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	<title>disaster risk science &#8211; Science</title>
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	<title>disaster risk science &#8211; Science</title>
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		<title>Stewardship, Not Command: New Framework for Governing Disaster Systems</title>
		<link>https://scienmag.com/stewardship-not-command-new-framework-for-governing-disaster-systems/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Denise Maddox]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 03:22:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Technology and Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[adaptive coordination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[adaptive governance strategies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aotearoa New Zealand]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collaborative emergency management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[complex adaptive systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster and emergency management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster governance framework]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster risk science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[emergency management workforce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[governance framework]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[indigenous and civil society roles in disaster response]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[institutional memory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[interagency coordination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Māori partnership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meta-governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multi-agency emergency response]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New Zealand disaster risk science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nonlinearity in disaster impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[resilience in emergency systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stewardship in disaster management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[system stewardship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trust and collaboration]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://scienmag.com/?p=201224</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A study of New Zealand's disaster management system proposes a three-pillar stewardship framework—relational, informational, and institutional—as a meta-governance approach for sustaining coordination and legitimacy in complex adaptive emergency systems.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Disasters rarely respect organizational boundaries, and neither does the work of managing them. A new study published in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Science argues that the effectiveness of disaster and emergency management (DEM) systems depends less on heroic leaders or rigid command structures than on a quieter, more continuous activity: stewardship. Drawing on 38 semistructured interviews with 40 practitioners across Aotearoa New Zealand&#8217;s DEM system, researchers Todd Miller, Loic Le De, and Katherine Hore of Auckland University of Technology have developed a three-pillar governance framework that reframes how complex, multi-agency emergency systems can be held together over time.</p>
<p>The study&#8217;s starting point is a theoretical one. Disaster and emergency management, the authors contend, behaves as a complex adaptive system: a network of interdependent actors—central and local government agencies, emergency services, Indigenous partners, civil society organizations, and private sector entities—whose roles and relationships shift as hazard conditions evolve. Three properties of such systems matter most for DEM. Self-organization allows actors to reconfigure coordination autonomously, as observed during the 2011 Tōhoku disaster in Japan, where local actors improvised networks after formal command structures collapsed. Nonlinearity means disruptions can propagate in ways that produce consequences disproportionate to their initial cause, a dynamic famously analyzed by Charles Perrow in his work on normal accidents. Emergent behavior, meanwhile, means system performance arises from interactions among actors rather than from prescribed plans, and therefore cannot be fully anticipated or controlled in advance.</p>
<p>These characteristics expose a structural mismatch. Leadership scholarship has evolved from trait-based theories toward relational, situational, and transformational models, yet it has remained anchored within the organizational unit rather than the interorganizational system. Even systems-oriented approaches such as meta-leadership and complexity leadership theory retain a largely leader-centric orientation, privileging the individual actor as the primary locus of control. The limitations of that orientation are visible in disaster history: post-event analyses of Hurricane Katrina identified failures of individual leadership alongside structural fragmentation, unclear cross-agency mandates, and inadequate mechanisms for aligning distributed actors toward shared objectives. The 2010 Haiti earthquake similarly showed how leadership capacity interacted with pre-existing institutional weakness and fragmented international coordination.</p>
<p>To fill this gap, the researchers turned to stewardship theory, which emerged as a counterpoint to agency theory&#8217;s assumption that actors are self-interested and require monitoring and incentives to perform. Stewardship instead conceptualizes actors as fundamentally motivated to pursue collective goals when organizational identification and value alignment are strong. Extended to the system level, stewardship becomes a form of meta-governance—concerned with shaping a system&#8217;s goals, rules, feedback, and response—rather than with directing operational activity. The concept has been applied in natural resource governance, public health system management, and complexity-informed public policy, but had not been systematically examined within DEM, despite the field&#8217;s combination of distributed authority, multi-agency interdependence, and nonlinear hazard environments.</p>
<p>The empirical work employed constructivist networked grounded theory, a methodology combining Charmaz&#8217;s constructivist grounded theory with social network analysis to examine both the relational structure of the DEM system and practitioners&#8217; experiences within it. Data were collected between August 2024 and June 2025 from participants recruited across national forums, professional networks, emergency services, territorial authorities, civil society organizations, and private sector actors. Interviews ranged from 43 to 96 minutes, with a mean of approximately 60 minutes, and analysis proceeded through iterative coding, constant comparison, and progressive category refinement until theoretical saturation was reached. Notably, stewardship was not a predetermined analytical construct; it emerged inductively as the integrative category explaining how participants understood coherence, legitimacy, learning, and adaptive coordination to be sustained across organizational boundaries.</p>
<p>Four interdependent themes emerged from the analysis. The first concerned governing a distributed system. Participants described uncertainty about who holds overarching responsibility for the system as a whole, with national oversight perceived as bounded to particular hazards rather than extending across the full breadth of interagency coordination. Recurrent misalignment between nationally designed arrangements and local operational realities was a persistent friction, sharpened by the fact that national guidance, absent legislative force, cannot be required to be followed. Participants also described ambiguity about which actors were recognized as legitimate contributors to the system, with the operational network extending well beyond formally prescribed structures.</p>
<p>The second theme centered on trust and inclusive participation as the relational infrastructure of coordination. Participants emphasized that the quality of pre-existing relationships was a more reliable predictor of coordination effectiveness than formal arrangements or statutory roles—one practitioner quipped that you need to build a relationship over eight cups of coffee before you can start asking for something. Civil society organizations were described as providing relational networks and community intelligence that are substantial but underrecognized within formal system definitions. Indigenous partnership emerged as a distinct dimension: under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, signed in 1840, Māori hold an enduring basis for partnership in governance, and participants described how the quality of that engagement directly shaped both the legitimacy and operational reach of the system, though Treaty-based partnership quality varied significantly across regions.</p>
<p>The third theme addressed information sharing and learning. The aspiration of a common operating picture was widely referenced but characterized as aspirational rather than operational—one participant observed that the only common thing about it is the word common. Incompatible information systems, platform fragmentation, and institutional protectiveness over data combined to produce what the authors call a feedback deficit: a system theoretically capable of shared sensemaking but operationally fragmented along institutional boundaries. Compounding this, insights gained through events and exercises were described as fading as urgency declined and personnel changed, leaving institutional memory residing in individuals rather than organizational systems and rendering learning sporadic rather than cumulative.</p>
<p>The fourth theme concerned sustaining capability and legitimacy over the long term. Resourcing was described as unevenly distributed, with reliance on locally generated ratepayer revenue producing what participants called a postcode lottery of capability, where organizational capacity reflects local financial circumstances rather than hazard exposure or statutory obligation. Workforce sustainability emerged as a significant concern, with 31 of 40 participants describing burnout, illness, recruitment delays, inconsistent professional standards, and the absence of any centralized repository for qualifications or competency requirements. Accountability, meanwhile, was described as diffuse, operating primarily through post-event inquiry rather than ongoing assurance of preparedness and coordination quality.</p>
<p>From these findings, the authors distill a three-pillar framework of system stewardship. Relational stewardship encompasses the trust, boundary-spanning networks, and inclusive participation through which coordination becomes possible, including sustained investment in Treaty-based partnerships with iwi and the formalization of relationships into organizational arrangements rather than individual positions. Informational stewardship covers shared situational awareness, data transparency, and feedback-informed learning, requiring both technical investment in compatible information management and cultural change that treats learning as a shared system function. Institutional stewardship concerns equitable resourcing, workforce capability, and accountability mechanisms that sustain capability and legitimacy over time. Crucially, the three pillars are interdependent: weakness in one degrades the others, while alignment across all three creates the conditions for sustained adaptive performance. Trust facilitates information sharing; shared understanding strengthens institutional confidence; equitable resourcing enables the sustained engagement through which relationships are built.</p>
<p>The practical implications are considerable. For national agencies, stewardship implies a reorientation of the governance function—from setting requirements to cultivating conditions, from assuring compliance to strengthening capability. For policymakers, the framework makes visible the structural interdependencies between funding, professional standards, and accountability mechanisms, demonstrating that reforms to any single dimension in isolation are unlikely to produce durable improvement. The authors caution that the conditions underpinning system stewardship should not be assumed to persist indefinitely; trust, shared learning, institutional legitimacy, and collaborative relationships require continual investment and renewal, and may be eroded by organizational change, resource constraints, and competing priorities. The study&#8217;s limitations are acknowledged: findings derive from a single national context, reflect participant interpretations rather than direct observation, and capture a single point in time, though the framework forms part of a cumulative research program. Ultimately, the study argues that strengthening disaster and emergency management requires moving beyond episodic leadership during events toward the deliberate, continuous stewardship of the relational, informational, and institutional conditions through which adaptive coordination, collective learning, and long-term system coherence are cultivated and sustained.</p>
<p><strong>Subject of Research:</strong> System stewardship as a complex adaptive system governance framework for disaster and emergency management in Aotearoa New Zealand</p>
<p><strong>Article Title:</strong> Stewardship for Disaster and Emergency Management: A Complex Adaptative System Governance Framework</p>
<p><strong>Article References:</strong> Miller, T., Le De, L., &amp; Hore, K. (2026). Stewardship for Disaster and Emergency Management: A Complex Adaptative System Governance Framework. <em>International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 17</em>(4), 725-738. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00762-6" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00762-6</a></p>
<p><strong>Image Credits:</strong> AI Generated</p>
<p><strong>DOI:</strong> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00762-6" rel="noopener noreferrer">10.1007/s13753-026-00762-6</a></p>
<p><strong>Keywords:</strong> disaster and emergency management, system stewardship, complex adaptive systems, meta-governance, governance framework, adaptive coordination, Aotearoa New Zealand, trust and collaboration, institutional memory, emergency management workforce, Māori partnership, disaster risk science</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">201224</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Reliable Are 100-Year Climate Extremes? New Study Warns of Overconfidence</title>
		<link>https://scienmag.com/how-reliable-are-100-year-climate-extremes-new-study-warns-of-overconfidence/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sloane Callahan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 22:53:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Technology and Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[100-year flood risk assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate Adaptation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[climate change impact on extreme events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[climate extreme event prediction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[climate extremes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster risk science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Estimated]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[evaluation of climate event frequency assumptions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[infrastructure design for climate resilience]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[large ensembles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[limitations of historical climate data]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nonstationarity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[overconfidence in climate risk estimates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poisson distribution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[probability of rare weather events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reliability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reliability of climate return periods]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Return]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[return period]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statistical analysis of climate extremes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statistical extrapolation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tail distribution modeling in climate science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[uncertainty in long-term climate projections]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://scienmag.com/?p=199452</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A new study applies an engineering reliability framework to show that estimated return periods for climate extremes are often far less certain than the data behind them can support.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When engineers design a dam, a levee, or a hospital to withstand a so-called 100-year storm, the label carries an air of certainty. Yet a new perspective article published in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Science argues that the confidence we place in these estimated return periods is often far greater than the data justify. Elisa Ragno of Delft University of Technology and Amir AghaKouchak of the University of California, Irvine, borrow a concept from engineering itself—reliability—and turn it against the statistics of climate extremes, revealing an uncomfortable truth: the probability of ever having observed the very event we claim to be designing against may be surprisingly low.</p>
<p>The traditional approach to extreme event analysis treats the occurrence of a flood, storm, or drought as a random variable described by a probability distribution fitted to historical observations. Design values for infrastructure are extrapolated from the tail of that distribution, often corresponding to magnitudes that have never actually been recorded. A 100-year event, for instance, is expected on average to occur once every 100 years, carrying an annual exceedance probability of 0.01. But as the authors emphasize, this framework rests on the natural variability of the climate and on assumptions of stationarity that are increasingly strained in a warming world, where hazards such as flooding, storms, and droughts are becoming more frequent and severe while urban exposure continues to grow.</p>
<p>The core of the new analysis is a simple but powerful reframing. In engineering, reliability is defined as the probability that a system remains in a satisfactory state over its lifetime. For a system designed around a T-year event over a lifespan of N years, the reliability is calculated as the probability that the design event never occurs during that period. The authors invert this familiar formula: instead of asking whether a structure will survive, they ask whether the T-year event itself is likely to appear in a dataset of observations or simulations spanning N years. The complement of the engineering reliability—the probability of observing the event of interest at least once—becomes a quantitative measure of confidence in the data itself.</p>
<p>Expressed as a function of the ratio between the return period T and the dataset length N, this observation probability converges, as the dataset grows large, to a Poisson distribution. The elegance of the Poisson approximation is that it is independent of the underlying distribution used to model the phenomenon, making it a broadly applicable yardstick. The authors caution, however, that the approximation breaks down for very small datasets, those shorter than roughly 30 years, and for return periods vastly exceeding the record length. Within its valid range, the metric delivers strikingly counterintuitive results that challenge how the rarity of extremes is commonly interpreted.</p>
<p>The most arresting finding concerns the case where the return period equals the length of the record. When N equals T, the probability of having observed the event of interest is always 0.63, regardless of the absolute magnitudes involved. The chance of seeing a 30-year event in 30 years of data is identical to the chance of seeing a 1000-year event in 1000 years of data. This invariance means that the extreme character of an event should be judged not in absolute terms but relative to the length of the observations or simulations used to derive it. A 100-year event estimated from 50 years of observations carries only about a 0.40 probability of having been captured in the record at all, and that figure drops to 0.26 when only 30 years of data are available—precisely the range of most instrumental records worldwide.</p>
<p>These numbers matter because recorded observations typically span only 30 to 50 years, meaning that inferences about 100-year or rarer events almost always lie outside the range of the data and depend heavily on the chosen statistical model. History shows how unprepared societies can be for events beyond their records: the 1953 storm surge flood in the Netherlands reshaped that country&#8217;s entire flood management system precisely because it exceeded what past experience had suggested was possible. The authors argue that preparedness must go beyond historical events, accepting that the past may not be a reliable guide to the future in a nonstationary climate, and that unexpected events are intrinsic to nonlinear, dynamic systems.</p>
<p>One promising response to the scarcity of observations is the use of large ensembles—many climate model simulations run under identical forcing conditions, each producing a different physically plausible realization of weather. Large ensembles allow researchers to sample internal climate variability far beyond what the observational record permits, and they have already demonstrated their value. Ensemble boosting techniques generated plausible storylines of a heatwave hotter than the unprecedented Pacific Northwest event of late June 2021, an event that was essentially unpredictable from observations alone. Conditional probability approaches have since shown promise in assigning return periods to such extreme simulated events, and studies using large ensembles have flagged high risks of unprecedented rainfall in the current climate.</p>
<p>Yet the authors issue a clear warning against overconfidence in these tools. Ensemble members are generated by climate models validated against observations, meaning their credibility derives from matching the statistical properties of the very records whose limitations the ensembles are meant to overcome. The apparent reduction in uncertainty comes simply from having more events to count, not necessarily from better estimates. Capturing internal variability in climate models is harder than capturing their response to external forcings, the computational demands of large ensembles are substantial, and validating their representativeness is not always feasible. Crucially, the reliability framework shows that the probability of simulating an event whose return period equals the dataset length remains 0.63 no matter how large the ensemble grows—more data does not dissolve this fundamental constraint.</p>
<p>The authors also dismantle the hope that large ensembles could eliminate statistical extrapolation altogether. Because the severity of an event is defined by its frequency of exceedance, some form of extrapolation—parametric or nonparametric—is unavoidable. Nonparametric plotting positions involve empirical interpolation whose results vary depending on the method chosen, while order statistics reveal that the return period of the single largest event in a dataset is formally undefined, tending to infinity. The link between event frequency and the definition of an extreme cannot be severed. Under nonstationarity, the classical formulas no longer hold because exceedance probabilities change from year to year; some researchers have proposed time-varying return periods, while others recommend abandoning return periods in favor of reliability-based design, fixing a desired reliability level within a project horizon and deriving design values numerically.</p>
<p>The broader message is one of calibrated humility. Return periods are often perceived as certain estimates, but attaching a reliability level to every inferred extreme would give decision-makers an honest measure of confidence and encourage critical use of available resources, whether observational or model-based. Large ensembles remain extremely valuable for compensating for limited observations, but they should be deployed with caution to avoid a false sense of security rooted in modeling assumptions and biases. As climate extremes intensify and exposure grows, the study suggests that the most dangerous illusion in disaster risk science may be the belief that our numbers about rare events are more solid than the data behind them.</p>
<p><strong>Subject of Research:</strong> Reliability of estimated return periods for climate extremes based on observational and simulated dataset length</p>
<p><strong>Article Title:</strong> On the Reliability of Estimated Return Periods for Climate Extremes</p>
<p><strong>Article References:</strong> Ragno, E., &amp; AghaKouchak, A. (2026). On the Reliability of Estimated Return Periods for Climate Extremes. <em>International Journal of Disaster Risk Science</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00764-4" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00764-4</a></p>
<p><strong>Image Credits:</strong> AI Generated</p>
<p><strong>DOI:</strong> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00764-4" rel="noopener noreferrer">10.1007/s13753-026-00764-4</a></p>
<p><strong>Keywords:</strong> return period, climate extremes, reliability, large ensembles, Poisson distribution, nonstationarity, risk assessment, statistical extrapolation, climate adaptation, disaster risk science, Estimated, Return</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">199452</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Indonesian Forecasters Confront Fixed Heat Thresholds and Trust Their Memories to Warn of Extreme Heat</title>
		<link>https://scienmag.com/indonesian-forecasters-confront-fixed-heat-thresholds-and-trust-their-memories-to-warn-of-extreme-heat/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Denise Maddox]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 16:13:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Technology and Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BMKG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[climate change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[climate change impacts on meteorology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster risk science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[effectiveness of early warning systems in Southeast Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extreme heat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[heat early warning systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[heat thresholds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[heatwave prediction challenges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[impact-based forecasting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia's climate change adaptation strategies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia's coastal urban heat risks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia's disaster risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia's tropical climate and extreme heat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesian heat warning system]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[limitations of fixed heat thresholds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meteorological decision-making under climate stress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[operational meteorologists]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[operational meteorologists in Indonesia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk communication]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[role of memory in weather forecasting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tacit expertise]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://scienmag.com/?p=196183</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A survey of 140 Indonesian operational meteorologists reveals that ambiguous heat thresholds and reliance on station data undermine warnings, while past successful experiences most strongly drive the decision to warn.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When dangerous heat builds over Jakarta, Surabaya, or any of Indonesia&#8217;s densely populated coastal cities, the responsibility for sounding the alarm rests on a small group of operational meteorologists working for the country&#8217;s Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency, known as BMKG. A new study published in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Science reveals that these forecasters are navigating an early warning system whose foundations are quietly cracking under the pressure of climate change. The research, based on a survey of 140 operational meteorologists serving in urban coastal areas across 31 of Indonesia&#8217;s 38 provinces, offers the first empirical window into how the people on the front line of heat warnings actually decide when to warn and what prevents them from doing so effectively. The findings are both technically revealing and, at times, unsettling: the single most powerful predictor of whether a forecaster issues a heat warning is not a health-based threshold or an impact model, but the memory of a past warning that worked.</p>
<p>The stakes could hardly be higher. Indonesia&#8217;s tropical climate, with relatively consistent temperatures and distinct wet and dry seasons, has historically masked the growing threat of extreme heat. Yet heatwaves in Southeast Asia are becoming more frequent, with rising numbers of warm days and nights often compounded by high humidity, which intensifies physiological heat stress and impairs both physical and cognitive function. A 2024 report from Climate Central found that roughly 6.3 billion people, about 78 percent of the global population, experienced at least 31 days of extreme heat exceeding 90 percent of historical temperatures between 1991 and 2020. For Indonesia, the consequences are measurable in lost labor: the country ranks among those incurring the largest losses in work capacity, estimated at 4 to 6 percent of annual gross domestic product, with each worker losing an average of 71.8 hours in a single year, some 15 billion hours nationwide. More than half of Indonesia&#8217;s 270 million people already live in heat-exposed urban coastal areas, and by 2035 two-thirds of the population is projected to be urban.</p>
<p>At the heart of the problem lies a definitional bottleneck. Indonesia&#8217;s official extreme heat definition, codified in BMKG&#8217;s legal documentation, uses a single fixed threshold: a daily dry-bulb temperature anomaly exceeding the climatological average by 3 degrees Celsius. That metric has never been calibrated against health outcomes in the Indonesian context, and it overlooks several factors that matter enormously in the tropics. Warm nights, which are warming faster than daytime temperatures globally, are ignored. Humidity, which dramatically amplifies heat stress, is not captured. And Indonesia&#8217;s naturally low temperature variability means a 3-degree anomaly may be far rarer, and far more anomalous, than in temperate climates where such thresholds were first developed. International guidance from the World Meteorological Organization and World Health Organization recommends that heat early warning thresholds be grounded in epidemiological evidence linking temperature and humidity to mortality, hospital admissions, and heat illness, and that composite indices such as the Wet Bulb Globe Temperature or Universal Thermal Climate Index, which combine temperature, humidity, wind, and radiation, be used to capture physiological strain. Indonesia&#8217;s current approach does none of this.</p>
<p>The research team, led by Yoshua A. Nugroho of BMKG and the University of Copenhagen together with Emmanuel Raju, Agie W. Putra, and Carolina P. Marghidan, designed their study around a conceptual framework adapted from work on United States tornado warning decisions, translating it carefully to the very different physics and perception of heat. Twenty senior operational meteorologists with at least five years of service helped refine the survey through semi-structured discussions before it was distributed to 300 eligible forecasters in June 2024, one of Indonesia&#8217;s hottest months. The final sample of 140 valid responses closely matched BMKG&#8217;s workforce demographics, with 64.3 percent male participants, a majority aged 25 to 34, and over half working at local stations. The team then applied hierarchical ordinary least squares regression, entering predictors in blocks that mirrored the operational reasoning process: internal challenges first, then external challenges, then data-driven decisions, personal judgment, and communal judgment.</p>
<p>The results on dissemination challenges were striking in their selectivity. Of all the potential obstacles the researchers modeled, only two internal factors emerged as significant. The first was terminology ambiguity, meaning the lack of a universally accepted, context-appropriate definition of extreme heat for tropical settings, which showed medium-sized effects on both technical and non-technical challenges. Without a shared, credible definition, forecasters reinterpret guidance individually, producing inconsistent warnings and delayed action. The second was reliance on weather station data as the primary validation measure. Most stations have limited instrumentation, and urban neighborhoods, particularly informal settlements, are demonstrably hotter than what nearby stations record, meaning dangerous heat events can simply go unmeasured. External challenges, such as the absence of collaboration mechanisms with health departments and local governments, did not independently predict dissemination difficulties, but they mattered in a subtler and more troubling way.</p>
<p>That subtlety surfaced in the analysis of perceived effectiveness. The interaction between heavy reliance on station data and weak external collaboration was the strongest predictor of whether forecasters believed the current system was working well. In agencies with few ties to health authorities or municipal governments, forecasters who leaned on station data were significantly more likely to view the existing threshold-based system as adequate. The authors interpret this as institutional self-reinforcement: the system appears effective not because it truly captures heat risk, but because it aligns with operational norms under constraint, and forecasters&#8217; views are rarely corrected because they seldom engage with the agencies that see heat&#8217;s health impacts firsthand. The researchers also argue that the apparently insignificant effect of missing vulnerability data reflects insufficient operationalization rather than irrelevance. Indonesia already holds census data, disaster agency risk maps, and community health profiles, but none are integrated into heat warning operations as decision-support tools.</p>
<p>The decision-making findings carry the sharpest implications. The full model explained 48 percent of the variance in whether a forecaster chose to issue a heat warning. Data-driven factors dominated, contributing 23 percent of explained variance, with the forecaster&#8217;s own interpretation of meteorological analyses, such as model outputs and forecast trends, showing a significant medium effect. Field reports from weather observers did not matter statistically. Among personal judgment factors, the most influential single predictor, with the largest effect in the entire model, was recognition of past experiences with successful warnings. In practice, forecasters consult a mental library of previous events, recalling which combinations of temperature, humidity, and wind once produced impactful outcomes, and match current conditions against that archive. This is what cognitive scientists of forecasting call tacit expertise, built over hundreds of hours of operational work, and the study shows it functioning as the primary decision substrate precisely where formal guidance is weakest.</p>
<p>The second significant personal factor was warning philosophy. Forecasters who adopt a liberal approach, issuing warnings more readily than colleagues, were significantly more likely to warn, a pattern the authors link to ambiguous terminology forcing individual adaptation and to defensive, self-protective behavior aimed at avoiding blame. The liberal philosophy minimizes the risk of failing to warn, but it inflates the false alarm ratio, and repeated false alarms erode public urgency in the phenomenon known as the cry wolf effect. Notably, communal judgment, such as seeking second opinions from colleagues, and interaction effects between human judgment and meteorological input showed no significant influence, suggesting that heat warning decisions in Indonesia remain largely solitary rather than collaborative. For a hazard whose impacts unfold across health systems, labor markets, and urban infrastructure, that individualization of risk is itself a structural vulnerability.</p>
<p>The authors close with concrete recommendations for BMKG and policymakers. They call for co-developing adaptive, locally calibrated heat thresholds with epidemiologists, urban planners, and public health experts so that exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity enter the warning criteria directly. They urge integration of real-time health surveillance streams into the impact-based forecasting platform, deployment of additional measurement tools in dense urban areas, and contextual vulnerability data as reference layers for forecasters. They also recommend operational training built on experiential learning, reflective practice, and scenario-based simulation to strengthen the demonstrated interplay between data and experience. Theoretically, the study extends the sociology of forecasting by showing that when formal guidance and context-specific thresholds are underdeveloped, tacit expertise ceases to be a supplementary refinement of data and becomes the foundation of the warning itself. As extreme heat accelerates across the tropics, the study suggests that the most important upgrade to any heat early warning system may not be a new algorithm, but the institutional scaffolding that lets human judgment, good data, and cross-agency trust reinforce one another.</p>
<p><strong>Subject of Research:</strong> Operational challenges and decision-making in heat early warning systems in Indonesia</p>
<p><strong>Article Title:</strong> Heat Risk Communication by Operational Meteorologists in Indonesia: Current Operational Challenges and Decision-Making Dilemmas in Heat Early Warning System</p>
<p><strong>Article References:</strong> Nugroho, Y. A., Raju, E., Putra, A. W., &amp; Marghidan, C. P. (2026). Heat Risk Communication by Operational Meteorologists in Indonesia: Current Operational Challenges and Decision-Making Dilemmas in Heat Early Warning System. <em>International Journal of Disaster Risk Science</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00760-8" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00760-8</a></p>
<p><strong>Image Credits:</strong> AI Generated</p>
<p><strong>DOI:</strong> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00760-8" rel="noopener noreferrer">10.1007/s13753-026-00760-8</a></p>
<p><strong>Keywords:</strong> heat early warning systems, operational meteorologists, Indonesia, BMKG, extreme heat, heat thresholds, risk communication, decision making, impact-based forecasting, tacit expertise, climate change, disaster risk science</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">196183</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Machine Learning Framework Assesses Roadway Vulnerability Using Aerial Imagery</title>
		<link>https://scienmag.com/machine-learning-framework-assesses-roadway-vulnerability-using-aerial-imagery/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Davidson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 19:26:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Technology and Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI-driven infrastructure damage classification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[automated infrastructure damage detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[automated road damage classification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster resilience modeling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster risk science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-resolution aerial imagery analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-resolution satellite imagery analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hurricane damage assessment using aerial imagery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hurricane damage modeling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hurricane impact on transportation networks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[infrastructure resilience after hurricanes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-term roadway vulnerability metrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine learning for disaster risk analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine learning for roadway vulnerability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine learning pipelines for disaster assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural disaster recovery assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[post-hurricane infrastructure damage detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[predictive modeling for road infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantifying storm impact on roads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[remote sensing for disaster management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[remote sensing in disaster management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[roadway vulnerability scoring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerability assessment of roads post-hurricanes]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://scienmag.com/machine-learning-framework-assesses-roadway-vulnerability-using-aerial-imagery/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[When Hurricane Idalia slammed into Florida&#8217;s Big Bend in late summer 2023 as a Category 3 storm, it left a trail of toppled trees, downed power lines, and blocked roads across rural Taylor County. Barely a year later, in August 2024, Hurricane Debby arrived as a far weaker Category 1 system—yet its slow, rain-soaked passage [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Hurricane Idalia slammed into Florida&#8217;s Big Bend in late summer 2023 as a Category 3 storm, it left a trail of toppled trees, downed power lines, and blocked roads across rural Taylor County. Barely a year later, in August 2024, Hurricane Debby arrived as a far weaker Category 1 system—yet its slow, rain-soaked passage over Apalachee Bay submerged many of the same roads for days, compounding damage that had never fully been repaired. Two very different storms, one shared stretch of asphalt. Now, a research team led by Samuel Takyi of the FAMU–FSU College of Engineering, together with Eren Erman Ozguven, Mark Horner of Florida State University, and Ren Moses, has turned that natural experiment into a rigorous quantitative framework, publishing in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Science a machine learning pipeline that can automatically detect, classify, and score roadway damage from high-resolution aerial imagery captured after hurricanes.</p>
<p>The heart of the study is a pair of new metrics designed to do what traditional damage assessments cannot: capture both the immediate severity of a storm&#8217;s toll on a road network and the longer-term pattern of vulnerability that emerges when successive hurricanes strike the same infrastructure. The first, the Road Closure Impact Index (RCII), quantifies how badly a storm disrupted access in a single event. The second, the Roadway Vulnerability Index (RVI), looks across multiple storms to flag road segments that repeatedly fail—those that consistently close, or that drift between partial and full closure, storm after storm. Together, the researchers argue, these indices transform scattered post-disaster imagery into an actionable map of where infrastructure investment and emergency response resources should flow first.</p>
<p>The technical machinery behind the framework combines two deep learning models working in sequence. The first is a multi-task roadway extraction model built on a ResNet-34 backbone, a convolutional neural network architecture whose 34 layers and skip connections preserve fine spatial detail across image scales. Inspired by an earlier multi-scale road extraction framework, the team customized it with task-specific loss functions, adaptive learning rate scheduling, and preprocessing tailored to post-disaster imagery. The model simultaneously performs road segmentation and centerline extraction, and it performed impressively: on validation data it achieved a Mean Intersection over Union—a standard measure of how well predicted road pixels overlap with actual ones—of 0.876, indicating high segmentation accuracy with minimal overfitting during training.</p>
<p>Once roads were delineated, the second model took over. The team trained YOLOv3—You Only Look Once, an object detection network prized for real-time performance—to classify road conditions into three categories: open, partially closed, and fully closed. YOLOv3 uses the Darknet-53 feature extractor, 53 convolutional layers originally trained on ImageNet, augmented to a fully convolutional 106-layer architecture, and the researchers chose it in part because it is the default detection model within ArcGIS Pro&#8217;s deep learning toolbox, allowing seamless integration with the geographic information system where the vulnerability maps were assembled. Training data consisted of 600 manually labeled bounding boxes drawn initially from aerial imagery of Lee County after Hurricane Ian, then expanded roughly fourfold to about 2,400 instances through rotation, scaling, and flipping. Hyperparameters—a learning rate of 0.001, 20 epochs, a batch size of 4, 256-by-256 pixel input tiles, and a non-maximum suppression threshold of 0.3—were tuned on a validation split of 10 percent of the data.</p>
<p>Detection performance was strong for the most operationally critical categories. F1 scores, which balance precision and recall, exceeded 84 percent for both the open and fully closed classes. In Hurricane Debby imagery, roughly 89 percent of fully closed predictions were accurate, and open-road predictions achieved perfect recall, meaning no passable road was wrongly flagged as damaged. The weakest link was the partially closed class, where recall dropped to 47 percent in Idalia imagery—a reflection of the genuine difficulty of identifying partial obstructions from above, where debris, water levels, and vegetation can obscure the visual signature of a road that is passable but compromised. The researchers note that YOLOv3 can struggle with small, occluded, or visually ambiguous road segments, and they suggest newer architectures such as YOLOv5 or transformer-based detectors as candidates for future refinement.</p>
<p>Applied to Taylor County, the framework produced strikingly different diagnoses for the two storms. Hurricane Idalia&#8217;s RCII came in at 0.54, corresponding to a normalized value of about 54 percent, while Debby&#8217;s reached 0.94—a normalized 94 percent, signaling a far more severe and widespread disruption of roadway accessibility. The interpretation tracks the physical character of each storm: Idalia&#8217;s destructive winds and storm surge caused immediate structural failures and debris-blocked corridors, whereas Debby&#8217;s prolonged rainfall and 3-to-5-foot surge drowned roadways in floodwater, keeping them closed for days, especially in inland and rural areas still weakened by the earlier hurricane. The index numbers thus encode something disaster managers intuitively understand but rarely measure: a slow, wet storm can cripple a road network far more thoroughly than a faster, stronger one.</p>
<p>The RVI added the temporal dimension. County road CR-38000037 topped the vulnerability table, having been fully closed in both hurricanes—an unambiguous candidate for priority reinforcement or redesign. Several state roads, including SR-38590000, SR-38540001, and SR-38540000, showed moderate vulnerability scores, oscillating between partial and full closure across the two events and suggesting intermittent but real susceptibility. Meanwhile, roads such as SR-38514001 registered an RVI of zero, remaining open throughout. When mapped in ArcGIS Pro with red, yellow, and green symbols denoting high, moderate, and low vulnerability, the result is a spatially explicit risk portrait that county planners and emergency managers can consult before the next storm forms in the Atlantic.</p>
<p>The choice of study area was deliberate. Taylor County is home to roughly 21,800 people, about a fifth of whom are 65 or older—a demographic particularly exposed during evacuations. Its 1,232 square miles blend coastal lowlands and dense forest, and its transportation spine runs along U.S. Route 98 parallel to the Gulf and U.S. Route 221 heading inland, both critical for evacuation and recovery. The imagery underlying the analysis came from the National Hurricane Center and NOAA, spanning resolutions from 1.5 feet per pixel down to 0.25 feet per pixel, with most images at roughly 0.15 meters per pixel—fine enough to reveal subtle damage, debris fields, and flood extents. Roadway shapefiles and evacuation route data came from the Florida Department of Transportation, allowing detected damage to be overlaid precisely on the real network. Images were mosaicked, georeferenced, and resampled with nearest-neighbor interpolation so that Debby imagery matched Idalia&#8217;s resolution, ensuring consistent feature detection across storms.</p>
<p>What elevates the study beyond a methodological demonstration is its finding about compounding, sequential disasters. The team documented that residual damage from Idalia measurably exacerbated Debby&#8217;s impacts: roads that had been partially restored after the first hurricane were the first to fail under the second. This cumulative vulnerability, they argue, is invisible to static assessment models built on historical data and manual inspections, which remain slow, resource-intensive, and poorly suited to the compressed timeframes of real disaster response. The RCII and RVI, by contrast, can be recalculated as new imagery arrives, and the underlying models can be retrained as fresh data emerge—properties the authors say make the framework adaptive rather than archival, suited to prioritizing debris removal, drainage upgrades, and evacuation route hardening in near real time.</p>
<p>The researchers are candid about limitations. The analysis covered only two storms in a single, predominantly rural county, and results may not generalize to regions with different geography or infrastructure standards. Aerial imagery remains hostage to resolution, weather, and availability, and gaps in coverage can translate into gaps in assessment. Nonetheless, the authors point to clear paths forward: integrating LiDAR and satellite data to enrich the input stream, improving predictive modeling so that vulnerability can be forecast before a storm rather than measured after it, and engaging affected communities to ensure that resilience investments reach the low-income areas that historical hurricanes, from Katrina to Harvey, have disproportionately devastated. For coastal communities on the front line of a warming Atlantic, the message of the work is stark but useful: the roads that fail once will likely fail again, and now, for the first time, there is an automated, quantifiable way to know exactly which ones.</p>
<div class="scienmag-article-metadata"><strong>Subject of Research:</strong> A machine learning and remote sensing framework for assessing roadway vulnerability and hurricane impact using high-resolution aerial imagery, applied to Taylor County, Florida after Hurricanes Idalia and Debby.</p>
<p><strong>Article Title:</strong> Developing a Machine Learning-Based Framework for Roadway Vulnerability and Impact Assessment Using Aerial Imagery</p>
<p><strong>Article References:</strong> Takyi, S., Ozguven, E. E., Horner, M., &amp; Moses, R. (2026). Developing a Machine Learning-Based Framework for Roadway Vulnerability and Impact Assessment Using Aerial Imagery. <em>International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 17</em>(2), 389-407. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00711-3" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00711-3</a></p>
<p><strong>Image Credits:</strong> AI Generated</p>
<p><strong>DOI:</strong> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-026-00711-3" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">10.1007/s13753-026-00711-3</a></p>
<p><strong>Keywords:</strong> machine learning, remote sensing, aerial imagery, hurricane impact assessment, roadway vulnerability, road closure impact index, roadway vulnerability index, YOLOv3, ResNet-34, geospatial analysis, disaster preparedness, infrastructure resilience</p>
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