The review’s methodology is rigorous and transparent. The researchers searched Scopus-indexed journals using carefully combined keyword sets—pairing “energy crisis” with terms such as “food market,” “food security,” “energy transition,” “green energy,” “energy poverty,” and “social policy”—and applied strict inclusion criteria that limited the sample to peer-reviewed research articles, excluding conference papers and book chapters. After screening for relevance and reliability, the final corpus settled at 68 studies. Among the most-cited works in this body of literature are analyses of the war’s heterogeneous impacts on global equity markets, assessments of environmental damage in Ukraine, and a prominent Nature Energy study quantifying the burden of the global energy price crisis on households worldwide.

The food market findings are perhaps the most alarming. Ukraine and Russia together account for roughly 40 percent of global grain exports, and the war disrupted the supply of wheat, barley, maize, oilseeds, and fertilizers at a moment when global food prices were already elevated. From 2011 to 2022, Ukraine ranked as the fifth-largest corn producer, contributing up to 2.7 percent of global output, and the ninth-largest wheat producer with a 3.3 percent global share. According to the most recent data from the Food and Agriculture Organization cited in the review, approximately 20 to 25 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural land has been degraded due to the conflict. Countries heavily dependent on Ukrainian wheat imports—including Egypt, Turkey, Mongolia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—have been hit particularly hard, and the United Nations has characterized the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war as a major food crisis.

What makes the food crisis particularly insidious is its energy dimension. Natural gas is not merely a fuel; it is a critical feedstock for the production of ammonia and nitrogen fertilizers that underpin modern agriculture. Fertilizers containing nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium can boost average crop yields by 30 to 50 percent in intensive agricultural systems, sustaining the capacity of crop production to nourish a growing global population. When natural gas prices spiked, several nitrogen fertilizer production facilities across the European Union reduced output, sending input costs higher and compressing margins for farmers already squeezed by elevated fuel and transportation expenses. The review notes that in March 2023, food inflation in the EU reached approximately 19 percent, compared to roughly 6 percent for overall inflation—a stark illustration of how energy costs propagate through the entire food value chain, from fertilizer production through irrigation, processing, and distribution.

The energy transition tells a more paradoxical story. In the short term, the crisis produced stagnation and even partial reversals: several European countries temporarily reactivated coal-fired power plants to guarantee domestic energy supply, and Germany’s emergency measures exemplified the difficult trade-offs governments faced between immediate energy security and long-term decarbonization commitments. The review observes that what is actually unfolding is less an “energy transition” than an “energy addition,” in which renewable capacity is layered atop conventional sources rather than cleanly replacing them. Yet in the longer term, the imperative of energy independence has become a powerful accelerant. The EU’s REPowerEU framework, whose central aim is to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels, plans to halt all imports of Russian liquefied natural gas and oil by the end of 2027, while also addressing Russia’s so-called shadow fleet used to evade sanctions and limiting imports of Russian uranium and enriched uranium.

The scale of Europe’s prior dependence explains why the shock was so severe. Before sanctions were imposed, Russia was the world’s third-largest crude oil producer and second-largest natural gas producer, supplying about 14 percent of global oil. The EU imported roughly 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. The war exposed how deeply energy security had been entangled with geopolitical vulnerability, and it forced a redefinition of the concept itself: energy security is no longer simply about a stable supply of oil and gas, but about the strategic risks of depending on imported fossil fuels from an adversary. The review argues that this reframing has made the transition to renewables, hydrogen, and nuclear power not merely a climate strategy but a national security imperative for many European states.

Energy poverty, the third pillar of the review, has emerged as the most socially corrosive consequence. High energy prices impose costs on households in two distinct ways: directly, through higher bills for heating, cooling, cooking, and mobility; and indirectly, through the elevated prices of goods and services whose production depends on energy and fossil feedstocks. The review cites Eurostat data showing that in 2024, 9.2 percent of EU citizens could not afford to keep their homes adequately warm during winter, compared with 10.6 percent in 2023 and 9.3 percent in 2022, while a further 6.9 percent of Europeans were behind on their utility bills. Energy poverty has been linked in multiple studies to serious physical and mental health consequences, including depression, anxiety, and social exclusion, and it disproportionately affects low-income households living in energy-inefficient housing.

The review identifies four principal drivers of energy poverty in the EU: accessibility and affordability issues, low energy efficiency in housing combined with high energy losses, divergence between household needs due to individual factors, and a lack of energy-related awareness and knowledge. In response, the EU has established the Energy Poverty Advisory Hub, which continues the work of the earlier European Energy Poverty Observatory by reorganizing classification systems and expanding the scope of energy poverty indicators. The review also situates energy poverty within the broader framework of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, noting that the war jeopardizes progress toward SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 2 (zero hunger), and SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), which directly addresses energy poverty through its mandate to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all.

The authors’ synthesis reveals a triple shock: the war simultaneously disrupted global food markets, accelerated the energy transition in the long run while causing short-term setbacks, and deepened energy vulnerability for low-income populations. The economic mechanics are unforgiving. Higher energy costs increase inflation, eroding consumers’ purchasing power; when consumption slows alongside rising inflation, the result is stagflation, a condition that is difficult to reverse without structural interventions aimed at development and cost reduction. The review warns that when food insecurity exceeds a critical threshold, political instability can follow in both democratic and non-democratic regimes, with risks of social conflict and general unrest. The imperative of securing basic needs for food and decent living conditions, the authors argue, should be a primary concern for political leaders worldwide.

Looking ahead, the review outlines a research agenda for a conflict that remains ongoing. Priority areas include studying the spatial dimensions of the energy-war nexus, examining food and energy supply chains under crisis conditions, comparatively evaluating government support measures for businesses and households, investigating the interplay between the energy transition and energy poverty during wartime, exploring whether the crisis can be leveraged as an opportunity to advance the Sustainable Development Goals, and assessing the war’s impact on renewable energy investment. The central lesson is sobering but clear: energy systems, food systems, and social welfare are not separate policy domains but a tightly coupled nexus, and shocks to one propagate rapidly through the others. In a globalized world where crises are increasingly likely, the review concludes that the only predictable feature of energy policy is the need for rapid adaptation—and that the path to a climate-neutral Europe by 2050, already ambitious, has become far more complex, costly, and contested than anyone anticipated before February 2022.

Subject of Research: The impacts of the post-2022 energy crisis on food markets, the energy transition, and energy poverty following the Russia–Ukraine war

Article Title: The impact of the energy crisis on the food market, the energy transition, and energy poverty after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war: a systematic literature review

Article References: Apostolopoulos, N., Goulas, C., Flouros, F., Papadopoulos, G., & Apostolopoulos, S. (2026). The impact of the energy crisis on the food market, the energy transition, and energy poverty after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war: a systematic literature review. Frontiers in Sustainable Energy Policy, 5, Article 1755555. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsuep.2026.1755555

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.3389/fsuep.2026.1755555

Keywords: energy crisis, Russia–Ukraine war, food security, energy transition, energy poverty, REPowerEU, fertilizer prices, renewable energy, European Union, sustainable development, systematic review, energy policy