The research extends meta-governance theory into the field of judicial supervision. According to the authors, the procuratorate occupies a distinctive middle position: it can intervene in environmental matters through litigation, yet it remains institutionally embedded within the state apparatus rather than standing above it. This embeddedness, they argue, is what makes its coordinating role “quasi” — able to activate networks and align agendas without undermining existing authority structures.

Methodologically, the study develops a four-party evolutionary game model involving procuratorial organs, administrative departments, polluting enterprises and the public, and then examines the model’s equilibrium dynamics empirically using the institutional evolution of EPIL in Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province, as its case. The framework is designed to analyze dynamic interactions among the four actors as the EPIL system evolves.

The findings indicate that quasi-meta-governance strategies — network activation, resource integration and agenda cultivation — can promote a transition from fragmented governance toward collaborative equilibrium. According to the paper, these strategies operate by reducing coordination costs, integrating governance resources and reshaping environmental cognition among the multiple actors involved. The authors present this as a pathway through which procuratorate-led coordination can transform fragmented environmental governance into a more stable collaborative arrangement.

The authors frame their contributions in three parts. Theoretically, the quasi-meta-governor concept explains how cross-boundary coordination can be achieved under institutional embeddedness without dismantling existing authority. Methodologically, the four-party evolutionary game framework brings dynamic, multi-actor interaction analysis into EPIL research. Empirically, the Zhoushan case identifies the institutional mechanisms through which procuratorate-led coordination can support collaborative governance, offering implications for the optimization of EPIL institutions.

For readers following environmental governance, the study’s significance lies in its account of how a judicially embedded actor can function as a coordinator as well as a litigant. The paper is published as open access; the version shared ahead of final publication is citable and carries a permanent DOI, and is subject to further edits before the final Version of Record replaces it.

Subject of Research: Quasi-meta-governance in China's procuratorate-led environmental public interest litigation

Article Title: Between transgressive intervention and transboundary coordination: quasi-meta-governance in China’s environmental public interest litigation for sustainable development

Article References: Li, X., Luo, C., Wu, X., Ma, Y., Yan, J., & Zhang, J. (2026). Between transgressive intervention and transboundary coordination: quasi-meta-governance in China’s environmental public interest litigation for sustainable development. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09479-9

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1057/s41599-026-09479-9

Keywords: environmental public interest litigation, quasi-meta-governance, procuratorate, evolutionary game model, collaborative governance, China, Zhoushan, meta-governance theory, environmental governance, sustainable development, Between, transgressive