this iterative puzzling, rather than any single master plan, produced the National Action Plan’s distinctive architecture of national missions tailored to different sectors.

The third and fourth strategies, political will and powering, address the political economy that surrounds any reform. Political will in the study refers to the sustained commitment of top leaders to back reforms even when they threaten entrenched interests, a factor that proved decisive in Bihar, where the state’s leadership after 2005 prioritized restoring law and order in a state long dominated by what commentators had called ‘jungle raj’. Powering, meanwhile, captures the mobilization of coalitions, resources and authority needed to push reforms through resistant bureaucracies and political networks. The authors show that these four strategies do not operate in isolation. Learning identifies what to do; puzzling works out how to do it; political will supplies the commitment; and powering assembles the coalition that makes implementation possible.

What makes the study technically interesting is its multi-scalar design. Most state-capacity research focuses on a single level, usually the national state, and most climate governance research either examines international negotiations or individual municipalities. By tracking the same mechanisms across national, state and city levels, Jha and Deshpande demonstrate that policy capacity is not simply a property that a government either has or lacks. It is built relationally, through linkages between scales. The national climate plan created frameworks and missions that cities could localize; international municipal networks such as ICLEI imported templates and technical expertise that a small city bureaucracy could never have generated alone; and sub-national reform in Bihar showed that a state written off as weak could reorganize its core coercive institutions within a few years when the political and bureaucratic incentives aligned.

The Bihar case is likely to draw the most attention from readers of comparative politics. Scholars such as Mukherjee and Moore have described Bihar’s incapacity as in part ‘by design’, the product of political strategies that deliberately kept state institutions weak to serve patronage networks. The new study does not dispute that history, but it documents what happened when the political calculus changed: fast-track courts cleared backlogs, conviction rates rose, and police reforms began to professionalize a force that had been deeply politicized. The lesson is uncomfortable for deterministic accounts of state-building. If weakness was politically constructed, it can also be politically dismantled, and the speed of that dismantling can surprise observers who assume capacity changes only over generations.

The climate cases carry equally consequential implications. India’s cities are on the front line of climate change, facing heat waves, flooding and infrastructure stress, yet most municipal governments have limited revenue, thin technical staff and fragmented authority. Studies by Bhardwaj and Khosla on how Indian city bureaucracies respond to climate change, and by Deshpande on municipal capacities under climate uncertainty, have described cities ‘superimposing’ climate tasks onto existing departments rather than building new institutions. The new research reframes this improvisation not merely as a deficit but as a strategy: low-capacity cities can assemble functional climate capacity by combining external network resources, national mission frameworks and internal learning. Rajkot’s climate-resilient action plan, developed under the CapaCITIES programme, illustrates how a mid-sized municipality can translate global climate discourse into a concrete local planning document without a large dedicated bureaucracy.

The authors are careful about the limits of their claims. The study is a qualitative case analysis built on published literature, policy documents and publicly accessible sources, and the authors state no competing interests. Three Indian cases cannot establish that the four strategies will travel to other weak states, and the abstract itself flags that future research should explore both the potential and the limitations of building policy capacity in weak states. There is also a normative tension the study leaves open: political will and powering depend on leaders and coalitions, which means the mechanisms that build capacity can also be captured by the same patronage politics that destroyed it. Whether learning-driven capacity endures after its political sponsors leave office remains an open empirical question.

Even so, the findings land at a propitious time. Donor agencies and international organizations have spent decades importing institutional blueprints into weak states with discouraging results, and the ‘pockets of effectiveness’ literature suggests the problem lies partly in ignoring how effective governance actually emerges. By specifying mechanisms, learning, puzzling, political will and powering, and by showing them operating across scales, the study offers a more actionable account than vague appeals to ‘political commitment’. For the growing community of researchers working on climate governance in the Global South, the message is particularly pointed: the capacity to act on climate change may not wait for the slow construction of a strong state, but can be assembled, case by case and scale by scale, by governments that learn faster than they grow.

Subject of Research: Building policy capacity across multiple scales of government in a weak or middling state, using Indian climate and governance reforms as case studies

Article Title: Governing across scales: building policy capacity in weak state

Article References: Jha, H., & Deshpande, T. (2026). Governing across scales: building policy capacity in weak state. Global Public Policy and Governance, 6(1), 66-81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-026-00142-2

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43508-026-00142-2

Keywords: state capacity, policy capacity, India, Bihar, climate governance, National Action Plan on Climate Change, multi-level governance, policy learning, political will, urban climate action, public administration, Global Public Policy and Governance