The model suggests that the government subsidy coefficient should remain below 0.5 for agricultural data utilization to be supported effectively under the assumptions and representative factors selected by the researchers. At a coefficient of 0.5 or higher, excessive subsidies are described as imposing unsustainable fiscal burdens while failing to adequately stimulate agricultural data use. This boundary represents a result within the evolutionary game, not a universal economic optimum.

Its practical meaning depends on the model’s parameters, assumed relationships and limited representation of the factors affecting decisions. Operators’ digital literacy is positively associated with their modeled willingness to participate. When the operator-literacy parameter is above 0.5, agricultural operators are more likely to choose participation in agricultural data utilization.

Strategic behavior also differs when literacy is lower: with the parameter below 0.5, government agencies tend to initiate guidance while agricultural technology enterprises adopt passive strategies. The analysis further finds that low digital literacy weakens the effectiveness of high-subsidy policies, leaving technology enterprises more likely to remain passive and agricultural operating entities more likely not to participate. Within this framework, public support alone does not resolve the participation problem when operators lack the digital literacy represented by the model.

The project entrustment fee provides a third modeled threshold. At a value above 5, the analysis predicts government disengagement, followed by passivity among agricultural technology enterprises and non-participation by agricultural operators. The fee therefore acts as a boundary in the simulated decision dynamics rather than a documented price observed across Chinese projects.

Overall, the study frames the realization of value from agricultural data elements as a three-party strategic process shaped by public support, operator capabilities, enterprise behavior and commercial cost. Because the findings are derived from stability analysis of a tripartite evolutionary game using strategically selected representative factors, they should not be read as direct measurements of policy effects, participation rates or commercial performance in China.

Subject of Research: Modeled strategic conditions for agricultural data-element utilization in China

Article Title: Examining the value realization mechanism of agricultural data elements in China: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Article References: Zheng, Y., Dou, X., Zhai, X., & Gao, X. (2026). Examining the value realization mechanism of agricultural data elements in China: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09412-0

Image Credits: AI Generated

DOI: 10.1057/s41599-026-09412-0

Keywords: agricultural data, evolutionary games, China, digital literacy, government subsidies, agricultural technology firms, agricultural operators, project entrustment fees, participation incentives, Examining, value, realization