The new research, published in the Journal of Eating Disorders, was conducted by Jessica E. Hocking of the Department of Psychology at the University of Notre Dame, now at Belmont University, together with Lucy Osler of Cardiff University’s School of English, Communication, and Philosophy and Michael C. Rea of Notre Dame’s Department of Philosophy. The collaboration itself is notable: rather than treating philosophy and psychology as separate enterprises, the team set out to determine whether a purely theoretical account of disrupted bodily experience could be translated into measurable constructs and validated with data from real participants. Their findings provide empirical support for phenomenological approaches to understanding anorexia broadly, and for Osler’s specific account of disrupted embodiment in particular.

At the heart of the study is the Disrupted Embodiment Scale, or DES, an instrument designed to capture the distinctive ways in which people with anorexia nervosa experience their own bodies. The scale is built around three dimensions drawn directly from phenomenological theory. The first, Body as Hardship, reflects the sense of one’s body as an encumbrance, a burden to be endured or managed rather than a home to be lived in. The second, Body as Threat, captures the feeling that the body is dangerous, something to be monitored, controlled and defended against. The third, Body as Separate from Self, describes a striking dissociative quality: the experience of one’s body as alien, as an object distinct from the person who inhabits it.

These dimensions matter because phenomenological philosophers have long argued that eating disorders are not simply about body image dissatisfaction or the desire to be thin. On Osler’s account, anorexia involves a deeper disruption in the pre-reflective, embodied relationship a person has with their own body. In everyday life, most people do not experience their bodies as objects at all; the body recedes into the background, quietly enabling action and experience. In anorexia, on this view, the body becomes foregrounded in a troubling way: it is experienced as an obstacle, a source of distress and something set apart from the self. The philosophical literature has articulated these ideas with care, but until now they had largely remained theoretical, lacking quantitative evidence that the described experiences actually distinguish people with anorexia from those without it.

To test the account, the researchers recruited two groups of participants. The first comprised 220 undergraduate women, a general population sample. The second comprised 138 women who self-identified as currently experiencing anorexia nervosa. All participants completed cross-sectional online questionnaires assessing disrupted embodiment, body dissatisfaction, drive for thinness, bulimic behaviors, general eating disorder symptomatology, dieting behaviors and impairment due to eating disorders. This design allowed the team to ask two distinct questions: whether disrupted embodiment contributes something beyond the well-established risk factors of body dissatisfaction and thinness-idealization, and whether women with anorexia actually report the kinds of experiences the phenomenological literature predicts.

The answer to both questions was, with one exception, yes. Using hierarchical multiple regression analyses, the researchers found that the DES total score and its three subscales explained variance in eating disorder symptomatology, bulimic behaviors and eating disorder-related impairment above and beyond body dissatisfaction and drive for thinness. In other words, knowing how much a person experiences her body as a hardship, a threat or as separate from her self adds predictive power beyond the traditional measures that dominate the field. This is a significant result, because it suggests that disrupted embodiment is not merely a restatement of body dissatisfaction but a distinct experiential phenomenon with its own clinical relevance.

The group comparisons were equally striking. In four analyses of covariance, controlling for age and body mass index, the women who self-identified as experiencing anorexia nervosa reported significantly higher levels of disrupted embodiment than the undergraduate women. They experienced their bodies more as a hardship, more as a threat and more as separate from their selves. These findings map directly onto the phenomenological account under investigation, indicating that the experiences philosophers have described from first-person reports and theoretical reflection are empirically detectable and measurably elevated in the population the theory was written about.

One interesting wrinkle emerged from the psychometric analyses. Bifactor analyses, combined with the consistency of the subscale-specific results, indicated that the DES may be best conceptualized as a unidimensional scale. In practical terms, this suggests that while the three dimensions of hardship, threat and separateness are theoretically distinguishable, the scale in practice measures a single underlying construct of disrupted embodiment. This has implications for future research, as it simplifies scoring and interpretation while preserving the instrument’s ability to capture the phenomenologically grounded experiences it was designed to measure. The researchers note that the one exception among their regression results does not undermine the overall pattern of support.

The implications of the study reach beyond measurement. If anorexia nervosa involves a fundamentally disrupted relationship to one’s own body, then treatments focused solely on changing beliefs about weight and shape may be addressing only part of the problem. Phenomenological accounts suggest that recovery may require restoring a lived, comfortable sense of embodiment, not simply correcting cognitive distortions. The researchers acknowledge the limitations inherent in their design: the data were cross-sectional, so the studies cannot establish whether disrupted embodiment is a cause, a correlate or a consequence of anorexia, and one participant group was defined by self-identification rather than clinical diagnosis. The samples also consisted of women, leaving open questions about how the construct applies more broadly.

Nevertheless, the work stands as a rare and successful example of empirical philosophy in action, demonstrating that careful phenomenological description can be operationalized, measured and validated, and that philosophy of mind and psychiatric science can inform one another productively. The study was funded jointly through the Kill Family Fund and the Franco Family Institute for Liberal Arts and the Public Good at the University of Notre Dame, with approval from the university’s Human Subjects Institutional Review Board and written consent from all participants. The authors declare no competing interests, and the article is published open access. As the phenomenological turn in eating disorder research gathers pace, this study provides that movement with something it has needed: hard data showing that when people with anorexia describe their bodies as burdensome, threatening and alien, those descriptions are not poetic exaggeration but measurable features of a serious illness.

Subject of Research: Empirical testing of phenomenological accounts of disrupted bodily experience in anorexia nervosa using the Disrupted Embodiment Scale

Article Title: Disrupted embodiment: empirically assessing phenomenological accounts of anorexia nervosa

Article References: Hocking, J. E., Osler, L., & Rea, M. C. (2026). Disrupted embodiment: empirically assessing phenomenological accounts of anorexia nervosa. Journal of Eating Disorders. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40337-026-01768-7

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1186/s40337-026-01768-7

Keywords: anorexia nervosa, eating disorders, phenomenology, embodiment, disrupted embodiment scale, body dissatisfaction, drive for thinness, body image, psychological assessment, philosophy of mind, bifactor analysis, eating disorder symptomatology