Approximately 200 survivors were stranded across a group of isolated islands after the ship struck reefs. Senior officers had sailed to present-day Jakarta to seek rescue, leaving Cornelisz, then an under-merchant employed by the company, as the most senior corporate figure among those remaining. According to the study, he consolidated power by replacing council members with loyal supporters, requiring personal oaths of allegiance and isolating potential opponents. The historical analysis maps these actions to corporate-psychopathy characteristics including the use of charm to gain trust, surrounding oneself with loyal supporters, removing challengers, creating divisions among rivals, establishing a climate of fear and avoiding responsibility when events go wrong. It also finds that his conduct reflected a priority of power, money and control.

Under Cornelisz’s leadership, around 100 men, women and children were murdered, and some women were subjected to sexual violence. He justified the killings as a means of conserving food and water, but the study also states that the murders removed people he perceived as rivals. The case study draws a sharp comparison with a group of survivors stranded on another island under Wiebbe Hayes. Hayes organized searches for water and food that found two freshwater wells, seabird eggs, fish, wallabies and seals. One follower reportedly described the resulting supply as sufficient for the survivors for a “thousand years.” The authors characterize the contrasting circumstances as a natural experiment in leadership: the group under Hayes developed cooperation and discovered resources, while the group under Cornelisz descended into murder and abuse. It was not a randomized experiment or a controlled evaluation, and the comparison involves one pair of leadership groups under extraordinary disaster conditions.

The study situates the episode within the emergence of shareholder capitalism. The Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602 as the world’s first multinational shareholder-owned company and established what became one of the world’s first stock exchanges in Amsterdam. Cornelisz’s case is presented as evidence that people driven by power, wealth and personal advancement may have been attracted to commercial enterprises from the earliest days of capitalist business. More broadly, the paper argues that corporate psychopathy remains a challenge for modern organizations and links psychopathic leadership with workplace bullying, harassment, reduced employee wellbeing, higher staff turnover and organizational failure. Those workplace relationships are discussed in the study and are not outcomes directly demonstrated by the 1629 case. The authors also call for employers to give greater weight to character, ethics and values when selecting senior leaders, presenting the historical comparison as a reason to examine how power, loyalty and responsibility are managed in corporate settings.

Subject of Research: Historical case analysis of corporate psychopathy traits in a Dutch East India Company leader

Article Title: Study identifies world’s first corporate psychopath

Article References: Study identifies world’s first corporate psychopath. Original publication (Bibliographic details unavailable.)

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: Not provided

Keywords: corporate psychopathy, psychopathic leadership, Jeronimus Cornelisz, Dutch East India Company, Batavia shipwreck, historical case study, shareholder capitalism, business ethics, leadership behavior, management framework, identifies, world

Gülçin Eren of Istanbul Bilgi University and Serdar Bozkurt of Yıldız Technical University surveyed 312 white-collar employees from private sector organizations in Istanbul, collecting data between January and April 2024. Their goal was to untangle a chain of influence that organizational psychology has been assembling for years: how dark personality traits relate to the willingness to voice disagreement inside the organization, how those traits relate to unethical acts committed for the organization, and whether workplace incivility—the everyday rudeness of ignored emails, condescending remarks, and exclusionary glances—acts as a situational trigger that converts dispositional risk into actual misconduct.

The theoretical engine behind the study is trait activation theory. The framework holds that personality dispositions do not express themselves uniformly across all situations; they surface when the environment supplies cues relevant to the trait in question. A competitive, aggressive setting, for instance, should make traits like callousness and manipulativeness more behaviorally consequential than a calm, cooperative one. Workplace incivility, the researchers reasoned, could function as exactly such a cue: a chronic, low-intensity signal of interpersonal hostility that might make the behavioral tendencies of employees with dark traits more pronounced. If true, the practical implications would be substantial, because incivility is one of the most common and most studied forms of mistreatment in working life.

The Dark Triad was measured both as a composite and at the level of its three constituent facets. Narcissism captures grandiosity, entitlement, and a need for admiration. Machiavellianism reflects strategic manipulation, cynicism, and a calculating orientation toward others. Psychopathy denotes callousness, impulsivity, and low empathy. The study also distinguished between two channels through which dark traits might express themselves. Organizational dissent, measured with a scale capturing both vertical dissent voiced to superiors and horizontal dissent voiced to peers, represents the expression of disagreement within the organization. Unethical pro-organizational behaviors, in contrast, represent rule-breaking and deception performed in the organization’s service. The two outcomes are conceptually distinct: one is a form of voice, the other a form of misconduct, yet both could plausibly be fueled by the same dispositional core.

The results confirmed the first part of the chain. Dark personality traits, considered as a composite, were significantly and positively associated with both organizational dissent and unethical pro-organizational behaviors. Employees who scored higher on the dark composite were more likely to voice disagreement inside the organization and more likely to report having engaged in unethical acts on the organization’s behalf. At the facet level, the picture became more textured. Psychopathy was unrelated to organizational dissent, whereas Machiavellianism and narcissism were both positively related to it. All three facets—psychopathy included—were positively related to unethical pro-organizational behaviors. The dissociation is telling: the impulsive, callous component of the Dark Triad appears to fuel misconduct without necessarily fueling the structured expression of disagreement, while the more strategic and socially oriented components fuel both.

The moderation results, however, defied the researchers’ expectations. Workplace incivility did not significantly moderate most of the relationships examined. The only interaction that reached conventional significance was borderline and treated as provisional: the association between psychopathy and unethical pro-organizational behaviors was stronger under higher levels of workplace incivility. In other words, among employees with psychopathic tendencies, chronic rudeness in the workplace appeared to intensify the link between disposition and misconduct. But the authors are explicit that this single significant interaction, among the many tested, should be interpreted with caution and replicated before it is treated as a reliable boundary condition.

The largely null moderation findings are themselves informative, the researchers argue. They suggest that interpersonal mistreatment, at least as measured here, does not readily function as a boundary condition for personality-behavior associations. The dispositional risk carried by dark traits appears to translate into dissent and unethical pro-organizational behavior across a range of social climates, not only in the hostile ones. This directs attention to other contextual candidates—ethical climate, leadership style, organizational structure—that might serve as more effective moderators. It also challenges a popular intuition: that dark traits only become dangerous when the environment is hostile. The data suggest the danger is more constant than that.

The study’s conclusions carry practical weight for organizations. Rather than relying solely on exclusionary recruitment decisions—screening out candidates with dark traits, an approach with its own ethical and legal complications—the authors recommend strengthening ethical organizational climates, promoting supportive leadership practices, implementing behavioral risk management strategies, and providing appropriate employee development interventions. The point is not that dark traits can be neutralized, but that organizations can reduce the potential risks associated with them by shaping the conditions under which all employees, including those with dispositional vulnerabilities, make decisions.

The findings also refine how organizations should think about voice. Organizational dissent is not inherently pathological; it can be a constructive channel for improving practices. But the study suggests that employees with Machiavellian and narcissistic tendencies are more likely to engage in it, which raises the question of whether their dissent serves organizational improvement or personal advantage. Distinguishing between these motives in practice is difficult, but the dissociation between dissent and misconduct at the facet level—psychopathy fueling misconduct without fueling dissent—suggests that the two outcomes are driven by partially different dispositional mechanisms and should be managed separately.

Ultimately, the study frames behavioral outcomes as arising from the interplay between individual tendencies and organizational conditions, while acknowledging that personality is one of several correlates of work attitudes and behaviors. The interplay, in this case, appears to be less conditional than trait activation theory might predict: dark traits expressed themselves in dissent and unethical pro-organizational behavior regardless of the level of incivility employees reported experiencing. The one provisional exception—psychopathy amplified by incivility—offers a thread for future research to pull. For now, the message for organizations is that the risk associated with dark personality traits is not waiting for a hostile climate to activate it. It is already present, and it must be managed through the ethical architecture of the organization itself.

Subject of Research: Psychology

Article Title: Examining the moderating role of workplace incivility in the relationship between dark personality traits, organizational dissent, and unethical pro-organizational behaviors

Article References: Eren, G., & Bozkurt, S. (2026). Examining the moderating role of workplace incivility in the relationship between dark personality traits, organizational dissent, and unethical pro-organizational behaviors. BMC Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-026-05640-w

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1186/s40359-026-05640-w

Keywords: Dark Triad, workplace incivility, organizational dissent, unethical pro-organizational behavior, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, narcissism, trait activation theory, organizational psychology, business ethics, Examining, moderating

The study, published in Current Psychology by Shekhar Manelkar of Symbiosis International University, Dharmesh K. Mishra of Symbiosis Institute of International Business, and Kishore Ashok Manelkar of Somaiya Institute of Management, examines how six of Geert Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions predict UPB among 216 employees of the Indian information technology industry. The researchers drew on Role Theory, which holds that people behave according to the roles and expectations they absorb from their social environments. Their central question was whether cultural values act uniformly on unethical behaviour, or whether the process of becoming socialised into an industry amplifies some values while silencing others.

Hofstede’s framework describes cultures along dimensions such as power distance, the acceptance of unequal authority; masculinity, an orientation toward competition and achievement; indulgence, the tolerance of gratifying one’s impulses; and their counterparts, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. Traditionally these dimensions have been used to compare countries, but the researchers measured them at the level of the individual, following the established CVSCALE approach. This allows a much finer-grained analysis, because two employees in the same national culture can hold very different personal values.

Data were gathered through snowball sampling, in which initial participants referred colleagues to the survey. The team analysed the responses using partial least squares structural equation modelling, a statistical technique well suited to testing how multiple latent psychological variables relate to an outcome, and then ran a multi-group analysis across three groups defined by industry tenure, from newcomers to long-tenured veterans. Tenure served as a proxy for the degree of industry socialisation, the process by which newcomers internalise the norms, values and expected behaviours of their professional world.

The results were strikingly selective. Of the six cultural dimensions studied, only three significantly predicted unethical pro-organisational behaviour: power distance, masculinity and indulgence. Together they explained 39 percent of the variance in UPB, a substantial share for a behavioural construct shaped by so many situational factors. Individualism, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, despite their prominence in cross-cultural ethics debates, showed no significant relationship with the tendency to behave unethically for the organisation’s benefit.

Power distance emerged as the most consistent and robust predictor. Employees who accept hierarchical authority as natural and legitimate were more likely to engage in unethical behaviour aimed at helping the company, and this effect held across all three tenure groups. It also strengthened with experience: the longer employees remained in the IT industry, the more strongly their deference to authority translated into misconduct in the organisation’s name. The finding aligns with earlier research linking power distance to fear of authority and to compliance with authoritarian leaders, mechanisms that can lead employees to follow directives without scrutinising their ethics.

Masculinity told a different story. A competitive, achievement-oriented value orientation predicted UPB only among employees with moderate to long tenure, not among newcomers. The authors interpret this through the lens of socialisation: early-career employees have not yet absorbed the industry’s competitive scripts, but as they progress, a strong drive for success and status appears to fuse with organisational loyalty, producing a willingness to bend ethical rules to secure wins. This echoes classic scholarship on how managerial cultures reward assertive, results-at-any-cost behaviour.

Indulgence showed a third, almost inverted pattern. Employees high in indulgence, who value pleasure and free gratification of desires, were more prone to unethical pro-organisational behaviour, but only in the short-tenure group. The effect disappeared among experienced workers, suggesting that industry socialisation over time restrains the hedonistic impulses that can initially facilitate rule-breaking, or that indulgent newcomers eventually either adapt to tighter norms or exit the field. The study thus paints a dynamic picture in which the same cultural value can drive misconduct at one career stage and be neutralised at another.

The theoretical upshot is that cultural values do not operate as fixed, uniform levers on unethical behaviour. Role Theory, the authors argue, explains this contingency: organisations assign roles, and socialisation into those roles selectively reinforces some value-behaviour links while weakening others. A deferential disposition becomes ethically dangerous only in a context that rewards unquestioning loyalty; a competitive streak becomes dangerous only once an industry has taught the employee what counts as winning. Moral disengagement, in Bandura’s sense, may then supply the psychological licence, allowing employees to reframe wrongdoing as service to a collective good.

For practitioners, the findings carry concrete implications. Ethics training that treats all employees identically may miss its target, because the psychological routes to misconduct differ by career stage. Organisations in high power distance environments might focus on protecting early-tenure staff from authority pressure and on building voice channels so that deference does not become complicity, while veteran employees may need interventions aimed at competitive overreach. The authors caution that the study must be replicated in other industries and cultures before the patterns can be considered general, but its core message is already provocative: the roots of workplace misconduct lie not just in individual morality, but in the cultural soil and the professional roles in which that morality takes shape.

Subject of Research: How Hofstede's cultural values and industry socialisation predict unethical pro-organisational behaviour among IT employees

Article Title: Beyond individual morality: an empirical study on how cultural values of masculinity, power distance and indulgence impact unethical pro-organisational behaviour

Article References: Manelkar, S., Mishra, D. K., & Manelkar, K. A. (2026). Beyond individual morality: an empirical study on how cultural values of masculinity, power distance and indulgence impact unethical pro-organisational behaviour. Current Psychology, 45(17), Article 1431. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-026-09962-1

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s12144-026-09962-1

Keywords: unethical pro-organisational behaviour, Hofstede cultural dimensions, power distance, masculinity, indulgence, role theory, organisational socialisation, business ethics, Indian IT industry, PLS-SEM, workplace misconduct, tenure

The research team, led by Juliana Barreiros Porto of the University of Brasília together with Marília Mesquita Resende, Katia Puente-Palacios, and Catherine T. Kwantes, set out to address a stubborn gap in the science of workplace ethics. Decades of studies have examined what researchers call ethical culture—the codes of conduct, ethics training, and compliance systems organizations build to steer behavior. But the authors argue that focusing only on ethics-specific infrastructure misses something fundamental: the broader cultural values that shape how employees think and act every day, whether or not those values mention ethics at all. To capture this bigger picture, they turned to a framework adapted from psychologist Shalom Schwartz’s theory of cultural values, developed for organizations by Antônio Tamayo and colleagues, which maps organizational values along three dimensions with opposing poles.

Those dimensions are worth spelling out because they carry the study’s most striking implications. The first contrasts autonomy, which emphasizes individuals pursuing their own ideas and affective experiences, with embeddedness, which stresses maintaining the status quo and restricting actions that could harm the group. The second pits hierarchy, the acceptance of unequal distribution of power and resources, against egalitarianism, the transcendence of personal interests in favor of others’ well-being. The third opposes mastery—an assertive drive to dominate, change the world, bend others to one’s desires, and demonstrate control—to harmony, an emphasis on adjusting to and fitting within the environment rather than conquering it. Each branch of the bank in the study registered its own profile across these values, allowing the researchers to ask whether branches that collectively endorsed certain values reported more or less unethical conduct.

Measuring unethical behavior is notoriously tricky, since few employees will admit to wrongdoing on a questionnaire. The researchers sidestepped this problem with a clever design built on earlier qualitative interviews with fifteen Brazilian employees, including five managers from ethics and compliance areas. From those interviews they constructed fourteen workplace scenarios, seven of which described unethical conduct. Participants were not asked about their own behavior; instead, they judged how characteristic each scenario was of their branch on a scale from zero to ten. One scenario, for example, describes an employee who needs to leave work three hours early for a birthday party without authorization and asks a coworker to clock her out while the boss is away on business. By reporting on others rather than themselves, participants could describe their environment while sidestepping some of the social desirability bias that plagues self-reports of misconduct.

The statistical architecture of the study was as important as its questions. Because culture is a shared phenomenon, the researchers first had to verify that employees within the same branch actually agreed with one another before aggregating individual responses to the group level. They used average deviation indices to screen out branches lacking consensus, then computed intraclass correlations to quantify how much of the variation in responses could be attributed to the branch rather than the individual. Notably, moral attentiveness—the tendency to chronically perceive and reflect on moral elements of everyday experience, originally conceived by psychologist Scott Reynolds as an individual trait—passed these tests as a collective construct, with intraclass coefficients of .05 for the reflective dimension and .08 for the perceptual dimension. This was itself a novel finding: a group’s shared moral attentiveness can exist as a genuine unit-level property, shaped by selection, socialization, and the standards newcomers absorb when they join a team.

When the researchers ran hierarchical linear regression models, the results delivered both confirmations and surprises. Egalitarianism and harmony emerged as the strongest protective values, each significantly and negatively predicting unethical behavior—supporting the hypothesis that cultures emphasizing concern for others and cooperative adjustment to the environment discourage misconduct. These results align with earlier meta-analytic work showing that benevolent ethical climates, which prioritize the well-being of others, are negatively related to unethical decisions. Harmony showed an additional twist: the strength of that value, meaning the degree of consensus among branch members, also contributed to lower misconduct, suggesting that when harmony is widely and strongly endorsed, the collaborative environment it creates actively discourages unethical actions. Mastery, by contrast, was significantly correlated with higher levels of unethical behavior, consistent with prior findings that aggressive, market-oriented cultures encourage employees to prioritize results over ethics and to focus on ends rather than means.

Two of the study’s predictions failed, and those failures may be the most thought-provoking results of all. Autonomy, which the authors had hypothesized would increase misconduct—drawing on research linking creativity and rule-breaking—actually correlated negatively with unethical behavior, echoing arguments by Tom Tyler and Steven Blader that self-regulation, in which employees follow rules because they choose to rather than because they fear punishment, can outperform external control. Meanwhile, collective moral attentiveness, despite emerging as a real group-level construct, did not significantly predict unethical behavior, and neither did the interactions between values and their strength. The authors suggest that moral hypocrisy may be at work: groups may maintain a positive moral self-image while failing to act morally, meaning that simply noticing and reflecting on moral issues is not enough to change conduct. Strong values, in other words, are not sufficient on their own; accountability structures, monitoring systems, and real consequences may be needed to translate values into behavior.

The study also carries a pointed message for the financial sector. A recent review of bank fraud recommended audits, fraud detection technologies, and forensic accounting as countermeasures, but the authors observe that such discussions routinely overlook cultural change and the management model itself. If mastery-driven, market-oriented cultures are associated with more misconduct, then the predominant management model in banking may deserve scrutiny alongside its control systems. One value, embeddedness, could not be tested because it showed no variation between branches—it appears to be a central value of the institution, shared so uniformly that it offered no contrast—which the authors note limits generalizability to highly normative organizations. The researchers also acknowledge the usual constraints of correlational, self-reported data: causality cannot be established, and unethical behavior might shape perceptions of culture rather than the reverse.

For managers, the practical takeaway is that aspirational value statements are not enough. The study underscores the importance of embedding values in daily practices, policies, and decision-making processes, aligning organizational systems with stated principles, and providing training that sharpens employees’ moral attentiveness and ethical decision-making skills. Future research, the authors suggest, should pursue longitudinal and experimental designs to untangle causal mechanisms, employ multi-source data to reduce bias, and identify the additional mechanisms—individual, situational, and contextual—that determine whether ethical conduct takes root. What the study makes clear is that the moral character of a workplace is not simply the sum of its people’s consciences. It is written into the values the organization lives by, and some of those values, it turns out, quietly write the rules of misconduct as well.

Subject of Research: The influence of organizational values, value strength, and collective moral attentiveness on unethical workplace behavior

Article Title: From Values to Actions: Investigating the Impact of Organizational Values and Moral Attentiveness on Unethical Behavior at Work

Article References: Porto, J. B., Resende, M. M., Puente-Palacios, K., & Kwantes, C. T. (2026). From Values to Actions: Investigating the Impact of Organizational Values and Moral Attentiveness on Unethical Behavior at Work. Trends in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43076-026-00513-y

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1007/s43076-026-00513-y

Keywords: organizational values, unethical behavior, ethical culture, moral attentiveness, workplace ethics, organizational psychology, banking sector, moral identity, multilevel analysis, corporate culture, business ethics, Brazil

Timothy Werner, professor of business, government, and society and Wade T. and Bettye C. Nowlin Centennial Professor of Business Administration at the McCombs School of Business at The University of Texas at Austin, has given this playbook a name: organizational repression. The term is borrowed deliberately from political science, where researchers have long studied how governments anticipate, disrupt, and escalate against political dissent. Werner’s contribution, developed with Natalie Holzaepfel and Olga Hawn of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is to argue that companies deploy an analogous set of strategies against stakeholder activism, and that these strategies are far more alike, and far more widespread, than previous scholarship has recognized.

Stakeholders, in this framework, are non-shareholder groups with an interest in a company’s conduct: employees seeking better conditions, activists demanding environmental accountability, communities affected by operations. Past research has generally assumed that firms treat such groups with a kind of grudging respect. Companies might resist stakeholder pressure, the literature suggested, but they might also collaborate with it or simply ignore it. What Werner and his colleagues wanted to show was something more unsettling: that firms can act to undermine the very ability of stakeholders to organize in the first place, before any negotiation, boycott, or campaign even begins.

The theoretical architecture of the paper, published in the Academy of Management Review, maps corporate tactics onto the three phases that social movements typically pass through. The first is emergence, the stage at which individuals privately notice a grievance but have not yet connected with others who share it. The second is coalescence, when people begin to organize, communicate, and identify as a group. The third is formalization, when the movement acquires structure, formal membership, and alliances with outside organizations. For each phase, the researchers identify matching corporate strategies designed to prevent or discourage the movement from advancing to the next one.

At the emergence stage, the goal is to stop collective action before it starts by convincing people there is nothing worth mobilizing over. The paper points to Exxon Mobil, which began funding research downplaying climate change as early as the 1970s, years before the company became a target of activist campaigns. By shaping the information environment and the perceived legitimacy of a grievance, a firm can prevent the grievance from ever crystallizing into a shared cause. A second strategy at this stage is reputational: cultivating a public image of being unreceptive to activism, so that potential organizers conclude that mobilization would be pointless before they ever attempt it.

Once a movement begins to coalesce, the corporate calculus shifts toward making participation costly. Here companies target the individuals most likely to join. When Delta Air Lines faced a unionization push among flight attendants in 2024, it offered a carrot: a 5 percent pay raise, but only for nonunion workers. The message was that loyalty to the company, not to a collective, would be rewarded. Other firms have reached for sticks instead, including demotions, schedule changes engineered to conflict with organizing meetings, and implicit threats to fire known organizers. The Amazon case in Virginia illustrates the same logic, combining surveillance with messaging designed to make association itself feel risky.

If a movement nonetheless achieves full formalization, recruiting members and forming alliances with outside groups, the most effective corporate response changes again, toward fracturing the coalition itself. The pipeline company Energy Transfer, facing protests over its Dakota Access Pipeline, allegedly hired private security firms to disrupt activist networks. It also pursued litigation against protest groups, ultimately winning a judgment of more than $600 million from Greenpeace. Lawsuits of this kind, often described by critics as strategic suits against public participation, can drain resources and attention from a movement even when the underlying dispute remains unresolved.

Werner is careful to emphasize what the theory does and does not claim. The researchers pass no ethical judgment on organizational repression, and they take no stance on whether repression is good or bad. Their claim is analytical rather than moral: that these tactics constitute a systematic, coherent, and underexplored set of behaviors that deserve rigorous empirical study in their own right, rather than being treated as scattered anecdotes about particular companies or industries. Framing union-busting, greenwashing, surveillance, and litigation as instances of a single strategic umbrella, they argue, allows scholars to see patterns that case-by-case analysis obscures.

The theory also carries an important caveat: organizational repression is not guaranteed to work. A company that moves too aggressively may trigger a backlash that strengthens the very movement it was trying to suppress, drawing public sympathy, media scrutiny, or regulatory attention to the grievance. The effectiveness of any given tactic therefore depends on context, on how visible the repression is, and on how stakeholders and observers respond. This contingency is precisely why the authors argue that systematic measurement is needed, rather than assumptions in either direction about how firms behave or how stakeholders fare.

The researchers’ next step is to test the framework empirically, drawing on data sources such as whistleblower reports, lawsuits, and leaked corporate documents to assess how often, and how effectively, companies actually deploy these tactics in practice. If the theory holds, it could reshape how scholars and policymakers think about the balance of power between corporations and the people they affect, moving the conversation from isolated scandals toward a structural understanding of how dissent is managed before it can gain momentum.

Subject of Research: How companies systematically repress collective action by stakeholders such as employees, activists, and communities

Article Title: How companies quietly undercut dissent

Article References: How companies quietly undercut dissent. (n.d.). Original publication

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: Not provided

Keywords: organizational repression, stakeholder activism, corporate strategy, union-busting, social movements, labor relations, greenwashing, Academy of Management Review, corporate surveillance, strategic litigation, collective action, business ethics