The researchers modeled migration policymaking as a strategic interaction among four stakeholder groups: youth, religious leaders, business elites and civil society. These groups formed coalitions that supported one of two strategies, Open Borders or Strict Controls. Influence was unequal across the groups, and the resulting policy outcome emerged from interaction among coalitions rather than from a direct correspondence between overall public opinion and government action.

To construct the simulation, the study integrated stakeholder theory, game-theoretic modeling and attitudinal information from the World Values Survey. Coalition payoffs were derived from normalized indices capturing security, economic and social perceptions associated with migration. In this framework, payoffs represent the modeled incentives available to coalitions when choosing between the two policy strategies. The analysis is consequently a computational representation of migration-policy preferences, not a direct observation of negotiations, legislative decisions or implementation.

Baseline results reflected the concentration of restrictive preferences among influential actors. The simulation therefore produced a restrictive-policy equilibrium even though some segments of Pakistani society held inclusionary attitudes. Sensitivity analysis showed that moderate shifts in attitudinal measures alone did not overturn that equilibrium. The finding separates the effect of changing individual or aggregate preferences from the effect of altering the coalition structure: limited movement in the modeled attitude indices was insufficient to change the policy outcome when influential coalitions remained aligned around restriction.

Coalition expansion through civil society, by contrast, decisively reversed the result in the sensitivity analysis. This outcome identifies coalition structure and the involvement of civil society as central mechanisms in the model, rather than attitudes alone. The research does not establish that broader civil-society participation would necessarily produce the same result in actual policymaking, because the simulation depends on its specified representation of stakeholders, influence and coalition payoffs. Its supported conclusion is narrower but clear: under the model’s baseline conditions, restricted migration strategies prevail because restrictive preferences are concentrated among influential actors, whereas enlarging the civil-society coalition changes the balance and produces an inclusionary outcome.

Subject of Research: Game-theoretic analysis of coalition influence on simulated migration governance in Pakistan

Article Title: A coalition game approach to migration governance in Pakistan

Article References: Akram, S. (2026). A coalition game approach to migration governance in Pakistan. International Review of Economics, 73(2), Article 40. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-026-00558-6

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s12232-026-00558-6

Keywords: migration governance, Pakistan, coalition game, game theory, public attitudes, civil society, policy simulation, World Values Survey, stakeholder influence, open borders, strict controls, coalition