Chiapperino and Paneni’s argument was straightforward: the tools, techniques, and habits of mind inaugurated with genomics were repurposed for multi-omics and big data analytics, yet these approaches were never designed to disentangle the complex interactions and looping effects among biological and environmental factors. They called for less reductionism and more holistic methods in epigenetics research. Dupras, who has repeatedly voiced similar concerns about the purely biomedical translation of epigenetic knowledge, nonetheless finds the framing problematic. In his view, conceptualizing the problem of reductionism as a question of whether epigenetics succeeds or fails as a biosocial science invites a series of unexamined assumptions, five of which he systematically dismantles in his commentary.

The first assumption is that genetics is not a biosocial science. Dupras argues this is demonstrably wrong. Our genomes are constantly exposed to and disrupted by ionic radiation, oxidative stress, mutagens, and viruses, all of which can alter the linear sequence of DNA and thereby gene expression. DNA repair mechanisms are highly active but not always successful, and repeated exposure to stressors coupled with imperfect repair can produce permanent mutations that affect gene expression over the long term, in ways not unlike epigenetic modifications. Beyond molecular damage, social factors shape the prevalence of genes within families, communities, and populations: historical events, migrations, niche construction behaviors, and mating patterns all influence the human genome, its diversity, and the distribution of genetic variants over time. Social scientists have also long observed that groups form and are reinforced around shared biological traits, a phenomenon known as biosociality, in which belonging to such groups encourages individuals to adopt or reinforce associated behaviors.

The second assumption flips the question: is epigenetics itself truly biosocial? Dupras points out that many epigenetic traits are almost entirely determined by widely shared components of the human genome, leaving little room for social factors. During embryogenesis and fetal development, cells and tissues differentiate and acquire their specific functions through obligatory epigenetic modifications, largely via DNA methylation programs. These highly conserved, necessary processes are epigenetic, but it is hard to see how they qualify as biosocial. Moreover, thinking of epigenetics as uniformly biosocial downplays the variety of external factors that affect epigenetic mechanisms, including physical rather than social environments such as environmental chemicals and pharmaceutical products, as well as lifestyle factors like tobacco or alcohol consumption, which are shaped by social contingencies but also by individual behavior and decision-making.

Third, Dupras challenges the notion that epigenetics is a homogeneous scientific field. Drawing on a recent international survey of epigenetic researchers, he notes there is currently no consensus on the appropriate definition and scope of the discipline. While most researchers agree that DNA methylation and histone modifications fall within epigenetics, there is disagreement about whether mechanisms such as RNA interference and the regulation of transcription factors should be included. This dissensus creates practical challenges, for instance when assessing whether existing policies against genetic discrimination should extend to epigenetic information. The survey also showed that researchers are spread across many subfields, including disease, functional, developmental, environmental, and inheritance-focused epigenetics. Notably, the International Human Epigenome Consortium has focused from its inception on mapping reference epigenomes for various cell types, a methodologically valuable objective that does not capture how epigenetic variants change under exposure or disease. Some researchers, Dupras adds, do not even identify as epigeneticists, finding the term too broad or too narrow for their work.

Fourth, the assumption that epigenetics and genomics are fundamentally distinct does not survive close scrutiny. Some epigenetic variants are plastic and reversible, but others are remarkably stable and can hardly be affected by environmental or social exposures; some may even be considered innate rather than acquired, persisting from birth to death much like genetic variants. The definitional boundary is also contested. One of the most widely used definitions of modern epigenetics describes it as the study of changes in gene function that are mitotically or meiotically heritable and that do not entail a change in DNA sequence. While histone modifications clearly leave the sequence intact, the case of DNA methylation is murkier. Following Lappé and Landecker, Dupras asks why we take for granted that methylation does not change the sequence: what if cytosine methylated in this way were conceptualized as a distinct molecular entity rather than a modified version of the original base? Taking the conundrum seriously leaves two options: redefine epigenetics, or reconceptualize DNA methylation as a genetic change. Either way, the line between the fields blurs considerably.

Fifth, and perhaps most unsettling, Dupras questions the assumption that epigenetics’ biosocial character will automatically produce socially desirable outcomes. He agrees with Chiapperino and Paneni that research may be skewed toward treating biomarkers as mere targets for molecular and pharmacological intervention. But he wonders why we assume that knowledge of the molecular effects of social phenomena will translate into greater policy recognition and prevention of inequities created by the social determinants of health. The main challenge facing public health, he suggests, may be more biopolitical than scientific. There is a real risk that molecular knowledge will instead favor biomedical interventions that fix the biological consequences of morally questionable social inequalities while leaving the inequalities themselves untouched. There is also the danger of increased stigmatization and discrimination arising from emphasizing correlations between sociocultural factors and biological differences between individuals and groups.

There are practical obstacles as well. Correlating complex social and environmental phenomena with biological marks seems inevitably prey to reductionism, because a large diversity of social stimuli can affect the same epigenetic variants, and a single social stimulus can affect multiple variants, making it extremely challenging to accurately correlate scales that are largely incommensurable. At minimum, Dupras argues, it may not always be relevant or useful to attempt such correlations at the molecular level. While endorsing greater recognition of complexity may look good on paper, specifying and operationalizing that posture in the daily conduct of research is far harder, and it may not account for the many similarities and blurred lines between genetics and epigenetics.

Dupras suggests there may be sociohistorical reasons for our reductionist reflexes. Modern epigenetics is still a burgeoning field, welcomed with open arms by those rightly displeased with decades of genetic reductionism and the persistent belief that the DNA blueprint will solve the mysteries of biological identity. Consequently, epigenetics has been mobilized most vigorously for its differences from genetics. Instead of this polarization, he proposes, following Meloni, that epigenetics be understood as a boundary object, a study object whose nature and significance can be appreciated from multiple epistemological standpoints. Such an approach could promote dialogue and reflexivity between biology and the social sciences, and it is through that dialogue, Dupras concludes, that science will best confront the determinism, essentialism, and exceptionalism that have long shadowed genetics and now threaten to distort epigenetics as well.

Subject of Research: Critique of reductionism and biosocial framing in epigenetics research

Article Title: Being against reductionism regarding epigenetics

Article References: Dupras, C. (2023). Being against reductionism regarding epigenetics. Epigenetics Communications, 3(1), Article 4. https://doi.org/10.1186/s43682-023-00020-6

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1186/s43682-023-00020-6

Keywords: epigenetics, reductionism, biosocial science, genetics, DNA methylation, bioethics, genetic determinism, social determinants of health, epigenetic discrimination, International Human Epigenome Consortium, boundary object, interdisciplinarity

The commercial landscape that prompted the study is expanding rapidly. Companies exemplified by TALLY Health in the United States, co-founded by Harvard researcher David Sinclair, offer at-home kits that analyze methylation rates across the genome to produce a biological age estimate. Biological age, in this framework, is a mathematical prediction derived from biomarkers, and the gap between biological and chronological age is presented as a window into how genetics, environment and socioeconomic circumstances shape health. Many firms go further, pairing tests with anti-aging supplements containing compounds such as calcium alpha-ketoglutarate, quercetin, trans-resveratrol, spermidine and fisetin, and encouraging customers to retest repeatedly to track whether their protocols are working. While distinct from true epigenomic editing with tools like CRISPR-dCas9, these strategies similarly aim to reprogram biological processes at the molecular level, blurring the line between science, medicine and commerce.

Methodologically, the study employed a real-time Delphi approach, an iterative survey technique that lets participants see the group’s collective responses and revise their own answers asynchronously. The panel, recruited through purposive sampling from the Francophone research community, included experts in philosophy, chemistry, biology, law, sociology, geriatrics, bioinformatics and genetic discrimination, with professional experience ranging from two to twenty-one years. Of thirty-seven people invited, thirteen began the consultation and ten completed it. They rated thirteen items on a seven-point Likert scale, with a deliberately high consensus threshold of eighty percent, reflecting the ethically sensitive nature of the domain. To interpret the results, the team applied the RULE framework proposed by Matthias Wienroth, which evaluates emerging technologies through three intersecting lenses: Reliability, Utility and LEgitimacy.

On reliability, the panel voiced substantial doubt. No formal consensus was reached on any of the thirteen items, signaling persistent disagreement about the likelihood and severity of emerging problems, but the pattern of responses revealed a general climate of concern. Participants questioned whether current epigenetic tests can deliver on their promises. One panelist argued that treating biological aging as a reversible phenomenon is problematic in itself, given the complexity documented across the epigenetics literature. The study highlights that construct validity remains an active debate: many first-generation epigenetic clocks, including the widely used Horvath and Hannum models, were trained to predict chronological age, not to measure the biological processes of aging. When companies relabel this output as biological age, they may be overstating what the measurement actually captures.

The technical critique extends to measurement stability. Research by Apsley and colleagues found that many DNA methylation probes used in aging algorithms show only average or below-average stability when samples are collected repeatedly within a single five-hour window, with acute stress and early-life adversity further perturbing readings. This instability means that short-term fluctuations in estimated biological age may reflect measurement noise rather than genuine epigenetic change. Consumers who take supplements for a few months and then retest could easily misinterpret such variation as evidence that an intervention is working. The study also notes that second-generation clocks such as PhenoAge and GrimAge, which integrate clinical biomarkers and predict morbidity and mortality, offer stronger construct validity, and some companies have adopted newer models like CheekAge. Yet a 2025 systematic review found no consensus on a standardized method for assessing biological age, underscoring how immature the field remains.

On utility, the panel was split. Four participants were skeptical that knowing one’s biological age offers practical value, three viewed it positively, and three were neutral. Skeptics argued that overall health at a given age is a better indicator and suggested the tests function largely as a way of selling a service. Supporters countered that an unfavorable result might motivate healthier behavior. The discussion also examined whether epigenetic clocks can serve as surrogate endpoints in anti-aging trials, a use that Horvath and Topol caution is not yet validated because changes in epigenetic age have not been shown to reliably predict clinical outcomes. The strongest convergence in the entire consultation, item three, showed eight of ten participants rejecting the scientific justification for marketing supplements alongside epigenetic aging tests, with one panelist calling the practice a potential exploitation of people’s natural anxiety about aging.

Privacy and data governance emerged as critical flashpoints. Epigenetic data can reveal intimate insights, including disease susceptibility and estimated life expectancy, and companies have already expressed interest in using epigenetic age for life insurance underwriting. The information is also being considered for refining DNA phenotyping in forensic investigations, and researchers have warned of potential secondary uses in immigration, employment screening and military contexts. Panelists questioned who would access the data and whether confidentiality assurances could be trusted, echoing long-standing concerns about the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry. Notably, the item calling for legislation to prevent epigenetic discrimination approached consensus with 79.21 percent stability, the closest any item came to the threshold. Panelists pointed out that existing genetic non-discrimination laws, such as those addressing genetic information in insurance, do not clearly extend to epigenetic data, leaving a regulatory vacuum.

The legitimacy dimension exposed deeper social fault lines. Panelists warned that marketing epigenetic tests as tools of personal empowerment risks shifting responsibility for aging from structural conditions onto individuals. Research by Krieger and colleagues has shown that epigenetic age acceleration is significantly associated with factors such as being born in a Jim Crow state, low parental educational attainment and adult impoverishment, conditions that disproportionately affect Black, Hispanic and socioeconomically marginalized populations. When test results strip away this structural context, accelerated aging caused by racial discrimination and economic injustice gets reframed as a personal deficit with a purchasable solution. Scholars have also warned that epigenetic responsibility narratives disproportionately target mothers and risk reinscribing racialized interpretations of biological difference. Several panelists further argued that the high cost of tests and supplements could worsen health inequities, with one observing that those who can afford repeated testing will demand more follow-up care, effectively privatizing healthcare services.

The consultation also grappled with what the commercialization of epigenetic youth does to collective perceptions of aging. Many participants felt the rhetoric reinforces ageism, pathologizes a natural process, and promotes an individualistic vision of health as capital to be maximized, with one panelist describing the phenomenon as neoliberal biocitizenship and the promise economy. Not all agreed; one participant argued that highlighting the negative aspects of aging is not morally reprehensible and that objecting to longevism is not a valid criticism. This dissent adds nuance, but the majority view held that consumer epigenomics benefits from and contributes to the commodification of longevity while obscuring the social determinants of health. The authors close with six recommendations, including improving public science communication about the limitations of current tests, regulating marketing claims about biological age, strengthening privacy protections, preventing unauthorized secondary uses of epigenetic data, organizing regular scientific guidance on clinical validity, and conducting further research with actual consumers. As epigenetic clocks migrate from laboratories to bathroom counters, the study suggests that the hardest questions are not technical but social: who benefits, who bears the burden, and whether measuring biological age will deepen or distort our understanding of what it means to grow old.

Subject of Research: Ethical, legal and social implications of direct-to-consumer epigenetic biological age testing

Article Title: Consumer epigenomics and biological age editing: ethical, legal, and social implications

Article References: Anvar, S., Dion-Labrie, M., Joly, Y., & Dupras, C. (2026). Consumer epigenomics and biological age editing: ethical, legal, and social implications. Epigenetics Communications, 6(1), Article 3. https://doi.org/10.1186/s43682-026-00044-8

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1186/s43682-026-00044-8

Keywords: epigenetics, biological age, DNA methylation, direct-to-consumer testing, epigenetic clocks, aging, privacy, epigenetic discrimination, health inequities, ageism, supplements, Delphi study